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DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW
The various federally assisted "welfare" programs have been
changing so rapidly that it is almost impossible to keep abreast of
significant developments in the field. With that in mind, this section
of the Review was created to provide a summary of the major
changes in the welfare system which occurred in 1973.
Welfare programs lead a chameleon-like existence, changing
to reflect the policies and priorities of each succeeding administra-
tion. In 1973, most of the changes in federally assisted welfare
programs were administrative, as the Nixon Administration con-
tinued to retreat from the beneficence of the Great Society.' There
was little significant legislative activity in the welfare area during
the year, 2 but the Supreme Court continued to play a vital role in
interpreting the Social Security Act3 and in defining the constitu-
tional parameters of the various programs.
4
These developments have affected each of the important wel-
fare programs-Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC),5 Supplemental Security Income (SSI),6 Food Stamps, 7
Medicaid,8 and the Office of Economic Opportunity's (OEO) Legal
Services Program. 9 In addition, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) issued a series of new regulations which
will have a significant impact on the administration of all public
welfare programs.'
I
AFDC
With the establishment of the OEO Legal Services Program"
and the recognition of the welfare recipient's right to challenge the
I See notes 327-558 and accompanying text infra.
2 But see Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 947 [hereinafter cited as Pub.
L. No. 93-233]; Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87
Stat. 221 [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 93-86]; Act ofJuly 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, 87
Stat. 152 [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 93-66].
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396g (1970) [hereinafter cited as "the Act"].
4 See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (note
107 iqfra); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (note 251
infra); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (note 253 infra);
Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (note 300 infra); Legion v.
Weinberger, 94 S. Ct. 564, affg mem. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (note 301 infra); Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 925, affg mem. Yee-Litt v. Richardson,
353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (note 453 infra).
5 See notes 11-143 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 144-80 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 196-269 and accompanying text infra.
8 See notes 270-326 and accompanying text infra.
9 See Note, Legal Services-Past and Present, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 960 (1974).
10 See notes 327-558 and accompanying text infra.
' Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1970).
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validity of state welfare procedures, 2 the volume of litigation in
the field of welfare law has soared.' 3 In 1973, that trend continued,
as evidenced by the vast number of cases involving AFDC, the
largest and most expensive of the categorical assistance programs.'
4
A. Controversies Involving Eligibility Criteria
Most of last year's judicial activity in AFDC involved the
revision and interpretation of various eligibility criteria and cen-
tered on three basic types of eligibility problems: (1) eligibility
based on need, (2) eligibility based on nonneed factors, and (3)
conditions precedent to eligibility.
1. AFDC Eligibility Based Upon Need
The primary factors considered in determining a family unit's
eligibility for AFDC are its available income and financial
resources. 15 Additionally, available income and resources are de-
terminative of the unit's level of assistance. 6 Thus, in this category
of eligibility criteria there are two levels of inquiry: (1) what
constitutes income and resources in the determination of need
(eligibility), and (2) what types of income and resources will be
considered or disregarded in determining the level of assistance?' 7
a. "Available Income and Resources" in the
Determination of Need
(i) Work Expenses. The Social Security Act states that "any
expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of... income" are to
be deducted from the family unit's income and resources prior to a
determination of need. t 8 In determining the allowable deduction,
12 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
Although the state must comply with the mandates of the Social Security Act and HEW does
have sanctions to encourage compliance, it appears that the recipient suit has been employed
more often than administrative action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604, 606 (1970). See also A. LA
FRANCE, M. SCHROEDER, R. BENNETT & W. BOYD, LAW OF THE POOR 254 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as LAW OF THE POOR].
13 LAW OF THE POOR 253-55.
14 See generally Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59
CORNELL L. REv. 825 (1974).
15 See id. at 829.
16 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20, 233.90 (1973).
17 Of course, the two concepts often are inseparable because income and resources for
the determination of need will also be used in computing the level of assistance. However, it
is important to note that there are provisions for some income disregards in determining
benefit levels once a unit is found to be eligible. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(8)(A), (B) (1970); 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(ii) (1973).
18 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970) (emphasis added).
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several states have used a flat-rate work expenses deduction instead
of deducting a family's actual expenses. 19 They have attempted to
justify this procedure by referring to the common use of a state-
wide standard of need, the right of the state to determine the
nature of reasonable work expenses, and the need for faster and
more efficient eligibility-determination procedures. These argu-
ments have been rejected by two courts during the past year. 0 In
both cases, the courts indicated that the state must use the family's
actual income and resources to determine eligibility.2' The use of
the standard work expenses deduction allowed the states to avoid a
careful evaluation of a family's actual financial requirements before
making an eligibility determination and thus violated the intent of
the statute.22 Arguably, the statewide standard of need represents
the state's determination of the general income level at which
AFDC assistance is necessary. However, the question of income and
work expenses covers only the individual family, and therefore, the
desirability of giving* the state broad powers to establish an overall
standard of need is immaterial.13
Several state courts have held that a state may determine what
constitutes reasonable work expenses 24 and that a state-wide stan-
dard deduction may be used in the interest of efficient welfare
administration.25 In light of the 1973 decisions discussed above,
these cases are probably wrongly decided, particularly since the
intent of Congress in enacting the work expenses deduction was to
Income here refers to the income of any "child or relative claiming aid to families
with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home as
such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in
determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid.
Id. § 607(a)(7) (1970); see 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv)(a) (1973).
19 A "flat rate" work expenses deduction is a specific figure which is subtracted from the
family's income if a member of the unit is working. For example, if the mother is employed
and her work expenses (e.g., travel) are $75 per month and the state uses a flat rate
deduction of $35 per month, only $35 will be deducted as work expenses from the unit's
monthly income in determining the level of assistance.
20 Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Graham, 2 CCH Pov.
L. REP. 17,151 (D. Neb. 1973).
21 See cases cited in note 20 supra.
22 See cases cited in note 20 supra.
23 In Shea, the court felt that the language of the statute requiring the state "to take into
consideration" all income and resources currently available to the family unit applied equally
to the work expenses section and therefore mandated that all work expenses be considered.
Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1973). See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
24 See, e.g., Garcia v.Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409, 510 P.2d 1099 (1973); Conover v. Hall, 104
Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1972).
25 In Conover, the court reasoned that if a state could create a maximum grant, it could
also use a standard deduction. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 82.
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provide for a work incentive by taking work expenses 'fully" into
account.26
(ii) Income of a Child Within the Unit. The income of a child in
the family is attributed to the family in determining need unless it
is earned income of a full-time student or a "part-time student who
is not a full-time employee" and who is attending a college, univer-
sity, high school, or vocational school.2 7 Although this pro-
vision appears rather straightforward, at least one state has at-
tempted to use it to reduce the number of people eligible for
AFDC.28 By considering only the child's standard of need and his
available income, Texas eliminated from AFDC many families in
which the child's income exceeded his personal needs but not the
needs of the family unit. 9 In Rodriguez v. Vowell, 3° the Fifth Circuit
struck down this practice on the ground that the state must
consider the needs of the entire family unit. Citing the intent of the?
program to maintain the family unit3 ' and the congressional rec-
ognition of the inseparability of the needs of the child and his
caretaker adult, the court had no difficulty invalidating the
regulations. 32 The importance of maintaining the family unit
through cash grants and services for both child and parent is a
recurring theme in the AFDC program. 33
(iii) Stepfather or Man-in-the-House Income and In-Kind
Income. Since many AFDC mothers remarry or take up residence
with other men, it is not surprising that considerable litigation has
arisen over the methods chosen by the states to deal with the
income of a stepfather or man in the house. The law in this area
was thought to have been clarified by the Supreme Court in King v.
Smith34 and Lewis v. Martin,35 but the states continue to develop
ingenious, albeit unsuccessful, methods of avoiding these decisions
and the HEW regulations implementing them. 36 Before the income
26 S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943) (emphasis added).
27 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A) (i) (1970).
28 TEXAS FINANCIAL SERVICES HANDBOOK §§ 3310(15), (16), cited in Rodriguez v. Vowell,
472 F.2d 622, 623 n.1 (5th Cir. 1973).
29 Id. For example, a family unit consisting of a child and his mother would have had a
standard of need of $134 per month, $85 of which would have represented the child's
standard of need. If the child earned $100 per month, the unit would have been ineligible
under Texas's scheme because the child's income exceeded his standard of need.
30 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973).
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
32 472 F.2d at 624-26.
33 See note 70 infra.
34 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
35 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
36 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973).
864 [Vol. 59:859
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of a stepfather or man in the house may be attributed to the AFDC
unit, the state must show actual contribution or, in the instance of a
stepfather, a general obligation to support the stepchild under state
law. 37 Some states simply choose to attribute the income of the
stepfather or man in the house to the AFDC unit,38 while others
have attempted to deny eligibility when the mother remarries.39
Still others have attempted to make "in-kind" income deductions
based upon the presumption that the stepfather or man in the
house assumes some of the cost of living in the family residence.4 °
It is quite apparent in the man-in-the-house situation that the
state's concern is more often moralistic than economic.
4
'
The cases decided during the last year continue to follow the
reasoning of Lewis and King in striking down such provisions.42
Although HEW has proposed a new regulation which would no
longer require that income be available to the family unit on a
regular basis before it is considered part of the family's budget, the
effect of the regulation on the stepfather or man-in-the-house
situation remains unclear.43
(iv) Resources. The current HEW regulations covering a fam-
37 Id. Essentially, the stepfather or man in the house is treated like a natural or adoptive
parent for purposes of determining his duty to support the child. Id.; see Lewis v. Martin,
397 U.S. 552 (1970).
's See, e.g., 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31 (1970). This regulation was declared invalid in
Slochowsky v. Lavine, 73 Misc. 2d 563, 342 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1973), and In re
Uhrovick, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 18,054 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973). In Boucher v. Minter, 349 F.
Supp. 240 (D. Mass. 1972), the court implied that if a mother remarries, the state cannot
presume that the stepfather contributes to the children in the absence of a support
obligation of general applicability. The mother's need, however, can be eliminated from the
family unit's budget because the stepfather-husband does have a general obligation to
support his wife. Id.
39 See, e.g., Donaldson v. Schmidt, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,126 (W.D. Wis. 1973)
(invalidating Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19(4)(d) (1957)); see Lopez v. Vowell, 471 F.2d 690 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973) (invalidating TEXAS FINANCIAL SERVICES HANDBOOK
§§ 3411 & 3454); cf. Bezio v. Neville, 305 A.2d 665 (N.H. 1973).
" See, e.g., Foster v. Minnesota, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 17,378 (1973); see Waits v.
Carleson, 31 Cal. App. 3d 201, 107 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1973). See also Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F.
Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
41 LAW OF THE POOR 302.
42 Income is attributed to a unit only if its receipt is reasonably predictable. Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). In addition, the state cannot attempt to punish a mother for
living with a man out of wedlock by terminating assistance to the entire family. King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
43 Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(i), (ii)(a)-(c); 233.90(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 18,254
(1973). The proposed change would strike the words "only such income as is available on a
regular basis will be considered." Id. The present and newly proposed regulations recognize
that the income of a man in the house or stepfather, who is under no general obligation to
support the chidren, cannot be imputed to the children. This change seems to have only a
marginal effect on the man-in-the-house situation.
1974]
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ily unit's resources allow each state considerable discretion in estab-
lishing guidelines for determining the amount and type of prop-
erty which must be included in an inventory of the recipient's
resources." However, in Green v. Barnes,45 the Tenth Circuit held
that a state may consider only an applicant's equity in a home as an
available resource. The holding was based on the language of the
regulation which states that "only currently available resources will
be considered. '46 Thus, while the state is given some discretion in
determining what property may be retained, it is still subject to
restrictions in the valuation of that property. 47
In July 1973, the acting Secretary of HEW proposed a
modification of the above regulation. 48 The proposed regulation
would raise the maximum limit for retained resources of the family
unit, limit the value of any automobile owned by the unit, and
delineate methods of valuation of real property. 49 In addition, the
proposed regulation would redefine available resources to include
a legal interest in community property or a trust.50 These regula-
tions have not yet been adopted.
b. Income and Resources and the Level of Assistance: Income from
Other Public Assistance Programs.5 1 A recent study by the Joint
Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy revealed that
between 60 percent and 75 percent of households on assistance
44 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1973). These regulations require only that the states
specify the kind and dollar amounts of resources which may be retained to meet the family's
"current and future needs while assistance is received on a continuing basis." Id. However,
many states have limits much lower than those allowed by the Department. LAW oF THE POOR
304.
45 485 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1973).
46 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973). There have been similar decisions in New
Mexico when the recipient owned a car or truck the value of which was less than the amount
of the purchase price still outstanding. Benally v. Hein, 84 N.M. 131, 500 P.2d 416 (1972);
Trujillo v. Health & Social Servs. Dep't, 84 N.M. 58, 499 P.2d 376 (1972).
47 The state is not required to consider the value of the home in computing a family
unit's resources. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973).
4, Proposed HEW Reg. § 233.20(a)(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 18,254 (1973).
49 Id. § 233.20(a)(3)(i)(b).
5' Id. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c).
51 Although the cases discussed above dealt with income in relation to the determina-
tion of eligibility, many are also in point on the issue of the level of assistance to be paid.
Thus, the stepfather and man-in-the-house cases often talk of the use of "in-kind income"
and of a state policy of reducing the level of assistance as a result of such income. See notes
34-43 and accompanying text supra. Of course, this result is only logical since much of the
income considered in determining eligibility is also examined in determining a unit's level of
assistance, and the addition of another person to the household may occur prior to or
during eligibility. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7), (8) (1970).
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receive assistance from more than one program. 52 This finding is
not surprising given the broad range of assistance programs that
are not based on need.53
An intermediate California court has held that a workmen's
compensation award is subject to recoupment when a family unit
becomes eligible for AFDC as a result of an injury for which the
workmen's compensation payment is received.54 Recently, another
California court upheld a state regulation 55 which allowed a reduc-
tion in an AFDC unit's housing grant when (1) the AFDC family
shared housing with an individual receiving assistance from
another categorical program and (2) the family's housing grant
exceeded its pro rata share of the actual housing costs. 56 This last
holding seems doubtful in light of the stepfather cases,57 for as in
those cases, an income contribution was assumed to have been
made to the family unit even though there had been no showing of
actual income availability. It should be noted that in both cases the
plaintiffs were natural mothers receiving Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled (APTD) whose children were AFDC
beneficiaries. 58 They were thus obligated to support their children,
and their income was therefore attributable to the family unit.
Although benefits received from another assistance program
would appear to be includible as income for eligibility and level of
assistance purposes, legislation pending in the 93d Congress pro-
vides that cost of living increases in Social Security payments be
disregarded in computing income.59
52 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
How PUBLIC WELFARE BENEFITS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN Low INCOME AREAS 2-3 (Comm. Print
1973).
53 Id. at 65. While the income generated by these overlapping programs is also
considered in determining eligibility for AFDC, it generally is not substantial enough to
render the unit ineligible and therefore has been placed in this section. See Rodriguez v.
Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973).
54 Ogdon v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 105 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1973).
55 CALIFORNIA ELIGIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE STANDARDS § 44-115.8 (1973), cited in
Cooper v. Carleson, 31 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 n.1 (1973).
56 Cooper v. Carleson, 31 Cal. App. 3d 546, 107 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1973).
57 See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
58 The court was careful to point out that shared expenses provided in-kind income to
the AFDC unit, and as such, they were not precluded from consideration by the federal
statute or regulations. Cooper v. Carleson, 31 Cal. App. 3d 546, 553, 107 Cal. Rptr. 502, 508
(1973); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 233(a)(3)(ii), (a)(4)(i) (1973). The court
also relied on Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), in dismissing the argument that the
state was in effect lowering the standard of need. The state's action was seen as reasonable
and within its discretion. The provision was directed at the level of assistance and not at the
question of eligibility. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 551-53, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 506-08.
59 H.R. 475, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
2. Nonneed Factors of Eligibility
Questions involving the nonneed factors of eligibility center
on the statutory definition of eligible individuals. 60 Within the
past year, the focus of administrative, legislative, and judicial activ-
ity has been upon four problems: (1) the right of unborn children
to AFDC, (2) what constitutes "continued absence from the home,"
(3) AFDC for school children, and (4) AFDC for aliens.
a. AFDC and Unborn Children. The Social Security Act's
definition of "child" makes no reference to unborn children;6 1
consequently, it is not clear whether they are eligible individuals
within the meaning of the Act. Since unborn children are not
specifically excluded by the Act, it can be argued that the state must
provide them with AFDC. Conversely, since the state's exclusion of
unborn children is not specifically precluded by the Act, it can be
argued that the state need not grant them AFDC. This question of
statutory construction raises the most difficult current issue in
determining who are "eligible individuals."
The Supreme Court in Townsend v. Swank62 held that a state
may not exclude a group eligible for AFDC under the federal
standards without a clear showing of congressional authorization or
intent to allow the state to make such an exclusion.6 3 However, two
other Supreme Court decisions, Wyman v. James64 and Jefferson v.
60 42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970).
61 Id. At present only 19 states have provisions for unborn children. See Parks v.
Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 622 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
62 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
63 In Townsend, Illinois had attempted to exclude from eligibility children who had
reached the age of 18 and who had enrolled in junior college. Id. at 284 n.2. The Court
invalidated the Illinois provisions on supremacy grounds, arguing that they deprived
benefits to those who were eligible according to the specific terms of the federal statute. 42
U.S.C. § 606(a)(2) (1970). The Court said:
King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization
for the exclusion [from eligibility] clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or
its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for
assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is
therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
404 U.S. at 286; see Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
The Townsend rationale raises an interesting burden of proof problem. It would seem
that the AFDC litigant must show through a reasonable interpretation of the Social Security
Act and an analysis of the various congressional reports on the Act that Congress intended
to extend coverage to unborn children. The state would then have to come forward and
negate that showing of legislative intent by pointing out an explicit intent on the part of
Congress to exclude unborn children.
64 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, the Court approved a "home visit" condition for
eligibility even though it was not authorized by statute or regulation. Id. at 319-20; see LAw
OF THE POOR 288.
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Hackney,65 raise some doubt as to the full effect of Townsend and
have been utilized by some lower courts to allow states to employ
eligibility criteria not specifically allowed by the federal standards.
66
Essentially, the Court in Townsend indicated that a state cannot
restrict the eligible AFDC population unless such a restriction was
authorized by the Social Security Act.67 But in Wyman, and more
particularly in Jefferson, the Court seemed to say that a state can
impose additional eligibility criteria so long as these criteria are not
specifically prohibited by the Act, are consistent with the goals of
the program, and are rationally related to the efficient administra-
tion of a state's welfare program.6 8 Significantly, neither Wyman
nor Jefferson purported to overrule Townsend.6 9
The Townsend-Jefferson dichotomy is reflected in the unborn
child decisions. Using the Townsend approach, some courts have
held that a state AFDC program must provide coverage for unborn
children. 0 These courts have consistently found that the legislative
history of AFDC reveals no congressional desire to allow states to
exclude unborn children and that the intent of the AFDC program
demands inclusion of unborn children in the family unit. In
addition, the courts have held that the HEW regulation 7 1 which
65 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In Jefferson, the Court approved a ratable reduction which
effectively denied AFDC to many family units eligible under the standard of need of the
state but with incomes in excess of the level of assistance after the state's ratable reduction.
Id. at 540; see notes 111-18 and accompanying text infra.
66 See notes 111-18 and accompanying text infra.
67 See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
68 See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
315, 319-20 (1971).
69 In Jefferson, the Court concluded that § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, a
cost-of-living increase provision for AFDC, did not mandate an increase in the eligible AFDC
population; the section was designed to reveal the discrepancy between the level of payments
made by the state and actual need and "to prod the States to apportion their payments on a
more equitable basis." 406 U.S. at 542. Thus, the ratable reduction was not to be considered
in determining eligibility but only in assessing the amount to be paid. "[Ajnd by using a
percentage-reduction system it has attempted to apportion the State's limited benefits more
equitably." Id. at 543. Townsend involved an attempt by the state to interject an additional
nonneed factor into the eligibility determination process. 404 U.S. 270. Thus, the two cases
are not inconsistent sinceJefferson focuses on the state's management of its welfare finances
and says nothing about attempts to reduce the welfare population, the issue addressed by
Townsend. The problem arises, however, because many courts have applied the language of
Jefferson to situations involving an evaluation of additional nonneed criteria. See notes 70-77
& 101-18 and accompanying text infra; LAW OF THE POOR 290.
70 See Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F.
Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973); Alcada v. Bums, 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ia. 1973); Wilson v.
Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
71 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1973).
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allows a state to extend AFDC benefits to an unborn child as
merely an optional program is invalid under the Social Security
Act.72
Yet one court has denied AFDC to unborn children on the
following grounds: (1) the legislative intent of Congress is
unclear; 73 (2) the statute reveals no specific coverage for unborn
children;74 (3) HEW's interpretation of the statute should be given
substantial weight; 75 and (4) since the statute and its legislative
history do not mandate eligibility for an unborn child, the state
may, under the reasoning of Jefferson, exclude the group at its
option in the interest of reducing welfare costs. 76
The courts that have adopted the reasoning of Townsend have
searched for congressional authorization for the exclusion of un-
born children, while the court relying on Jefferson emphasized the
absence of a specific grant of eligibility. Thus, each faction has
concluded that in the absence of a specific prohibition or provision
the result reached was mandated by a Supreme Court decision.77
b. Continued Absence of the Parent. The Social Security Act
and the relevant HEW regulation state that a needy child is one
"who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of
72 Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), is the most recent of the district
court cases. In his opinion in Doe, Judge Merhige reviewed the litigation on the subject
during the past year and concluded that under Townsend the burden of proof is on the state
to show that Congress intended to allow the states to vary eligibility requirements. Id. at 827;
see note 63 supra. See also Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973). In Wilson, the
district court discussed a recent unsuccessful attempt by the 92d Congress to bar unborn
children from eligibility for AFDC benefits. The court reasoned that Congress's attempts to
exclude unborn children from the program showed that they were eligible under existing
law. Id. at 1154-55.
73 Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 625 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The cases also disagree as to
the effect to be given to definitions of "child" in other federal programs and different areas
of the law. Id. at 623-24. Compare Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
74 Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 625 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
75 Id. at 623.
76 Id. at 625-26. A recent California case held that an unborn child is eligible for AFDC,
but the court indicated that the state may deduct from the grant to the "Family Budget Unit"
the value of the unborn child's in-kind income received in the form of housing and
nourishment supplied by the physical contribution of the mother during pregnancy.
California Welfare Rights Org. v. Brian, 31 Cal. App. 3d 265, 107 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1973). The
court reviewed the holding of Jefferson and concluded that if a state can determine how its
limited resources are to be distributed among various categorical programs, as was the case
in Jefferson, such discretion is "sufficiently broad to permit differential treatment of the born
and the unborn" absent a specific prohibition by the Constitution or the Social Security Act.
Id. at 279, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The court further held that under Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), the state's practice did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
77 This problem will again arise in connection with preconditions to eligibility. See notes
100-28 and accompanying text infra.
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the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental
incapacity of a parent, and who is living with" a relative. 8
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Carleson v. Remillard79 upheld a
California district court's decision to invalidate a California regula-
tion that denied AFDC to family units in which the parent was
absent from the home as a result of military service. The Court,
following the reasoning of Townsend, held that since there was no
specific federal provision allowing the exclusion of servicemen's
families, they must be considered "eligible individuals." 80 "[I]t was
not stated or implied that eligibility by virtue of a parent's 'con-
tinued absence' was limited to cases of divorce or desertion."''8 In
June of 1973, the Acting Secretary of HEW proposed hew regula-
tions to bring the Department's guidelines into compliance with
Carleson.82
Within the past year, several federal district courts have relied
on the reasoning of Carleson and the applicable federal regulations
to hold that a state cannot premise continued absence solely upon
proof of absence for a period of at least six months,8 3 or a sentence
of imprisonment.84
c. AFDC and School Children. In 1956, Congress amended the
Social Security Act to include all children between the ages of
sixteen and eighteen in the AFDC program. 85 In Virginia, how-
7s 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1973). The regulations further
define continued absence as:
Such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's functioning as a provider...
and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the
parent's performance of his function[s] ... If these conditions exist, the parent may
be absent for any reason, and he may have left only recently or some time
previously.
45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(iii) (1973).
79 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
80 Id. at 600-05.
81 Id. at 602.
82 Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 233.90(b)(5), 233.90(c)(1)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 14,693 (1973).
83 Carter v. Stanton, 350 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Ind. 1972), citing IND. ADMIN. RULES AND
REGS. (52-1001)-2 (Burns 1967).
84 Majchszak v. Schmidt, 358 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Wis. 1973). An interesting California
decision, Hypolite v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 979, 108 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1973), invalidated a
California regulation that denied benefits to a child who did not live with his parents. The
state regulation stated that the parent was not absent from the home and that therefore the
child was not eligible. Id. at 983, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 754, citing CALIFORNIA ELIGIBILITY AND
ASSISTANCE STANDARDS § 411-450.12. The court held that the reference point for "continued
absence" was the child's home and not that of the parent. Id.
85 Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-800, tit. III, pt. III, § 322, 70 Stat. 850 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970)). The Social Security Act of 1935 provided for aid to children
only up to the age of 16. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 406, 49 Stat. 629. In
1939, Congress added a provision giving the states the option of covering children in school
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ever, the state made AFDC benefits available only to school chil-
dren within this age group. 86 Although the Virginia procedure
directly contravened the 1956 amendments, it remained in effect
until a district court struck it down in 1972.87
Congress now has extended AFDC eligibility to school children
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one attending high
school, vocational school, or a college or university.8 A recent case
has held, however, that it was the intent of Congress to make this
extension of eligibility optional for the states.8 9 Therefore, a state
may choose to exclude all children over the age of eighteen without
violating the Social Security Act.90 It would appear that the lan-
guage in Townsend permits such a conclusion. 91
d. AFDC and Aliens. In 1971, the Supreme Court in Graham
v. Richardson92 invalidated an Arizona welfare statute which re-
quired a longer period of residence for aliens than for citizens in
order to qualify for categorical assistance 93 and a Pennsylvania
statute which denied general assistance to all aliens. 94 In June 1972,
between the ages of 16 and 17. Act of Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, tit. IV, § 403, 53 Stat. 1380.
The 1956 amendments eliminated the school option and extended mandatory eligibility to
all children under the age of 18. Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, tit. III, §§ 321, 322, 70 Stat.
850.
86 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105(a) (1973).
87 Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972) (invalidating VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-105(a) (1973)). Lawson serves as an example of how slow a state may be in comply-
ing with federal standards; Virginia was withholding eligibility for AFDC from a group of
persons to whom Congress had extended eligibility 12 years earlier. The case also illustrates
the inadequacies of the federal monitoring system and the reluctance of HEW to use its
influence in assuring compliance with federal law.
88 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
89 Donaldson v. Schmidt, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17, 126 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
90 Id. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1970).
91 Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 270, 287-91 (1971). In Townsend, the Court pointed
out that § 406(a)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2)(B) (1970)) was
actually the latest in a series of amendments to the Act extending AFDC benefits to older
children. The history of these amendments, said the Court,
does show that whenever Congress extended AFDC eligibility to older children
-from those under 16 to those 16-17, and finally to those 18-20-Congress left to
the individual States the decision whether to participate in the program for the new
age group.
Id. at 287-88.
Of course, once a state decides to expand its program to cover a new age group, it
cannot, consistently with the statute, discriminate among members of the group (e.g.,
between those attending college and those attending vocational school), providing aid to
some eligible persons and not to others. Id. at 288. In Townsend, Illinois had unsuccessfully
attempted to discriminate in this fashion. See note 63 supra.
92 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
93 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-233,-252(2),-272(4) (1956). These sections relate to Aid
to the Totally and Permanently Disabled, Old Age Assistance, and Aid to the Blind.
94 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 433(2) (1968). This restriction solely concerned
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HEW proposed new regulations to implement the Graham
decision. 95 The proposed regulations were altered in June 197396
and, as of this writing, have not been adopted. 97 The newly
proposed regulations merely restrict AFDC eligibility to lawfully
admitted aliens. 98 Recently proposed legislation would add this
distinction to the Social Security Act.99
3. Conditions Precedent to Eligibility
While the need and nonneed factors of eligibility define the
eligible population, the conditions precedent to eligibility focus on
behavior control of the individual recipient using the carrot of
welfare and the stick of its denial. In 1973, there was significant
legislative and judicial activity with regard to two types of condi-
tions precedent-state supplemental work programs"' and en-
forcement of an absent parent's support obligation.
a. State Supplemental Work Programs. When the Congress
enacted the Work Incentive (WIN) Program in 1967,101 several of
the states already had work requirement programs for AFDC
recipients.' 0 2 Since that time twenty-two states have adopted some
form of supplemental work program. 113 Early lower court cases
held that such supplemental programs were preempted by the
Pennsylvania's own general assistance program which is run without federal matching funds
or federal guidelines.
95 Proposed HEW Reg. § 233.50, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,977 (1972).
91 Proposed HEW Reg. § 233.50, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,910-11 (1973).
97 The new proposed regulations attempt to give recognition to the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Graham that while the fourteenth amendment does protect aliens, the
federal government has an additional constitutional interest in controlling alien affairs, and
state welfare regulations denying assistance to lawfully admitted aliens violate that interest.
See id.; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
98 Proposed HEW Reg. § 233.50, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,977 (1972).
99 H.R. 2597, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
100 As a condition precedent to eligibility for the WIN program, all applicants "shall
register for manpower services, training and employment." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A) (1970);
45 C.F.R. § 233.11(a) (1973). There are exceptions to this registration requirement, however.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19)(A)(i)-(vi) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.11(a)(1)-(6) (1973). Many states
have supplemental work programs which include AFDC recipients not affected by WIN.
101 Act. of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. II, § 204, 81 Stat. 884-89 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A) (1970)). See Lurie, supra note 14, at 833.
102 See New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414 (1973).
103 Id. at 412. Generally, the state programs are similar to New York's. "Employable
recipients," as defined by state social services laws and regulations, are required to file job
certificates with the local agency prior to receipt of their welfare check. The job certificates
are issued by the state employment office; they certify that the recipient has not turned
down a bona fide job referral or offer without good cause. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW
§§ 385.1, 385.7 (McKinney Supp. 1973). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 11-200
(Smith-Hurd 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.19(6) (1957).
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WIN program.' 0 4 The cases generally adhered to the rationale of
Townsend v. Swank' 05 and held that without an express authoriza-
tion for an additional state work program in the Social Security
Act, the state could not restrict the otherwise eligible population
under the federal statute.11 6
In 1973, the Supreme Court put an end to this line of
reasoning in New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino. 10 7
The Court termed the AFDC program one of "cooperative
federalism,"' 018 under which the states had the authority to pro-
mote the efficient administration of the program.0 9 Absent a clear
expression of congressional intent to preempt the work require-
ment field through the WIN program, the states could seek to curb
the rising costs of welfare through supplemental work programs." 0
Analyzing the WIN program and its legislative history, the Court
found no clear expression of federal preemption.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall"' pointed out that once
again the court had ignored its "fundamental rule for interpreting
the Social Security Act"' "1 2 as set forth in Townsend v. Swank." 3
Townsend required a specific authorization in the Social Security Act
for any additional state restrictions of eligibility under the Act."14
If Townsend were strictly followed, then in the absence of such
an authorization a recipient eligible under the federal AFDC cri-
teria could not be denied benefits because of state-imposed
requirements. 1 5 Focusing on the purpose and provisions of the
I04 Bueno v. Juras, 349 F. Supp. 91 (D. Ore. 1972); Jeffries v. Sugarman, 345 F. Supp.
172 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 481 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1973); Woolfolk v. Brown, 456 F.2d 652
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); see LAW OF THE POOR 366.
105 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
1"6 See note 104 supra.
.. 7 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
108 Id. at 413.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 414. There seems to be considerable disagreement over the effectiveness of the
WIN program and New York's supplemental program. See U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 24, 1973, at 66-69; N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 6. See also STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT
ON THE POOR 50-56 (Comm. Print 1972). In addition to its supplemental work program, New
York has been engaged in an experimental work program in some of its welfare districts
which has also been the subject of litigation during the past year. Aguayo v. Richardson, 473
F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.), application for stay denied, 410 U.S. 921 (1973).
I Mr. Justice Brennan joined Mr. Justice Marshall in dissent. 413 U.S. at 423.
112 Id.
113 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
II4 Id. at 286.
115 413 U.S. at 423-24.
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WIN program, the dissent concluded that additional state work
requirements would undercut the basic policy of AFDC
-maintaining the family unit while fostering economic stability.'
1 6
The dissent did concede that states have some "latitude" in the
adjustment of benefits through the establishment of the standard
of need and the level of benefits to be paid." 7 However, these two
areas are not related to "eligibility" and must be 'in the control of
the state as long as AFDC remains a state-federal program."'
Dublino appears to open the door to further supplemental
conditions on eligibility enacted by the states in the name of the
efficient management of the welfare system.
b. Enforcement of an Absent Parent's Support Obligation. Since
an eligible AFDC family unit is by definition one in which one of
the parents is continually absent from the home,1 9 it is not surpris-
ing that the federal statute and accompanying regulations deal with
the problem of obtaining support -from the absent parent. 20 Many
AFDC units include illegitimate children, a fact which only com-
pounds the need to identify the absent parent.
12
Frequently, the state will attempt to precondition AFDC eligi-
bility on the disclosure of the whereabouts or the identity of the
absent parent. However, these disclosure requirements have been
continually rejected by the courts on the grounds that the Social
Security Act "contains no explicit requirement that mothers divulge
the name of or institute a support action against a child's father as
a condition of [AFDC] eligibility."' 22 Although there has been no
116 Id. at 428.
117 Id. at 432.
118 Dublino provides an interesting addendum to the earlier discussion of the Townsend-
Jefferson dichotomized analysis of the Social Security Act. See notes 63-69 and accompanying
text supra. In Jefferson, the Court rejected the argument that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970)
placed benefit levels within the group of criteria which could not be altered by the states. 406
U.S. at 541. In Dublino, it appears that the Court felt the work program was an analogous
situation. However, as Mr. Justice Marshall emphasized, the question is not how much is to be
paid, but rather, who is to be paid. See 413 U.S. at 424-32. Although the Court in Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), did allow "home visits" as a state-imposed condition precedent
to eligibility, thus lending support to the majority in Dublino, Mr. Justice Marshall correctly
pointed out that Wyman was not decided on statutory grounds but on the issue of the
constitutionality of the visit under the fourth amendment. 413 U.S. at 424-25 n.3.
119 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
120 Id. § 602(a)(17)(ii) (Supp. II, 1972) (known as NOLEO provision); 45 C.F.R.
§ 235.70 (1973).
121 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(i) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 235.70 (1973).
122 LAW OF THE POOR 342 n.20. A recent case in a federal district court in California
held that implicit threats by welfare investigators, written on the stationery of the local
district attorney and stating that failure to cooperate with the investigator in determining the
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definitive ruling by the Supreme Court in this area, a case involving
this problem is pending before the Court. 123
During 1973, there has been a significant amount of adminis-
trative action in response to several lower court cases. HEW has
proposed several new regulations that would allow the states to
condition the eligibility of the parent on her cooperation in naming
the absent parent 124 and create a state agency with federal subsidi-
zation which would assist local welfare agencies and the local law
enforcement agencies in finding the absent parent by using its own
facilities and the records of the Internal Revenue Service. 1 25
While HEW has been active in this area during the past year,
there has been some activity in Congress as well. One bill now
pending before the 93d Congress would amend the Social Security
Act so as to obligate the caretaker adult to disclose the identity and
whereabouts of the absent parent. 2 6 Willful failure to disclose
whereabouts of the absent father could result in termination of assistance, violated the Social
Security Act. Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
123 Doe v. Burns, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S.
Sept. 4, 1973) (No. 406). The Court has, however, affirmed without opinion decisions
striking down such eligibility rules. See, e.g., Meyer v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), affd
mem., 404 U.S. 803 (1971). Summary affirmances have little precedential value, however.
H'urley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
124 Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 233.90(b)(4)(i), (ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 10,940 (1973). HEW's
decision to allow states to precondition the parent's eligibility on cooperation with the local
agency seems to be a response to the Supreme Court's remand of a New York case which
had invalidated a New York statute creating a similar precondition to eligibility. Lavine v.
Shirley, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972); see 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 366 (1972). See also N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 101-a (McKinney Supp. 1973); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 369.2(f)(3)(ii)(e)(3), (4) (1970). It is
not clear that the Court's remand of the Lavine case can be interpreted as an acquiesence to
the New York practice. In 1972, the state amended § 101a of the Social Services Law by
adding a provision that any portions of the above noted statute that are inconsistent with a
federal statute or regulation are inoperative. Ch. 687, § 4 [1972] N.Y. Laws 2996; see Lewis v.
Lavine, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 16,547 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In light of the above amendment, it appears that the Court's purpose in remanding was
simply to allow a more specific enunciation of the points of inconsistency. A similar result
was reached in Dublino. See 413 U.S. at 422. On remand, the district court invalidated § 101a
of the New York Social Services Law on the grounds that, notwithstanding the above noted
HEW regulation change, the New York statute contravened a long line of cases interpreting
the NOLEO provision of the Social Security Act. Shirley v. Lavine, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
18,028 '(N.D.N.Y. 1973).
125 Proposed HEW Reg. § 235.75, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,530 (1973).
126 S. 1842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The proposed legislation is entitled The
Federal Child Support Security Act of 1971. A similar bill was introduced in the 92d
Congress. S. 2669, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). In addition to amending the Social Security
Act sections on AFDC, the bill also has a number of other interesting features. It provides
that any court-ordered support payments made from the federal treasury to the child will be
considered loans to the parent, payable to the federal government with interest of 8% per
annum. S. 1842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2025(a) (1973). Monies received by the federal
government under this arrangement are then to be placed in a "revolving fund" to be used
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would make the caretaker adult ineligible for assistance and would
subject him or her to a fine or imprisonment.2 7 In addition, the
proposed legislation would give the federal government a lien
against the property of the absent parent for any money paid out
by the federal government for child support.1
2 8
B. AFDC-UF
AFDC-UF (unemployed father) is not a mandatory
program. 2 9 However, twenty-four states had adopted the program
by mid-1973.' 30 The most significant activity in AFDC-UF during
1973 centered around the definition of "unemployment."' 3' Previ-
ously, the definition of "unemployment" used by HEW was at-
tacked unsuccessfully on constitutional grounds.1' 2  However, the
for future loans to needy parents, thereby relieving the burden on the general taxpayer. Id.
§§ 2020(a), (b). Of course, the federal government would have to make the initial contribu-
tion to the fund. Id. § 2020(c).
Finally, the bill provides that the Attorney General will have access to government
records to enable him to locate the parent. Id. § 2030(c).
127 The maximum penalty under the bill is a $1,000 fine and/or one year in prison. S
1842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2031(b) (1973). The bill's sponsor, Senator Bellmon, asserts that
many welfare mothers support the bill. See 119 CONG. REC. 9286-92 (daily ed. May 17, 1973)
(remarks of Senator Bellmon). One state has a similar statute which imposes criminal or civil
penalties upon the mother of an illegitimate child who refuses to assist in the prosecution of
the child's father for support. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-440(b), 52-442(a) (1960). The
Connecticut statute was recently upheld on the grounds that it dealt with the mothers of
illegitimate children generally and was not specifically restricted to AFDC mothers, thus
avoiding a supremacy clause argument. See Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973).
2I S. 1842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2025(c)(1), (2) (1973); see note 126 supra. Several
states have similar provisions which may even reach property held by the caretaker adult and
the absent parent as joint tenants. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 360 (McKinney Supp.
1973). One court has held that such liens can be discharged in bankruptcy. In re Williams, 2
CCH Pov. L. REP. 16,960 (W.D. Wash. 1973).
29 See Lurie, supra note 14, at 828. AFDC-UF provides cost grants and in-kind services to
family units when the dependency of the child is based on the father's unemployment. The
father must register for the WIN program, and the state must attempt to provide vocational
training to the father to return him to the workforce as quickly as possible. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 607(a) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.100(a)(1)(i), (ii) (1973).
130 See Lurie, supra note 14, at 829. One state, Maine, recently terminated its AFDC-UF
program, and its action withstood a court challenge. The court held that the state could
terminate benefits to one group, unemployed fathers, if its decision had a reasonable
relation to the economic regulations of the welfare system and if the state attempted to
lessen the hardship created by its action by simultaneously increasing unemployment
benefits. United Low Income, Inc. v. Fisher, 470 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1972); see LAW OF THE
POOR 356-57.
131 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970) gives the Secretary of HEW the power to determine what
constitutes "unemployment." A recent case has reaffirmed the Secretary's broad discretion-
ary power in this area. Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.), affd, 409 U.S. 904
(1972).
I See LAW OF THE POOR 357-58.
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current controversy stems from an HEW proposal that might allow
strikers to receive AFDC-UF benefits. The Department has issued
two proposed regulations, both of which retain the 100 hours of
work. per month qualification.1 33 But one of these regulations
would allow the state to impose additional restrictions (enabling the
state to make strikers ineligible), while the other would make the
federal definition exclusive of any additional criteria. Should the
Department choose to adopt the latter, it is unclear how the states
will view continued participation in the AFDC-UF program.
C. State Funding Schemes for AFDC
Although the AFDC program is primarily a cooperative ven-
ture between the states and the federal government, HEW regula-
tions allow the states to delegate the administrative responsibilities
of the program to local governments. 34 Moreover, these local
governments may also be required to provide a portion of the
program's necessary funding. 35 As a result, urban welfare agen-
cies, to which this responsibility has been delegated, faced with a
declining tax base, angry taxpayers, and increased welfare rolls,
have attempted to reduce both the level of benefits paid and the
number of recipients eligible for assistance. 36
In 1973, New York City and certain of its officials participated
in an interesting and potentially significant suit challenging the
funding structure of AFDC and other categorical programs. The
plaintiffs in City of New York v. Richardson137 alleged that the general
welfare clause of article I of the United States Constitution re-
quired that the federal government bear the entire cost of all
categorical programs 38 and, in the alternative, that the payment of
'33 Proposed HEW Reg. § 233.100(a)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 49,3200 (1973). Although HEW
placed a March 5, 1973, deadline on all comments from the public, the Department has not
yet decided which proposal to adopt.
134 45 C.F.R. § 205.100(a)(1) (1973). In New York, the local agencies are organized on a
county level. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 61 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
5 HEW regulations mandate that the state pay at least 40% of the nonfederal share.
The state has two federal funding formulas from which to choose. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(3),
1396b (1970). For a description of the two funding formulas, see 1. Lurie, Legislative,
Administrative & Judicial Changes in the AFDC Program 1967-71, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.,
93D CONG., IST SESS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE 92 (Comm. Print 1973). At least 16 states
fund their programs solely from state funds. City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923,
927 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1973).
1'36 See notes 51-59 and accompanying text supra.
137 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973).
131 Id. at 928. The plaintiffs argued that because the Social Security Act had been
enacted pursuant to the general welfare dause (U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8) the federal
government was obliged to assume the full burden of the cost of the assistance programs,
which were a federal concern. 473 F.2d at 928.
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New York City's contribution to the programs from local property
tax revenues violated the rights of city taxpayers under the equal
protection clause. Although the Second Circuit dismissed the plain-
tiffs' welfare clause claim, it ordered that a three-judge court be
empaneled to determine whether New York City taxpayers had
been denied equal protection of the laws. 139 While expressly limit-
ing its holding to a decision convening a three-judge court, the
court hinted that the state would have difficulty finding a rational*
basis for a system which forced New York City to provide benefits
for seventy-four percent of the state's welfare recipients when the
city embraced only forty-five percent of the state's population .
40
It is important to note that the Second Circuit's decision in
Richardson preceded the recent Supreme Court ruling in San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 141 Although Rodriguez
involved the inequality in financial assistance for education, the
Court's opinion recognizes the desirability of local administrative
and financial control of local governmental services. 4 2 In addition,
theJefferSon holding supports a local control argument. 43 Pending
a decision by the three-judge court and a potential direct appeal to
the Supreme Court, state welfare schemes using local agencies and
local property taxes for some of the nonfederal portion of the
grant will undoubtedly continue.
D. Conclusion
During the past year the AFDC program has undergone
several significant changes. Confronted with skyrocketing costs and
swelling welfare rolls, state agencies have attempted to diminish the
eligible population through their interpretations of the nonneed
factors of AFDC eligibility-continued absence of the parent, un-
born children, AFDC for school children, and AFDC for aliens
-and by the creation of additional preconditions to eligibility,
including "find-the-father" and work requirements. In addition,
139 473 F.2d at 933.
140 The state did not offer an explanation of the rationale underlying the existing
system, perhaps in the belief that the court would reject all of the plaintiffs claims and never
reach the three-judge court issue. Id. at 931-32.
141 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
142 See generally id.
143 See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The court in Richardson remarked
that "[g]overnmental efficiency has never been thought to legitimize unconstitutional dis-
crimination." 473 F.2d at 932. The court relied on the district court opinion in Rodriguez and
lower court cases to sustain its holding that a constitutional issue existed. Id. at 932-33 n.10.
With the reversal of Rodriguez by the Supreme Court, the dictum in Richardson as to who
would prevail on the constitutional issue is questionable. See id. at 932.
1974]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the states have attempted to reduce the level of payments through
imputed income provisions, standardized deductions and broad
interpretations of available resources.
All of this activity is set in a context of confusion. The AFDC
program encompasses billions of dollars and millions of people.
Fifty separate state agencies formulate regulations, and federal and
state courts issue opinions on their validity. The breadth of the
program is simply awesome.
However, one clear line of development emerged in 1973. It
appears that the Supreme Court and HEW are moving toward a
position in which the states will exert more influence on eligibility
decisions than they have in the past. The strength of Townsend was
severely tested during 1973, and the Supreme Court appears to
have adopted a more flexible approach, from the states' standpoint,
in interpreting the mandates of the Social Security Act. It is not
clear, however, whether this "new federalism" will solve the prob-
lems of the poor or merely compound them.
II
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME FOR THE AGED,
BLIND, AND DISABLED--SSI
Nineteen seventy-three was a year of transition from the
traditional adult welfare programs to a new federal Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program which became effective January 1,
1974.144 The former programs, Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to
the Blind (AB), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled
(APTD), were state-administered grant-in-aid plans. 45 The states
retained control of the day-to-day operation of these programs and
were free to establish their own benefit levels.' 41 In comparison,
," The SSI program was included in the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter cited as "1972 Ace, or "Social Security
Amendments of 1972"]. For a description of the former programs and a comparison of
those programs to SSI, see 58 CORNELL L. REV. 803 (1973).
145 These programs were financed through a system of cost sharing, in which the
federal government paid 66% of the costs in 22 states and 60% in most of the others. Burke,
The Need for Welfare Reforn, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 353, 357 (1968).
In 1968, there were 0.1 million recipients under the AB program, 0.9 million under the
APTD program, and 2.3 million under the OAA program. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME
MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 115 (1969).
146 This freedom led to the wide disparity in benefit levels throughout the country.
Although some flexibility might be necessitated by cost of living fluctuations, the variance
from state to state was seen as one of the major ills of the previous system. See Musgrave,
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SSI involves the establishment of minimum federal criteria for the
determination of eligibility and benefit levels and is designed to
avoid the wide disparity of procedures and payments which had
developed throughout the country. 47 Additionally, states are re-
quired to supplement SSI payments in order to maintain pre-SSI
benefit levels, 48 and the states have the option of supplementing
the program to attain benefit levels even higher than federal
standards require. 49 In either case, the states may choose between
state and federal administration of the supplementation program. 50
The establishment of a national system is unquestionably the
most significant feature of the SSI program. Old Age Assistance,
for example, had been administered under fifty-four different
schemes with varying need and income formulations. 15 1 Providing
for uniform minimum benefits and for state supplementation, SSI
represents an important improvement. 52
A. Determination of Eligibility
In order to be eligible for SSI benefits, applicants must be at
least sixty-five years of age or meet the statutory definitions of
Heller & Peterson, Cost Effectiveness of Alternative Income Maintenance Schemes, 23 NAT'L TAx J.
140 (1970).
147 A preliminary description of SSI was provided by the House Ways and Means
Committee:
Under the new Federal program, uniform eligibility requirements and uniform
benefit payments would replace the multiplicity of requirements and benefit pay-
ments under the existing State-operated programs. The new program has been
designed with a view toward providing:
1. An income source for the aged, blind, and disabled whose income and resources
are below a specified level;
2. Incentives and opportunities for those able to work or to be rehabilitated that
will enable them to escape from their dependent situations; and
3. An efficient and economical method of providing this assistance.
H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
'48 Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 212, 87 Stat. 155; see note 178 and accompanying text infra.
149 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. II, 1972); see note 179 and accompanying text infra.
150 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. II, 1972); see notes 180-92 and accompanying text infra.
151 See HousE REPORT 150. Naturally, a wide disparity in benefit levels results from this
multiplicity of programs. For example, in April 1968, OAA payments ranged from $50 in
Mississippi to $182 in Nebraska. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH, THE BILL TO REVAMP THE WELFARE SYSTEM 46 (1970). The House Ways and
Means Committee reported a range from $97 to $350 per month as of July 1970. HousE
REPORT 150.
152 In addition to the obvious advantage of uniformity, the quality of administration may
improve since SSI is administered by the Social Security Administration. HousE REPORT 157.
This should obviate the uneven quality of state administration, even though many of the
employees who administered the old programs will be involved with SSI. See Hearings on the
Social Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
120-21 (1971) (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW).
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blindness or disability. 153 Furthermore, the proposed regulations
provide that an applicant is not eligible for SSI if he is eligible for
other benefits but has not applied for them. 154 Additional eligibility
criteria include special limits on gross income from a trade or
business 155 and a limitation on the eligibility of those who are
outside the United States1 56 and those who, throughout any month,
have been in a public institution 157 or a "hospital, extended care
facility, nursing home, or intermediate care facility" which is receiv-
ing Medicaid payments on behalf of the applicant. 58 Alcoholics
and addicts are covered by SSI, but only if they are undergoing
Although SSI will be administered by the Social Security Administration, it will be
financed out of general revenues and not from Social Security trust funds. U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education & Welfare, News Release (undated) in 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,488.
153 Although 65 is the usual retirement age, it is not necessarily the most appropriate
eligibility threshold. For example, the Social Security Act now provides that individuals may
opt into the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program (Social Security) at age
62, as long as all other eligibility criteria are met. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
The definitions of blindness and disability contained in the statute (id. § 1382c(a)) are
somewhat technical and parallel those used in the disability insurance program under Social
Security. "These definitions... provide reasonable, objective, and fair tests of disability and
blindness which are appropriate for the proposed program." HousE REPORT 147.
154 See Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.230, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,088 (1973). "Other benefits"
include annuities, pensions, retirement benefits or disability benefits. Id.
155 The Secretary (of HEW) may prescribe the circumstances under which,
consistently with the purpose of this subchapter, the gross income from a trade or
business (including farming) will be considered sufficiently large to make an
individual ineligible for benefits under this subchapter. For purposes of this
subsection, the term "gross income" has the same meaning as when used in chapter
I of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
42 U.S.C. § 1382(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
156 Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no individual shall
be considered an eligible individual for purposes of this subchapter for any month
during all of which such individual is outside of the United States .... [A]fter an
individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days,
he shall be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has been in the
United States for a period of 30 consecutive days.
Id. § 1382(f).
157 Id. § 1382(e)(1)(A). The proposed regulations define a "public institution" as "an
institution that is the responsibility of a governmental unit, or over which a governmental
unit exercises administrative control." Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.231, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,088
(1973).
158 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II, 1972). Those individuals are eligible for a
maximum benefit of $25 per month. See id. § 1382(e)(1)(B)(i). The apparent rationale for
this provision is that "[flor [those] people most subsistence needs are met by the institution
and full benefits are not needed. Some payments to [those] people, though, would be needed
to enable them to purchase small comfort items not supplied by the institution." HOUSE
REPORT 150.
This "institutional inmate" exception in the case of either public or private institutions
will certainly ease administrative burdens, but its supporting rationale is appropriate only
with respect to those recipients who are not expected to leave such an institution. The
rationale that the institution fulfills the applicant's every need ignores the fact that the
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"treatment that may be appropriate for [their] condition ... at an
institution or facility approved ... by the Secretary [of HEW]" and
can demonstrate that they are "complying with the terms, condi-
tions, and requirements of such treatment."15 9
Originally, SSI made no provision for continuing the coverage
of "essential persons," such as wives of eligible OAA recipients who
were not eligible themselves under the old programs. However, a
person "whose needs were taken into account in determining the
need [of the applicant]" in December, 1973, may now be treated as
an essential person, enabling the recipient to receive an additional
$70 per month.' 60 This is an important change, for now 125,000
recipient might well have outside expenses, such as rent or taxes, which are continuing
obligations. Furthermore, if the recipient has an eligible spouse, he or she will receive only
one-half of the couples benefit of $210 until the recipient has been institutionalized for more
than six months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(b) (Supp. II, 1972). This amount is $35 less than the
spouse would receive as an eligible individual.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(3)(A) (Supp. II, 1972). The statute is not clear as to whether
aged individuals are included in this provision. It states that "[n]o person who is an aged,
blind, or disabled individual solely by reason of disability" caused by alcoholism or addiction
may be eligible unless he submits to treatment. Id. (emphasis added). Arguably this require-
ment should be read to cover those who are obtaining benefits solely on the basis of disability
caused by alcoholism or addiction. The aged and the blind should be entitled to benefits
simply because they are aged or blind. Apparently the House Ways and Means Committee
agreed since it recommended
that those people who are disabled, in whole or in part, as a result of the use of drugs
or alcohol should not be entitled to benefits under this program unless they
undergo appropriate, available treatment in an approved facility, and the bill so
provides. Your committee, while recognizing that the use of drugs or alcohol may
indeed cause disabling conditions, believes that when the condition is susceptible to
treatment, appropriate treatment at Government expense is an essential part of the
rehabilitation process of people so disabled.
HousE REPORT 149 (emphasis added). As applied to the disabled, this requirement seems
eminently reasonable in light of the current levels of drug addiction and alcoholism
throughout the country.
160 See Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 211(a)(1)(A), 87 Stat. 154, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-233,
87 Stat. 947. This will increase to $73 on July 1, 1974. Id.
The term "essential person", when used in connection with any qualified
individual, means a person who-
(1) for the month of December 1973 was a person (described in subsection
(b)(2)) whose needs were taken into account in determining the need of such
individual for aid or assistance under a State plan referred to in subsection
(b)(1) as such State plan was in effect for June 1973,
(2) lives in the home of such individual
(3) is not eligible (in his or her own right) for supplemental security
income benefits under title XVI of the Social Security Act (as in effect after
December 1973), and
(4) is not the eligible spouse (as that term is used in such title XVI) of such
individual or any other individual.
If for any month after December 1973 any person fails to meet the criteria specified
in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of the preceding sentence, such person shall not, for
such month or any month thereafter be considered to be an essential person.
Id. As this definition illustrates, this is essentially a grandfather clause, ensuring that an
essential person under a state program prior to January 1974, will be an essential person
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essential persons will be eligible for $100 million in SSI benefits.161
Financial eligibility requirements are reflected in SSI's uniform
"needs test," which requires applicants to have personal incomes of
less than $1,560 per year and financial resources of less than
$1,500 in order to qualify for assistance.16 2 Because of the applica-
tion of a significant income and resource disregard, 6 3 however,
these figures are not as low as they might seem, and more appli-
cants should be eligible under SSI than under the previous
systems.' 6 4 Furthermore, persons who had been receiving benefits
in states which had more liberal income and resource limits before
under SSI. For example, the wife of an OAA recipient who would have been an essential
person iii December 1973 will be treated as an essential person under SSI. But the wife of an
applicant who becomes eligible for SSI after January 1974 would not be an essential person,
and the SSI recipient would not be eligible for the extra $70 per month.
161 See 119 CONG. REC. S. 12,718 (daily ed. June 30, 1973).
162 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. II, 1972). For couples, these figures become
$2,340 and $2,250 respectively. Id. See generally Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 416.1101-.1180, 38
Fed. Reg. 27,407-09 (1973), §§ 416.1201-.1266, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,409-12 (1973) (dealing with
definitions of and exclusions from "income and resources").
163 The income disregard is $20 per month of social security or other unearned income
and an additional disregard of $65 of earned income. One-half of any earnings above $65
per month is also disregarded. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(b)(2), (b)(4)(C) (Supp. II, 1972).
The earned income disregard is essentially a work incentive program which is interest-
ing because not only are most of the recipients unemployable, but also the social security
program contains a retirement test specifically designed to discourage the elderly from
working. See id. § 411 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
Benefits received under a state's supplementation plan are also disregarded in order to
encourage the states to supplement the federal program. Id. § 1382e(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
Obviously, if the federal benefits were reduced in amounts equal to the state's payments, the
recipients would receive the same stipend and the state's supplemental plan would be
frustrated.
In determining the value of an applicant's resources, his home, household goods,
personal effects, and automobile are not considered if they are within the limits established
by HEW. Id. § 1382b(a)(1)-(2); see Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 416.1212, .1216, .1218, 38 Fed.
Reg. 27,410 (1973).
164 One of the most striking aspects of the new program is that the number of eligible
individuals in the aged, blind, and disabled categories will almost double. The projected
number of recipients under the adult programs for fiscal year 1973 was 3.4 million. HOUSE
REPORT 227. Under SSI, that figure should jump to 6.2 million. Id.; see U.S. Dep't of Health,
Education & Welfare, News Release, May 30, 1973 in 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,070. This will
be a welcome change, particularly for the elderly, since poverty is more prevalent among the
aged than among any other age group; in 1968, 25% of all aged persons were poor. See
COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC WELFARE SYSTEM 26
(1970). This rather grim statistic improved to 22% in 1971. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE Low INCOME POPULATION 1971, at 4 (1972).
Even in the most liberal states, SSI will reach more applicants than had been covered
previously. HOUSE REPORT 227-28. California was estimated to experience the smallest
increase-from 599,700 eligibles under the previous plans to 608,700 under SSI. Id. at 227.
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the enactment of SSI are automatically deemed to meet the re-
source test.1
65
Under the previous welfare plans, it was sometimes difficult to
predict exactly what kinds of income or resources had to be
considered in determining eligibility and benefit levels.' 66 SSI pro-
vides for specific guidance in some of the problem areas. The value
of the applicant's home and appurtenant land is excluded from the
eligibility calculation, 6 7 at least to the extent that its value does not
exceed an amount which HEW deems reasonable. 68 Additionally,
SSI provides that when an applicant is living with another person,
regardless of.the type of accommodation, he is still eligible for SSI,
but his benefits will automatically be reduced by one-third.
169
165 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. II, 1972). This section was added pursuant to an
amendment offered by Senator Cranston. In presenting the amendment, the Senator stated:
[T]his amendment is of a basically noncontroversial nature, and would simply
"grandfather" in present eligibility and resources of those receiving aid to the aged,
blind, and disabled. This encompasses approximately 1,500 individuals whose
resources are presently within the allowable resources in their respective States, but
who would be over the maximum resource "disregard" (under the new act].
118 CONG. REc. S 17,029 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
166 See generally 58 CORNELL L. REV. 803, 812-17 (1973).
167 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1) (Supp. 11, 1972).
168 Although this uniform approach may ease some administrative burdens, a more
equitable system would not automatically deny eligibility to an applicant owning a home
valued above a set amount, but would reflect the value of the home in the computation of
benefits received.
A denial of eligibility is especially harsh since the potential applicant does not have any
opportunity to establish need. For example, suppose that HEW establishes a maximum value
for an applicant's home of $25,000. If applicant A has a house assessed at $24,500, he will be
"eligible" for SSI, and the value of his house will be ignored under the resource disregard.
Id. If applicant B has a house assessed at $25,500, not only will he not be entitled to the
resource disregard, but he will be deemed ineligible for SSI because of the $1,500 resource
limitation. Id. This would be the result even ifB had no income or other resource and A was
earning $3,000 per year, because A would be entitled to the income disregard as well. See
note 163 supra.
In fact, the proposed regulations do establish a $25,000 limit on the value of an
applicant's home ($35,000 in Alaska and Hawaii). See Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1212, 38
Fed. Reg. 27,410 (1973). Until the regulations are fully implemented, however, recipients
will have to be guided by imprecise generalities. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
& WELFARE, IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME
PAYMENTS 13 (1973) (DHEW Pub. No. (SSA) 74-11011):
Certain items of property are not counted in figuring the value of property you
own. Generally, property that doesn't count includes your home, household goods,
personal effects, and automobile, as long as their value does not exceed a reason-
able amount.
For the regulations pertaining to the evaluation of an automobile as a resource, see Proposed
HEW Reg. § 416.1218, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,410 (1973).
169 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A) (Supp. II, 1972). The proposed regulations provide:
Such one-third reduction in the payment standard will not apply where only
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Finally, in determining the level of an applicant's income and
resources for eligibility purposes, SSI provides that "income and
resources shall be deemed to include any income and resources of
[a] spouse, whether or not available to [the] individual."1 7 0 This
presumption applies not only to a legal spouse under state law but
also to individuals who "are found to be holding themselves out to
the community in which they reside as husband and wife."'17 1 The
breadth of this provision may be subject to constitutional attackY.7 2
support or maintenance (i.e., room or board) is furnished in kind; both support and
maintenance must be furnished for such reduction to apply. Where only support or
maintenance is furnisfied in kind, the value of such support or maintenance will be
included as unearned income ....
Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1125(f), 38 Fed. Reg. 27,408-09 (1973). There is a special
provision dealing with how the states, in determining supplementary payment levels, may
treat the situation in which the applicant is living with an AFDC family:
In the case of an individual who, for December 1973 lived as a member of a family
unit other members of which received aid (in the form of money payments) under a
State plan of a State approved under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act
(AFDC), such State at its option may... reduce such individual's December 1973
income... to such extent as may be necessary to cause the supplemental payment
... payable to such individual for January 1974 or any month thereafter to be
reduced to a level designed to assure that the total income of such individual (and
of the members of such family unit) for any month after December 1973 does not
exceed the total income of such individual (and of the members of such family unit)
for December 1973.
Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 10(b) 87 Stat. 947, amending Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 212(a)(3), 87 Stat.
155.
170 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972). This income attribution applies only if the
spouse lives in the same household as the applicant and may be avoided entirely if HEW
deems it to be inequitable under the circumstances. Id.
,71 Id. § 1382c(d)(2). This requirement is important since it precludes a couple from
terminating their formal marital relationship solely in order to establish the eligibility of one
of the partners or to obtain the increased benefits which would be available to them as
individuals.
172 The validity of a presumption that a spouse's income will be imputed to the
applicant is questionable, particularly since the provision applies to those who do not have a
support obligation under state law. The presence of a support obligation has been deemed
crucial by the Supreme Court in the AFDC area. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the
Court invalidated Alabama's so-called "substitute father" regulation, which denied AFDC
payments to any mother who cohabited with any single or married able-bodied man. The
Court held that when Congress specified "parent," it meant one who had the duty of
support. Id. at 327. Subsequently, the Court had to determine the validity of a California
regulation which presumed the needs of a family to be reduced simply by virtue of a man's
presence in the home. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), rev'g Lewis v. Stark, 312 F.
Supp. 197 (N.D. Cal. 1968); notes 35-43 and accompanying text supra. In striking down the
regulation, the Court relied on an HEW regulation which provided, in part, that "only
income and resources that are, in fact, available to an applicant or recipient for current use
on a regular basis will be taken into consideration in determining need and the amount of
payment." Id. at 555. The current regulations provide: "[Oinly such net income as is actually
available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and only currently available
resources will be considered." 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973); see Solman v. Shapiro,
300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.), affd per curiam, 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
These cases were decided on statutory grounds, however. Consequently, if one wanted
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B. State Supplementation
SSI presently provides for monthly payments of $140 for an
individual recipient or $210 for a couple,'173 but on July 1, 1974,
these levels will be raised to $146 and $219, respectively.' 7 4 The
1972 Act provided that SSI recipients would not be eligible for
food stamps,'7 5 but fortunately this provision has since been
rescinded for most SSI recipients. 76
to attack the presumption created by the new law, he would have to formulate a constitu-
tional argument. In the Lewis case, the plaintiff alleged violation of both due process and
equal protection guarantees. 312 F. Supp. at 202-06. The lower court dismissed these
arguments, and the propriety of that disposition was not resolved on appeal since the
constitutional issue was not reached. Thus, a constitutional argument does not appear to be
foreclosed.
173 See Pub. L. No. 93-66, §§ 210(a), (b), 87 Stat. 154, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-233,
§ 4(a)(1), 87 Stat. 953.
174 See Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 4(a)(1), 87 Stat. 953,amending Pub. L. No. 93-66, §§ 210(a),
(b), 87 Stat. 154. The 1972 Act provided for benefits of $130 per individual and $195 per
couple. Act. of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1466. Public Law 93-66
raised these benefits to $140 and $210 respectively, effectiveJuly 1, 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-66,
§§ 210(a), (b),'87 Stat. 154. Public Law 93-233 raised them again by changing the effective
date of Public Law 93-66 to January 1, 1974, and by providing for the additional increase in
July 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 4(a)(1), 87 Stat. 953. Since Public Law 93-233 was passed
late in 1973, the increases it mandated were not incorporated in the January SSI payments.
Consequently, SSI recipients will get their additional benefits retroactively. See 119 CONG.
REC. H 11,956 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1973).
Even with the increase, however, SSI benefits are inadequate. For example, SSI will not
bring aged individuals over the poverty line of $1,931, and aged couples will just barely clear
their poverty line of $2,424. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note
164, at 18. Furthermore, the poverty line itself is not a meaningful standard. See generally S.
Jacobsen, A Proposal for an Alternative Poverty Line, June 8, 1970 (unpublished thesis in
Mann Library, Cornell University).
175 Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 411(a), 86 Stat. 1492:
Effective January 1, 1974, section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "No person who is eligible
(or upon application would be eligible) to receive supplemental security income
benefits under title XVI of such Act shall be considered to be a member of a
household or an elderly person for purposes of this Act."
The legislative history of this provision is not particularly clear. The Ways and Means
Committee merely noted that
[the] bill would amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964 by providing that.., adults
eligible for benefits under [SSI] would be excluded from . . . the food stamp
program.
Your committee also notes that the President has expressed his intention to
transfer the food stamp program [from the Department of Agriculture] to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Your committee believes there is
considerable merit in such a step because the residual segments of this program
would be administered by the same Department which administers the cash pay-
ments under this bill.
HOUSE REPORT 196.
176 See Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 8(a)(1), 87 Stat. 956.
The Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (P.L. No. 93-86)
[made] a recipient of supplemental security income benefits eligible for food stamp
and food distribution programs unless such recipient receive[d], as part of his'[SSI]
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Some states had paid higher benefits under the former pro-
grams than the minimum established by SSI. 177 These states were
required to supplement the federal payments so that no recipient's
payments were reduced when SSI went into effect.' 78 Moreover,
each state has the option of establishing a program to supplement
SSI benefits to any desired level.' 7 9
benefits, an amount equal to the bonus value of food stamps (according to the Food
Stamp Schedule effective July, 1973) in addition to the amount of assistance such
recipient would be entitled to receive under the provisions of a state plan under
Title I, X, XIV or XVI of the Social Security Act in effect for December, 1973.
2 CCH Pov. L: REP. 17,427 (1973). This act has been modified, however, by § 8(a)(1) of
Public Law 93-233 (87 Stat. 956), which provides:
Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 is amended effective only for the
6-month period beginning January 1, 1974 to read as it did before amendment by
Public Law 92-603 and Public Law 93-86, but with the addition of the following new
sentence at the end thereof: "For the 6-month period beginning January 1, 1974 no
individual, who receives supplemental security income benefits under Tide XVI of
the Social Security Act, State supplementary payments described in section 1616 of
such Act, or payments of the type referred to in section 212(a) of Public Law 93-66,
shall be considered to be a member of a household or an elderly person for
purposes of this Act for any month during such period, if, for such month, such
individual resides in a State which provides State supplementary payments (A) of
the type described in section 1616(a) of the Social Security Act, and (B) the level of
which has been found by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to have
been specifically increased so as to include the bonus value of food stamps."
HEW has now determined that under Public Law 93-233 SSI recipients will be eligible to
apply for food stamps in every state except California, Massachusetts, Nevada (only applies
to aged and blind), New York, and Wisconsin. See Proposed USDA Reg. § 271.10(c), 39 Fed.
Reg. 3812 (1974). However, as the six-month provision suggests, Congress has not yet
defined the relationship between SSI and the food stamp program. See 119 CONG. REc. H
11,956-57 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1973). For a discussion of Medicaid eligibility, see notes 279-85
and accompanying text infra.
177 "There appears to be some 35 states in which SSI's replacement of current OAA,
AB, APTD and food stamps benefits, without state supplementation, would mean a reduction in
some recipients' incomes." Blong & Thorkelson, State Supplementation of Benefits Under the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 653, 654 (March 1973)
(emphasis added). These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Note
that this list was compiled before food stamp eligibility was reestablished and the recent
increases in benefits were announced. Nevertheless, the importance of state supplementation
is undiminished because even the modified benefit levels are too low. See note 174 supra.
178 The Senate originally rejected an amendment to the 1972 Act which would have
instituted this requirement. See 118 CONG. REC. S 17,037-38 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1972). The
amendment's proponents were ultimately successful, however, as Public Law 93-66 man-
dated that persons who were receiving OAA, AB, or APTD benefits in December 1973 were
to be protected against a cut in their monthly payments with the advent of SSI. Pub. L. No.
93-66, § 212, 87 Stat. 155; see 9 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DoCs. 896 (1973). See generally
Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 416.2070-.2082, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,412-14 (1973) (implementing this
portion of Public Law 93-66).
179 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
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There are two kinds of state plans contemplated by the 1972
Act. The first is a state-administered supplementation plan' 80 in
which the state is free to establish and operate the supplementation
program in any way it chooses. 181 The only federal requirement is
that the payments be "cash payments . .. made . . . on a regular
basis . . . as assistance based on need."'182
The second alternative is a federally administered supplemen-
tation plan, which would be vastly more efficient than the state-
administered plans because a single agency would administer the
program. 183 Under this scheme, the state may enter into an agree-
ment with HEW whereby the Social Security Administration will
administer the state-financed supplementary program. 184 The state
receives a distinct financial benefit from opting for the federally
administered program because all administrative costs are borne by
the federal government, leaving the state with only the expense of
the actual benefits paid. 8 5 A state which entered into such an
agreement would also benefit from the 1972 Act's "hold harmless"
clause which provides that state supplementation payments "shall
not exceed the non-Federal share of expenditures as aid or assis-
tance for quarters -in the calendar year 1972.'186 This provision is
180 Id.
181 Blong & Thorkelson, supra note 177, at 653.
182 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
183 As the Ways and Means Committee noted:
Although . . . there may be a continuing need for State supplementation of the
new Federal assistance programs, it would appear generally desirable that such
supplementation be provided through the same agencies which would be estab-
lished to operate the Federal programs. This would avoid unnecessary duplication
of administrative costs, would permit the States to take advantage of the improved
methods and procedures which the bill would require, and would tend to foster
national uniformity in the operation of assistance programs.
HousE REPORT 199.
184 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. II, 1972). As Blong and Thorkelson explain:
If a state elects federal administration the federal government becomes respon-
sible for the entire operation of the eligibility and payment process. The state
establishes the eligibility and payment standards . . . but [the Social Security
Administration] would be responsible for the acceptance and processing of applica-
tions, eligibility determinations, issuance of payment, etc. In effect, an individual
would apply for both federal and state benefits by filing an application with [the
Social Security Administration].
Blong & Thorkelson, supra note 177, at 655.
185 42 U.S.C. § 1382(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
188 The statute, as amended, provides:
The amount payable to the Secretary by a State [pursuant to a state supplementa-
tion plan] for any fiscal year, other than fiscal year 1974 ... shall not exceed the
non-Federal share of expenditures . . . in the calendar year 1972 .... and the
amount payable for fiscal year 1974 pursuant to such agreement or agreements
shall not exceed one-half of the non-Federal share of such expenditures.
Id. § 1382e note, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 87 Stat. 969.
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designed to protect the states from an increased financial burden
due to the application of more liberal eligibility requirements
under the new federal standards.187
To qualify for federal administration, a state's supplementa-
tion program must include all those eligible for SSI under the
federal statute and regulations.18 8 A state may, however, employ a
higher income-resource disregard than SSI's, thereby bringing
more recipients within its coverage, and still qualify for a federally
administered supplementation plan."8 9
Under either plan, the states are allowed to discourage "benefit
shopping" by imposing a durational residency requirement. 90 Al-
though states clearly should be allowed to limit their payments to
bona fide residents, any durational requirement may well be
117 See Hearings on the Social Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1971) (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW). For
example, suppose a state's share of its 1973 OAA, AB, and APTD programs were $12
million. If it spent more than $12 million on its SSI supplementation plan, the extra cost
would be borne by the federal government. However,
[since state costs under the new program are measured against the total nonfederal
share of assistance costs in the adult categories, it seems unlikely that many states
would approach the level at which they would qualify for federal funds unless their
state supplementation level was far in excess of the federal benefit level and/or
there was a great increase in the number of aged, blind or disabled individuals who
qualified for aid.
Blong & Thorkelson, supra note 177, at 657.
188 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(b)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
189 The 1972 Act provides:
Any State (or political subdivision), in determining the eligibility of any indi-
vidual for supplementary payments described in subsection (a) . . . may disregard
amounts of earned and unearned income in addition to other amounts which it is
required or permitted to disregard under this section in determining such eligibil-
ity, and shall include a provision specifying the amount of any such income that will
be disregarded, if any.
Id. § 1382e(c)(2). Also,
in administering state payments supplementing the federal payments, the federal
government will permit a state to establish two payment levels to take account of
geographic variations in living costs within the state, providing the areas can be
identified by county or zip code. If the state can show special justification, a third
geographic variation might be allowed. Moreover, the federal government will
permit a state to select up to five different payment levels to fit different living
arrangements, such as a recipient living alone, living with an ineligible spouse, or
living in certain kinds of care facilities, e.g. a nursing home.
U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, News Release, May 30, 1973 in 2 CCH Pov. L.
REv. 17,070.
900 Any State (or political subdivision) making supplementary payments described
in subsection (a) . . . may at its option impose as a condition of eligibility for such
payments, and include in the State's agreement with the Secretary under such
subsection, a residence requirement which excludes individuals who have resided in
the State (or political subdivision) for less than a minimum period prior to
application for such payments.
42 U.S.C. § 1382e(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
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unconstitutional.' 9'The proposed regulations also allow the states
to impose a lien on the property of SSI recipients as a condition to
eligibility and to require that a relative of the individual contribute
to his support.' 92
191 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The exact boundaries of Shapiro are
not clear, but it has been relied upon to strike down a presumption that an applicant who
was not a resident for more than one year had moved into the state for the purpose of
obtaining benefits and was therefore ineligible. See Bowens v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 49 (1970). In Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971), the
Supreme Court held, per curiam, that "[w]hether a welfare program is or is not federally
funded is irrelevant to the constitutional principles enunciated in [Shapiro]." Thus, a state
may not rely upon the argument that since the program is state-funded the state may impose
whatever criteria it desires. Former HEW Secretary Richardson took the view that state
durational residency requirements are unconstitutional: "We think that the Supreme Court
decision on this point makes unconstitutional the provision of H.R. 1 [the much amended
predecessor of the 1972 Act] which seeks to permit States to apply residency requirements
with respect to eligibility for the State supplement." Hearings, supra note 187, at 112.
Shapiro might be distinguished, however, on the ground that for SSI recipients a basic
federal program is available no matter where they live. It is only the supplemental portion
which is withheld by the application of the residency requirement. In Shapiro, the entire
benefit was withheld.
Conceivably a subdivision of a state might try to impose residency requirements on
applicants for a supplementary program. Such a residency requirement could impede
interstate travel (if applied to a new state resident) and the right to travel intrastate (if
applied to a long time state resident). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 94 S. Ct. 1076
(1974) (Supreme Court invalidated Arizona county durational residency requirement for
nonemergency hospital or medical care as violative of right to travel interstate). See generally
Intrastate Residence Requirements for Welfare and the Right to Intrastate Travel, 8 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-Ctv. LIB. L. REV. 591 (1973).
192 Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.2003, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,189 (1973). Lien and relative
responsibility statutes are quite popular with state agencies despite the fact that lien statutes
may work unnecessary hardships and relative responsibility laws may well lead to serious
psychological problems for both the recipient and the responsible relative. Tully, Family
Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutional Imposition, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 32, 39-43 (1971).
Furthermore, relative responsibility laws tend to perpetuate poverty by thrusting a support
obligation upon those just emerging from poverty themselves. Id. at 42-43.
Interestingly enough, the 1972 Act makes no mention of allowing states to impose these
requirements. This led the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law to criticize this section
of the proposed regulations:
[Tlhere is nothing on the face of the federal statute which generally authorizes
additional eligibility requirements in a federally administered supplementation
program. On the contrary, the statute specifically recognizes the question of
additional eligibility requirements for such supplementation and authorizes only
one to be imposed by the states, the durational residency requirement .... Even
more fundamentally,... § 1616(b) of the statute requires that federally adminis-
tered supplementation be provided "to all individuals residing in such state.. . who
are receiving SSI benefits .. ." Clearly the effect of Section 1616(b)(1) is to prohibit
states from establishing eligibility conditions for supplementation which are differ-
ent from those applicable to the federal benefits, since any variation in conditions
would create a possibility that some federal recipients might not qualify for the state
benefits.
Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, Letter to Commissioner of Social Security, Aug. 30,
1973, at 3 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
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The limited material that is presently available indicates that all
states except Texas and Arizona plan to establish or have estab-
lished supplementary plans.' 93 Of these, "twenty states are plan-
ning to provide only mandatory supplementation, i.e. supplementa-
tion only for those aged, blind and disabled individuals who [were]
on the rolls in December 1973 to maintain their income at the
December 1973 levels."' 94 Not surprisingly, the majority of the
states have chosen the federally administered supplementation
program.195
III
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
A. The Program Prior to 1973
The 1964 Food Stamp Act' 96 was one of the first major
components of the Great Society. In enacting the program, Con-
gress sought to create an alternative to direct distribution of feder-
ally held surplus and other food, 197 both as a better means of
193 See Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, supra note 192, at 1.
194 Id. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana (tentative), Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana (tentative), New Mexico
(tentative), North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 2.
195 Twenty-eight states have indicated they will establish a federally administered
program, while only 15 are considering self-administration. See id. at 2-3. "Florida and
Virginia appear to be leaning toward federal administration of the mandatory supplementa-
tion and state administration of the optional program." Id. at 2. This procedure is specifically
allowed in the proposed regulations. See Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.2074(c), 38 Fed. Reg.
27,413 (1973). A state could not, however, manage the mandatory program itself and have
the federal government manage the optional portion. The question of administration has
apparently been unresolved in the remaining states.
19r 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2025 (1970), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2019, 2023 (Supp. II,
1972) [hereinafter cited as Food Stamp Act].
Congress approved the Food Stamp Act as an extension of a four-year pilot program
conducted by the USDA under the authority of the Act of August 24, 1935, ch. 641, § 32, 49
Stat. 750. By its final year, fiscal year 1964, the test program included 43 areas in 22 states
and gave 392,000 people an added $28.6 million of food purchasing power. In evaluating
the pilot phase, USDA research agencies reported that the program had admirably accomp-
lished its aim. Not only were many families able substantially to increase their food
consumptiox. and obtain nutritionally adequate diets, but community economics and agricul-
ture benefitted as well. Retail food sales increased about 8% in the pilot regions; 80% of that
increase represented the purchase of more livestock products, fruits, vegetables, and
grains-the products from which farmers get the best returns. H.R. REP. No. 1402, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 HousE REPORT]. For a more complete
report of the impact and results of the pilot program, see S. REP. No. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-8 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
197 In parts of the country where the food stamp program is in effect, the Food Stamp
Act prohibits, except in special circumstances, simultaneous distribution under the Federal
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ensuring an adequate nutrition level in low income households and
as a boost to the agricultural economy.' 98 To implement this
design, Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture "to for-
mulate and administer a food stamp program"'199 which was to be
made available throughout the United States. From this authority,
as modified in 1971, resulted the food stamp program in effect at
the start of 1973.
1. Federal-State Cooperation
Since its inception, the federal food stamp program has been
administered by state agencies, or by local agencies to which the
state has delegated authority, in cooperation with and under the
supervision of the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 0 0 State participation in
Commodity Distribution Program, which provides direct donations of food "packages"
containing some 20 kinds of foods designed to supply all essential nutritional requirements.
7 U.S.C. § 2013(b) (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(a) (1973). Counties in states participating in the
original program were, however, free to elect either method of food assistance. There has
been a consistent and comprehensive federal effort to ensure that eligible families in every
political unit in the country benefit from one of these programs. In fact, by July 31, 1970, all
but 22 of the nation's counties and cities were in some way involved in one of these
programs. 1970 HouSE REPORT 6-7. Recently, however, the federal government determined
that the food stamp program is a more effective means of implementing food assistance.
Consequently, after the end of the fiscal year 1974, any state desiring to participate in a food
assistance program must do so through the distribution of food stamps. Pub. L. No. 93-86,
§ 3(i), 87 Stat. 247, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
198 The policy and purpose of the Food Stamp Act are set forth at 7 U.S.C. § 2011
(1970):
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the
general welfare, that the Nation's abundance of food should be utilized coopera-
tively by the States, the Federal Government, local governmental units, and other
agencies to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nations [sic] population and
raise levels of nutrition among low-income households. The Congress hereby finds
that the limited food purchasing power of low-income households contributes to
hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. The Congress
further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining
adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial
manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural
economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To
alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized
which will permit low-income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet
through normal channels of trade.
The Food Stamp Act charges its administrators "particularly to encourage the continued use
of those [foodstuffs] or surplus in abundant supply so as not to reduce the total consumption
of surplus commodities which have been made available through direct distribution." Id.
§ 2019(a).
199 Id. § 2013.
200 Originally, the "state agency" responsible for the administration of the program
within the state -was that agency responsible for the state's federally aided public assistance
programs. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 3(h), 78 Stat. 703. Today that
agency is the one specifically designated by the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out the
1974]
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the program was made voluntary by the Food Stamp Act,20 1
although the federal government consistently has encouraged state
participation. 2  Once a state decides to enter the program, it
becomes subject to rather close federal supervision, which is pro-
vided in two ways. First, the federal government finances a large
part of the program. It is the FNS which prints the coupons,
disburses them to the states, and ultimately pays for the bonus
value of the monthly coupon allotments destined for eligible
households through state distribution.0 3 Moreover, although the
states must bear most of the administrative costs of the program,
the FNS reimburses each state agency for 62.5 percent of costs
incurred in performing the following specific duties: the education
of potential recipients, the certification of households not already
on federally aided public assistance grants, and the provision of
hearing officials for aggrieved applicants. 20 4
The more significant federal control, however, is that which
the FNS exerts directly over the administration of the program in
each state. The state's opportunity to participate in the food stamp
program depends entirely upon its securing FNS approval of a
purposes of the Food Stamp Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(h) (Supp. II, 1972). Its primary duties
include the certification of eligible households and the acceptance, storage, and protection of
coupons after their delivery to the state. 7 C.F.R. § 271.1-.9 (1973). In addition, the agency is
charged with the sale and issuance of coupons, which it may control directly or through local
government agencies or banks. Id.; see SENATE REPORT 2. Finally, the state agency must
conduct an "outreach program" to inform potential participants of the program. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2019(a) (1970); id. § 2019(e) (Supp. II, 1972); 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(k) (1973); 1970 HOUSE
REPORT 2.
201 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970); see SENATE REPORT 15.
So long as a state has chosen to participate in either federal family food assistance
program, however, it has been required to provide its hungry citizens in every county with
either commodity distribution or food stamps. No county may elect not to receive its share of
the state's food stamp assistance. Jay v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 308 F. Supp. 100,
107 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
202 See note 197 supra. Currently 48 states and the District of Columbia participate in
the food stamp program; New Hampshire and Delaware do not supply food stamps. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, AUGUST 1973, at i (1973).
203 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970). The Food Stamp Act authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to issue coupons redeemable at face value from funds appropriated by Congress
for the program and made available through the facilities of the United States Treasury. See
note 229 infra.
The original House version of the 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act provided
that by fiscal year 1974 each state would finance 10% of the difference between the face
value of coupons issued to a household and the amount such household paid for its coupons.
H.R. 18582, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1970). However, this language was stricken in
conference, and it was not revived on the House floor. H.R. REP. No. 1793, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1970); see 7 U.S.C. § 2024 (1970).
204 7 U.S.C. § 2024 (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1973).
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plan of operation in which it agrees to conform to the federal
regulations and to act only after confirmation by the FNS.20 5 To
obtain a favorable ruling from the FNS, the state agency must
agree, principally, to disregard food stamp benefits as income for
Social Security, welfare, or taxation purposes; not to decrease other
welfare benefits as a consequence of the receipt of food stamps; to
avoid racial, political, religious, or ethnic discrimination among
applicants; to impose no residence requirements for eligibility; to
hold applicant information confidential; to apply uniform person-
nel standards in both food stamp and other federally aided assis-
tance programs; to keep records of its actions available to the FNS;
and to meet all FNS requirements in certifying eligible households
and providing redress for aggrieved applicants. 6 No food stamps
will be issued without an approved plan, and failure to comply with
federal standards will result in suspension of benefits until the
state agency's nonconformity is corrected. 0 7
2. Eligibility and Certfication
Eligibility for food stamps is predicated on the establishment
of a "household" unit, because food stamp benefits are available to
"households" rather than to individuals.20 8 For the purposes of the
program, "[a]ll persons, excluding roomers, boarders, a#d unre-
lated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping, or
child-care reasons, residing in common living quarters shall be
consolidated into a group prior to determining if such a group is a
household .... 209 A "household" must at least live as an economic
unit which shares cooking facilities and a common cupboard.
Furthermore, until 1973, the state's inquiry extended also into the
age and familial ties of the would-be household's members. For
205 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (Supp. II, 1972); 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(i), (j) (1973). The plan must
describe the manner in which and the political subdivisions wherein the program is to be
established. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (Supp. II, 1972). It must cover a federal fiscal year and may
be extendable by the FNS for succeeding fiscal years. 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(i) (1973).
The regulations detail the necessary items in a plan of operation, including the
administrative plans for accomplishing statutory duties such as outreach (see note 200 supra)
and sampling to monitor the program's effectiveness in each state. 7 C.F.R. § 271.8 (1973).
206 7 U.S.C. 88 2019(b), (d) (1970); id. §8 2019(c), (e) (Supp. II, 1972); 7 C.F.R.
§§ 271.1(b)-(h) (1973). The FNS will approve no plan with eligibility standards falling
short of those set by the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
207 7 U.S.C. § 2019(f) (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 271.1(t) (1973). Of course, this action does not
penalize the state, but the recipients who need the stamps and are innocent of any
wrongdoing.
208 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(a) (19.73).
209 Id.
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example, unrelated persons under sixty years of age could not be a
"household" for food stamp purposes.2 10
Only after an applicant or group demonstrates its identity as a
valid "household" may it take its second step toward
certification-proof of financial eligibility. If the household consti-
tutes one in which all members meet the requirements for and
receive other federally aided public assistance or general assistance
grants, this latter task is simple. Such a household may be found
eligible and be certified to participate in the program, without
further inquiry into its members' income or resources,2 n on the
basis of information contained in an affidavit and in its assistancefile.2 12
All other households, however, must undergo a more complex
eligibility determination process.21 3 The state agency must ascertain
whether an applicant satisfies the uniform national standards
21 4
210 Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 3(e), 78 Stat. 703; 7 C.F.R. § 270.2(jj)
(1973). Groups or individuals who were eligible under the previous regulations included
individuals related to each other by blood or marriage, a group consisting entirely of persons
over 60 years of age whether or not related, individuals less than 60 years old but related to
another member over 60, or a housebound elderly person, or a single individual cooking for
home consumption. Id. For recently added eligible household categories, see notes 233-36,
251-52 & 257 and accompanying text infra.
Regardless of the establishment of an otherwise valid "household" entity, however, all
persons even potentially eligible for SSI benefits under tide XVI of the Social Security Act
were to be disqualified as household members and elderly persons under the food stamp
program as of January 1, 1974. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1973). This provision has now
been rescinded, however, and many SSI recipients are eligible for foodstamps. See notes
175-76 and accompanying text supra.
211 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(b) (1973).
212 7 U.S.C. § 2019(c) (Supp. I, 1972); 7 C.F.R. § 271.4(a)(1) (1973). Section 441(c) of
the 1972 amendments to the Food Stamp Act deleted the specific statutory provision for the
short-cut certification, but did not say that the USDA was prohibited from using this method
if it wished. See 7 U.S.C. § 2019(c) (Supp. II, 1972). In fact, section 411(d) of the same
amendments apparently broadens in general the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to
use his discretion in setting eligibility requirements, by proclaiming that instead of certifying
applicant households according to specific congressional directive, states now must follow
simply whatever standards are prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to the Food Stamp Act.
Id. § 2019(e). Consequently, the regulations dealing with the simplified certification proce-
dure can, and still do, stand.
213 All needy households, not simply those eligible for other public or general assis-
tance, may qualify for food stamps if they meet the financial need requirements. SENATE
REPORT 10-11, 15; 1970 HOUSE REPORT 4.
214 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a), (b) (1970); SENATE REPORT 15; 1970 HousE REPORT 3; note 237
iqfra. Ordinarily participation is limited to those households whose income and resources are
recognized as substantial limiting factors on their ability to purchase a nutritionally adequate
diet. Provisions were made in the original act, however, for short-term participation by
households victimized by disasters which disrupted commercial channels of food distribu-
tion. Emergency eligibility standards are established without regard to a household's income
or other financial resources.
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prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture. 1 5 In so doing, the
agency must compute both the income level of the household, less
deductions for any of certain specified deductible household
expenses, 216 and the value of the household's resources. 217 If
neither of the resultant figures exceeds the national standards, 218
215 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c), 2014(b) (1970). The Secretary of Agriculture establishes these
standards in consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Standards
are set for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands. The latter three regions require special eligibility standards and coupon allotment
schedules reflecting average per capita income and cost of a nutritionally adequate diet in
these jurisdictions; however, these standards may not exceed those used in the 50 states.
Under the original program, each participating state established its own eligibility
standards, using maximum income limitations consistent with the state's standards for
federally aided assistance programs. SENATE REPORT 15; 1970 HousE REPORT 4.
216 The regulations define income as including, but not limited to: wages; net income
from self-employment less the cost of that income's production; total income from roomers;
total income from boarders, less a deduction for each boarder amounting to the value of the
coupon allotment for a one-person household; total payments to the household by a member
committed only to contribute part of his income; annuities, pensions, disability or unem-
ployment compensation, and old-age, survivors, or strike benefits; payments from federally
aided or other need-based assistance programs; payments other than those for medical costs
made for the household by a nonmember; cash gifts and awards for support and education,
scholarships, and educational grants; support and alimony payments; and all other royalty,
rent, dividend, interest, or other gains. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1) (1973).
This section also specifies that the following items are exempt from consideration as
income: wages or self-employment income of students under 18; payments received under
title II of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970)); nonmonetary gains or benefits; small, irregular, and
not reasonably foreseeable income gains during a given quarter; insurance-settlement,
sale-of-property, and other nonrecurring lump-sum payments (such as retroactive Social
Security pension payments); 10% of wages or training allowance, not to exceed $30 per
household per month; and all loans except deferred-payment educational loans. 7 C.F.R.
§ 271.3(c)(1) (1973).
Permissible deductions listed include mandatory deductions from earnings such as
taxes, Social Security, and union dues; medical expenses exceeding $10 per month; child or
other care costs necessary to enable a household member to be employed; unusual and not
reasonably anticipated expenses; court-ordered outgoing support and alimony payments;
educational expenses for tuition and mandatory school fees, including those covered by
educational assistance grants of all types; and shelter costs in excess of 30% of the
household's income. Id.
217 The regulations outline exclusions and inclusions in, as well as a standard for
determining, the value of household resources. See 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(4) (1973). Inclusions
are liquid negotiable resources and nonliquid property assets. Id. Excluded from resources
are the household's home, car, household and personal effects, and the cash value of life
insurance policies; any "income-producing property, producing income consistent with its
fair market value"; additional vehicles necessary for work, tools of a household member's
trade, and farm machinery necessary for the household's self-support; the total resources of
roomers, boarders, and household members committed to contribute only a part of their
incomes to the household; and "Indian lands held jointly with the tribe" or saleable only with
approval from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id.
Resource value represents fair market value, less encumbrances. There are no "deduc-
tions" from resources similar to those provided for income valuation.
218 The maximum allowable resources-including both liquid and nonliquid
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and formerly if the applicant met both a tax dependency 219 and a
work registration requirement, 220 the applicant household may be
assets-of all members of each household shall not exceed $1,500 for each house-
hold, except, for households of two or more persons with a member or members
age 60 or over whose resources are not excluded under subdivision (iii)(c) of this
subparagraph, the resources shall not exceed $3,000.
Id. § 271.3(c)(4)(i). Subdivision (iii)(c) of this regulation excludes the total resources of a
roomer or boarder committed to contribute only part of his income to the applicant
household, as payment for services including food and lodging. According to another
provision in the regulations,
[u]niform national income standards of eligibility for participation of nonassistance
households in the program for the 50 States and the District of Columbia shall be
the higher of: (i) The income poverty guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture based on the statistics on poverty levels reported by the Census
Bureau's Current Population Reports; or (ii) the level at which the total coupon
allotment equals 30 percent of income. These income standards for each nonassis-
tance household size will be prescribed in General Notices published in the FEDERAL
REGISTER.
Id. § 271.3(c)(3).
For example, FSP No. 1974-1.1, amend. 18, fixed the national income standards for
nonassistance households in the District of Columbia and all states except Alaska and Hawaii
as the higher of:
(1) The maximum allowable monthly income standards for each household
size which were in effect in such States or the District of Columbia prior to July 29,
1971, or
(2) The following maximum allowable monthly income standards.
Maximum allowable monthly
income standards-48
States and District
Household size: of Columbia
O ne ................................................................. $183
T w o ................................................................. 260
T hree ................................................................ 373
Four ................................................................. 473
Five ................................................................. 560
Six .................................................................. 646
Seven ................................................................ 726
Eight ................................................................ 806
Each additional member ................................................ +67
38 Fed. Reg. 30,118 (1973).
219 Under the statutory mandate (7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970)), the Secretary of Agricul-
ture reiterated in FNS regulations a "tax dependency requirement." For a discussion of the
demise of that requirement, see notes 253-54 and accompanying text infra.
The regulations declared the ineligibility of any household which included a member
age 18 or over who was claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes by a
member of a household not certified as eligible for food assistance, during the tax period for
which such dependency was claimed, and for one year thereafter. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(d) (1973).
For example, a mother with whom a child 18 or over resided in an otherwise eligible
household unit had to be disqualified for two years from receiving food stamps if her
estranged husband, living elsewhere, had claimed the child as a dependent because he, the
husband, made support payments, even though those payments were inadequate to elimi-
nate the need for food assistance.
220 The statute sets forth a "work registration requirement." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970).
Unlike the tax dependency clause, this mandate has weathered the changes of 1973.
Consequently, under the regulations each applicant household must see that its able-bodied
members between the ages of 18 and 65 who are not already working 30 hours a week, are
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certified "eligible" and scheduled to receive food stamps, subject to
periodic recertification. 221 This determination process must be
completed within thirty days of receipt of an application.222
3. Coupon Allotments, Purchase Requirements, and
Redemption of Coupons
Every certified household is entitled to receive a specific
monthly coupon allotment, for which it pays only a percentage of
the monetary face value. 223 The difference between the face value
of the allotment and its cost to the recipient constitutes the
"benefit" conferred by the program.
The size of the allotment awarded each household depends
not on income, but solely upon the number of individuals in the
household. 224 Income does bear, however,. on the cost of the food
stamp allotment to the recipient. A household must pay a higher
percentage of the face value of its allotment as its income increases.
Thus, while two families of four will receive the same monthly
allotment of stamps, each will pay a different sum to obtain them,
not mothers charged with the care of dependent minors or of incapacitated adults, or are
not at least half-time students, register with the appropriate state or federal employment
agency, and comply with certain other requirements with respect to accepting reasonable
offers of employment. See 7 C.F.R. § 2 7 1.3(e) (1973). Failure to so register and become
available for employment renders the household ineligible for food stamps.
This requirement reflects substantial debate over the 1971 amendment. The House
Committee on Agriculture concluded that it was both necessary and desirable to deny
assistance to "freeloaders" while at the same time preserving "the idea that honest labor to
earn one's livelihood is a fundamental part of our national heritage . 1970 HousE
REPORT 11.
221 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(2), (4) (1973). Certification generally is made on the basis of the
application, an interview, and the verification of income and any other factors in question.
When a household's income changes substantially in source or amount, a reverification and
recertification must follow. In addition, the agency must review participant households at
regular intervals to determine any other changes in status likely to affect eligibility, size of
coupon allotment, or purchase requirement. Certification periods vary with the type of
household, i.e., welfare, nonassistance, or farm. See id. § 271.4(4). See note 246 infra.
222 7 C.F.R. § 271.4(3) (1973).
223 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970).
224 Parker, King & Maloney, Polyunsaturated Placebos for the Poor: Food Stamps, the Food
Industry and Government Regulation, 17 How. L.J. 489, 505 (1972). For an example of
allotments for each household size, see FSP No. 1973-1, 38 Fed. Reg. 8287 (1973), and note
226 infra.
Prior to 1973, the value of any allotment was "in such amount as the Secretary
determines to be the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet," and was adjusted once a year to
reflect changes in the prices of food as they were published by the Department of Labor's
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970). For the current situation, see notes
242-43 infra.
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depending upon the size of their respective incomes. The needier
participant will receive a greater "bonus" from the program.225
As they are prescribed, the FNS publishes schedules of allot-
ments and purchase requirements in the Federal Register.2 26 In
addition to these specific per household prescriptions, the Food
Stamp Act itself establishes a ceiling cost beyond which households
may not be charged. Under the Act, each purchase requirement
"shall represent a reasonable investment on the part of the house-
hold, but in no event more than 30 per centum of the household's
income . ," and no charge may be made against a family of four
with income less than thirty dollars per month.227
225 Parker, King & Maloney, supra note 224, at 505. The authors provide an illuminat-
ing example of how the food stamp program works to deliver its actual benefits. Id. at
506-12.
226 7 C.F.R. § 271.5 (1973). The most recently published schedules appear at 38 Fed.
Reg. 30,119, 31,874-76, 32,588, 32,826 (1973). A schedule is structured in this manner:
MONTHLY COUPON ALLOTMENTS AND PURCHASE REQUIREMENTS-
48 STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Number of
Persons in
Household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Monthly
Coupon
Allotment $42 $78 $112 $142 $168 $194 $218 $242
Monthly Net
Income Monthly Purchase Requirement
0- $19.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$20- $29.99 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
$30- $39.99 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
$40- $49.99 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8
$50- $59.99 8 10 10 10 11 11 12 12
$60- $69.99 10 12 13 13 14 14 15 16
$70- $79.99 12 15 16 16 17 17 18 19
$80- $89.99 14 18 19 19 20 21 21 22
$90- $99.99 16 21 21 22 23 24 25 26
$100-$109.99 18 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
$110-$119.99 21 26 27 28 29 31 32 33
$120-$129.99 24 29 30 31 33 34 35 36
$130-$139.99 27 32 33 34 36 37 38 39
$140-$149.99 30 35 36 37 39 40 41 42
The chart continues on through a net monthly income of $780 to $809.99 for a family of
eight. As the monthly income increases, families with fewer members are disqualified for
stamps, so that by the time $809.99 is reached, only eight-person households are still eligible.
Households of more than eight persons are subject to a different formula for finding the
value of the allotment and purchase requirement. See id. at 30,119.
227 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(d)(3) (1973). Eligible households may
elect to receive less than their authorized allotments and to pay for the reduced allotments
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After a household receives its allotment, 228 it is free to use the
stamps to purchase certain eligible foodstuffs, including all domes-
tic staples, produce, meat, and some prepared meals.229 Such
purchases may be made only at retail stores which have been
approved for participation in the program by the FNS. 23° Either
charges bearing the same ratio to the charges they would have paid for their entire
allotments as the face values 'of the reduced allotments bear to the face values of the entire
allotments. Id.
Until 1973, all participant households could elect to have charges, if any, for their
coupon allotments deducted from any other welfare or federally aided assistance grants they
were entitled to receive, and to have their allotments distributed to them together with such
grants. Act of Jan: 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 6(b), 84 Stat. 2048; see note 244 infra.
The House bill for the 1971 amendment proposed a minimum purchase requirement of
at least $0.50 per person per month, not to exceed $3.00 per month for a family of six or
more. This minimum charge met strong objection, however, and consequently failed to pass.
The final bill contained a compromise authorizing the Secretary to provide free stamps to
the neediest households. The no-charge proviso of the statute (7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (1970)),
couched in terms of four-member households, was meant to extend to smaller and larger
households with similar needs. 1970 HousE REPORT 14-15, 31; H.R. REP. No. 1793, supra
note 203, at 8.
22' The state agency may issue coupons through the United States mall (7 C.F.R.
§ 271.6(d)(1) (1973)), or may arrange to have them sold at local government agencies
or its own outlets. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(b) (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(d) (1973).
229 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(b), 2019(h) (1970); 7 C.F.R. § 270.2(s) (1973); note 239 infra.
Under the program in effect through 1972 and early 1973, eligible food excluded alcoholic
beverages, tobacco, foods identified on the packages as imported, and any imported meat.
But meals purchased by elderly persons from authorized nonprofit meal delivery services
did constitute "eligible food" so long as the elderly persons so using their coupons were
feeble, housebound, disabled, or physically handicapped. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(h) (1970).
The express intent of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in its original
definition of food and designation of the coupon allotment size allowed each household was
to restrict recipients to the purchase of low-cost, nonluxury food items designed to provide
high nutritional value. SENATE REPORT 9-10; see 7 U.S.C. § 2019(a) (1970).
Failure to comply with regulations governing the use or redemption of coupons means
temporary or perhaps even permanent disqualification from the program for the offending
household. 7 C.F.R. § 271.9(e) (1973).
230 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b) (1970); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland, Inc. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1971). All establishments falling within the Act's definition of
"retail food store" (7 U.S.C. § 2012(f) (1970)), however, are not ipso facto admitted to the
program. Despite its concession that Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cleveland, Inc., satisfied the
basic definitional requirements for participation, the Fifth Circuit in 1971 sustained its
exclusion from the food stamp program. Because Congress had aimed particularly at
providing low income households with "an opportunity more nearly to obtain a low-cost
nutritionally adequate diet" (7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970)), the court determined that it was
perfectly reasonable for the Secretary of Agriculture to exercise the prerogative vested in
him by granting approval only to grocery establishments stocking a large number of low-cost
foods. 449 F.2d at 257.
Coupons may not be used to pay for food previously bought on credit. 7 C.F.R.
§ 271.9(c) (1973). A recipient who transfers his coupon allotment to someone else for cash
instead of redeeming his coupons in the authorized manner is guilty of a misdemeanor or a
felony, depending upon the total value of the stamps he sells. 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b) (1970).
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the certified head of the household or his authorized representa-
tives may redeem the coupons.23'
B. Program Developments
With the year 1973 came several changes in the food stamp
program of substantial significance to would-be stamp recipients.
Generally, these changes broadened the scope of food stamp
coverage, particularly in the area of eligibility for benefits.
1. Legislative and Administrative Changes
a. Eligibility. Section 3 of the Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act of 1973232 extends and amends the provisions of the
Food Stamp Act. Probably its most important feature is its exten-
sion of eligibility to a number of previously excluded .groups of
individuals. Now encompassed within the definition of eligible
"households" are drug addicts and alcoholics who regularly par-
ticipate in drug addiction or alcoholic treatment and rehabilitation
23programs. ' Moreover, most aged, blind, and disabled individuals
eligible to receive Supplementary Security Income benefits, who
were to be excluded from eligibility as food stamp "households" as
ofJanuary 1, 1974,34 have been reinstated as potential participants
231 7 C.F.R. § 271.9(a) (1973). Once the retailer obtains the stamps, he may redeem
them for face value through authorized wholesalers who act in cooperation with the federal
government, or by depositing them, like money, in his regular bank account. The bank will
then redeem the coupons through the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve System.
7 U.S.C. § 2018 (1970); SENATE REPORT 16.
... Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3, 87 Stat. 246.
211 Id. §§ 3(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2019 (1970); see notes
208-10, 215 & 229 and accompanying text supra.
"Household" is now defined to encompass any narcotics addict or alcoholic living under
the supervision of a private nonprofit organization or institution for the purpose of regular
participation in a treatment and rehabilitation program. To qualify, the "nonprofit organiza-
tion or institution" and its program must be certified by the state agency or agencies
designated by each state's governor, pursuant to federal law, as administrator of the state's
own drug and alcohol addiction treatment programs. Pub. L. No. 93-86, §§ 3(a), (c), 87 Stat.
246, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1970). Like other households these newly defined units will
be subject to uniform national standards of eligibility prescribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture. Id. § 3(d), 87 Star. 246, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1970). Members of such units,
however, are not subject to the work requirement of the statute (see 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)
(1970)) because they are excluded from the definition of "able-bodied adult" used therein.
Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(e), 87 Stat. 247. Finally, drug addicted or alcoholic members of
eligible households may use their coupons to purchase meals prepared or served to them
during the course of their treatment or rehabilitation program under the same conditions
governing purchase of meals by the elderly. Id. § 3(f), 87 Stat. 247, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019
(1970).
234 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. II, 1972); note 210 supra.
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in the program.235 Finally, residents of certain federally subsidized
housing for the elderly become eligible to form a food stamp
"household" because the new law specifically removes them from
the excluded category of residents of institutions and boarding
houses.
23 6
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act alters food
stamp eligibility in two other important ways. First, the Act in-
creases the Secretary of Agriculture's ability to establish temporary
emergency eligibility standards. 37 Second, the prescribed uniform
national standards of income and resource eligibility now take into
account part of the value of housing furnished by an employer to
members of an applicant household. 38
235 The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3, 87
Stat. 246, provided that certain SSI recipients could be eligible for food stamps. The
eligibility criteria spelled out in the Act were altered by Public Law 93-233 (87 Stat. 947), but
at least some SSI recipients will still be eligible for food stamps. See notes 175-76 and
accompanying text supra.
Under the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act, households including SSI recip-
ients would become "nonassistance" households for the purposes of food assistance. This
means they would not be entitled to the presumption of financial eligibility that is enjoyed by
participants in other federally-aided public assistance programs. Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(b), 87
Stat. 246; see notes 211-12 and accompanying text supra. However, the effective date of this
provision was postponed until at least July 1, 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 8(a)(2), 87 Stat.
956), and it is not clear whether it will ever become effective.
216 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3 (p), 87 Stat. 249,amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970). Residents
in housing built under either § 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. § 170lq (1970)),
or § 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970)) are not ineligible because
of residence in a boarding house or institution. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
.3. Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(h), 87 Stat. 247, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970). The
Secretary now may establish temporary emergency eligibility standards without regard to
income and other financial resources not only for households victimized by disasters which
have disrupted commercial channels of food distribution (see note 214 supra), but also for
households which are victims of mechanical disasters which disrupt the distribution of
coupons. Such emergency standards may be set for the former group when the Secretary
determines that the victim households require temporary food assistance and that commer-
cial channels of food distribution are again available to meet these households' temporary
food needs. Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(h), 87 Stat. 247; 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970). For the latter
group, temporary eligibility standards apply only for the duration of the mechanical disaster.
H.R. REP. No. 427, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973) (conference report).
The House Committee on Agriculture intended in its endorsement of this provision to
emphasize the need for certification prior to the actual issuance of food stamps. Its purpose
was to "unalterably condemn"
the practice it understands has developed in some areas of issuing food stamps to
large groups of applicants who make application at the same time and because of
limited staff facilities, food stamps are issued immediately without regard to
determining the eligibility of the individual applicants.
H.R. REP. No. 337, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1973).
238 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(g), 87 Stat. 247. Payments in kind are relevant to financial
eligibility standards only if such. payments are in lieu of or supplemental to the household's
income and only when the payment takes the form of housing provided the employee by the
19741
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b. Definition of Eligible Food. A second area of major change
in the food stamp program is reflected in the Agriculture and
Consumer Protection Act's expansion of the definition of eligible
food. For the first time, a food stamp recipient may use his
coupons to obtain imported foods, garden seeds, plants intended to
produce food for the personal consumption of the eligible house-
hold, and, for some certified households in Alaska, hunting
and fishing equipment.2 39 In addition, the ability of elderly persons
to purchase prepared meals with their coupons has been greatly
augmented. No longer is the use of food stamps for that purpose
restricted to meals delivered to housebound, feeble, disabled, or
physically handicapped aged individuals in their homes.240
c. Allotment and Administration. Finally, the Agriculture and
Consumer Protection Act affects the food stamp program in two
other areas: coupon allotments and the general implementation
and administration of the program in the states.24' The face value
employer. The value taken into account is that of the actual value of the housing, "but in no
event shall such value be considered to be in excess of the sum of $25.00 per month." Id.,
amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
239 Pub. L. No. 93-86, §§ 3(1), (n), 87 Stat. 248-49, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(b) (1970);
compare 7 C.F.R. § 270.2(s) (1973). The USDA revised its definition of eligible food to
include seeds, plants, and imported foods immediately upon the passage of the amend-
ments, without the usual 30 days' notice, because the Agriculture and Consumer Protection
Act mandated the change, because this particular change involved action only by USDA, and
because it felt that speedy removal of the restriction on imported foods would "allow food
stamp participants the flexibility they need to get the most economical and nutritious foods
available with their limited food purchasing power." 38 Fed. Reg. 22,465 (1973).
Alaskan household members, in accordance with any rules and regulations the Secretary
deems necessary to prescribe, can purchase with their coupons hunting and fishing equip-
ment to be used for obtaining food for the household, if the Secretary determines that the
location of the household makes it extremely difficult for its members to reach retail food
stores and that the household greatly depends upon hunting and fishing for its subsistence.
Firearms, ammunition, and other explosives are not permissible food stamp purchases. Pub.
L. No. 93-86, § 3(n), 87 Stat. 248-49.
240 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(k), 87 Stat. 248, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019(h) (1970); note 229
supra. Coupons may now be used by members of eligible households who are at least 60
years of age or elderly persons and their spouses to pay for meals prepared by senior
citizens' centers, apartment buildings occupied primarily by elderly persons, public or
nonprofit private schools which prepare meals especially for elderly persons, public or
nonprofit eating establishments which prepare meals especially for elderly persons during
special hours, and any other public or nonprofit private establishments approved for such
purpose by the Secretary of Agriculture. Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(k), 87 Stat. 248. They may
also be used to purchase meals prepared especially for elderly persons during special or
regular hours and offered for sale at concessional prices pursuant to any contract for such
purpose between an appropriate state or local agency and a private establishment. Id.
241 Pub. L. No. 93-86, §§ 3(i), (j), (m), 87 Stat. 247-48, amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2019(e),
2016(a), 2025 (1970).
The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act extends the food stamp program
through June 30, 1977, and provides for the continued availability of any sums appropriated
under the Food Stamp Act until those funds are expended. Id. § 3(j), 87 Stat. 247.
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of the coupon allotment which a state agency will be authorized to
issue henceforth will be adjusted semi-annually rather than annu-
ally, in order to allow the FNS the opportunity to keep pace with
changes in the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet.2 42 Allotments
now must be distributed at least twice each month,243 and each
state must institute procedures under which any recipient house-
holds may arrange to have the charges for their coupon allotments
deducted from any payments or grants they may receive under the
AFDC program.24 4 Congress has changed the law to assure that all
242 Id. at § 3(m), 87 Stat. 248, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970);H.R. REP. No. 427,
supra note 237, at 30, 40; note 224 supra.
Beginning with the 1974 allotments, food stamp benefits will be updated twice as often
as previously. The initial adjustments will incorporate price changes through August 31,
1973, as reported by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. All adjustments
will occur in $2.00 increments, or "by the nearest dollar increment that is a multiple of two."
In October 1973, the USDA announced the first allotment adjustments made pursuant
to the new law. On January 1, 1974, the monthly food stamp allotment for a family of four
rose nearly 22%, from $116 to $142. Giving this increase even more meaning to nonassis-
tance households, USDA simultaneously raised the maximum cash income allowable for
financial eligibility. For example, the maximum for a household of four has been raised
from $387 per month to $473-also approximately a 22% increase. Only about 5% of the
12.3 million food stamp recipients will not benefit from a similar increase. Recipients near
the upper limit on the income eligibility scale for one- and two-person households will find
their increased allotments offset by increased purchase requirements. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3 1,
1973, at 9, col. 1.
The increased allotments and benefits will of course have an impact on the cost of the
food stamp program. It was estimated at the time the increase was published that govern-
ment costs would rise in the current fiscal year by $400 million, to $2.9 billion. Id. This
budget increase may create some fiscal problems, because to date Congress has appropriated
only $2.5 billion to cover the augmented expense of administering the amended program
with its substantially expanded eligibility. 1973 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RE'. vol. XXXI, no. 41, at
2747, col. 1. In recognition of congressional determination to maintain or increase levels of
participation in food assistance programs, however, President Nixon in his 1975 budget
requests has asked for an increase in food stamp appropriations to $3.9 billion in the next
fiscal year. 1974 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. vol. XXXII no. 6, at 272, col. 2.
243 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(i), 87 Stat. 247-48, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (1970).
Formerly the frequency of issuance was determined by the regulations (7 C.F.R.
§ 271.6(d)(4) (1973)), which required that eligible households be offered the frequency
of coupon issuance best geared to the frequency of their receipt of income. A proviso
to that regulation assured that all project areas would provide at least for a monthly
and a semi-monthly schedule of issuance.
244 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(i), 87 Stat. 247-48, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (1970). Until
March 28, 1973, the Secretary's regulations, pursuant to legislative authority (see 7 U.S.C.
§ 2019(e) (1970)), ordered state agencies to permit any participating household to elect to have
the cost of its full monthly coupon allotment deducted from the amount of its federally
aided public assistance grant or payment. 7 C.F.R. § 271.6(d)(2) (1973); note 227 supra. In
response to the revocation of that legislative authority (see 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (Supp. II,
1972)), the Secretary amended the regulations simply to give the state agency the option of
providing for a means of voluntary household deduction of the food stamp purchase
requirement from any federally aided public assistance grants or payments the household
may be entitled to receive. 38 Fed. Reg. 8049-50 (1973). The newest provision restores the
mandate of the earlier law insofar as it may have applied to grants received under AFDC,
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states implement the food stamp program in every one of their
political subdivisions if it is feasible to do so. 245
Only a few administrative changes occurred in the food stamp
program during 1973. In July, the FNS announced a new averaged
yearly income method for computing income received by house-
hold members on other than an hourly or piecework basis, al-
though nonetheless received under a contract renewable on a
yearly or longer basis, as in the case of public school employees.2 46
In August, it amended its financial eligibility standards for nonas-
sistance households247 to exclude any earnings resulting from vol-
unteer services performed by elderly applicants.248 And in May,
which provides grants to the states to aid families with dependent children and to foster
other child-welfare projects.
245 Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(i), 87 Stat. 247-48, amending 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (1970); 7
C.F.R. § 271.1(i) (1973), as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 22,465-66 (1973). Originally, the state only
had to specify in which of its political subdivisions it desired to provide coupons; but the new
food stamp law has required that each state agency prior to January 1, 1974, submit for FNS
approval a plan delineating the way in which it intended to conduct the food stamp program
in all of its political subdivisions. The only means by which a state could avoid this duty to
submit a plan for any of its subdivisions was to demonstrate effectively the impossibility or
impracticability of implementing the program in the designated subdivision. The FNS is to
approve or disapprove each state plan in sufficient time to allow for its institution by no later
than June 30, 1974. See note 197 supra.
246 38 Fed. Reg. 17,845 (1973). Before this amendment, the regulations permitted (1)
the averaging of household income over the appropriate certification period, (2) the
even averaging or uneven prorating of farm or self-employment income over a certifi-
cation period not to exceed one year, and (3) the averaging of income from scholar-
ships, educational grants, fellowships, and veterans' educational benefits over the period
which such income was intended to cover in determining household eligibility. 7 C.F.R.
§§ 271.3(c)(2)(i), (ii), (iii) (1973). To these methods of handling income, the Secretary added
the following provision:
To determine the eligibility of households with members who receive compen-
sation on other than an hourly or piecework basis under a contract which is
renewable on a yearly or longer basis (such as, but not limited to, school employees),
such members shall be deemed to be receiving compensation continuously for an
entire year even though predetermined nonwork (vacation) periods are involved or
actual compensation payments are scheduled for payment during work periods
only. For such persons, compensation received under such contracts shall be
averaged over a 12-month period.
38 Fed. Reg. 17,845 (1973), amending 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(2) (1973). This new means for
handling income does not apply in situations in which the other party to the contract refuses
or is unable to pay under the contract, or in which the flow of earnings anticipated in the
contract otherwise is interrupted. Id.
247 See notes 211-12 and accompanying text supra.
248 38 Fed. Reg. 21,917 (1973). Because the Older Americans Comprehensive Services
Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-29, 87 Stat. 55 (amending the Older Americans Act of
1965), prohibit considering as income for any purpose whatsoever any compensation
authorized to be paid to elderly volunteers participating in the National Older Americans
Volunteer Program, the food stamp program's definition of income had to be altered to
conform with that law. The result is a new regulation which views money earned this way as
nonincome with respect to food assistance eligibility. 38 Fed. Reg. 21,917 (1973), amending 7
C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(ii) (1973).
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the FNS updated its procedures for verifying the amount of
income a household receives from any of the Social Security
programs.249
2. Judicial Activity
During 1973, some of the most telling blows against the
program's eligibility standards were dealt not by the legislature, but
by the courts.25 ° Significantly, these decisions uniformly favored
the would-be beneficiaries of the program.
In June 1973, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
two of the most comprehensively exclusive requirements for food
stamp eligibility. In United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno,2 5' the Court struck down as violative of due process the
rule that all members of an eligible household must be related to
one another, or else be over sixty and living elsewhere than in an
institution or a boarding house.252 For similar reasons, in United
States Department of Agriculture v. Murry255 the Court invalidated the
requirement that no member of a certified household who is over
eighteen may have been claimed as a tax dependent by a member
of an ineligible household for the year prior to the one for which
food assistance is sought.254 This requirement had apparently been
enacted for the purpose of keeping food stamps out of the hands
of the children of relatively affluent families, who might attempt to
obtain stamps through a "household" established while away at
school or college.2 5 5 Both provisions and their attendant regula-
tions, according to the Court, created legislative classifications un-
sustainable under the fifth amendment. The relatedness rule fell
249 38 Fed. Reg. 11,338 (1973). Each state agency, if it so chooses, may verify a
household's report of Social Security benefits received via the automated data processing
system used jointly by the Social Security Administration and the Social and Rehabilitation
Service of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id., amending 7
C.F.R. § 271.4(a)(2)(iii) (1973).
250 The courts were particularly critical of those standards established in the original act
which were buttressed in 1971 by a Congress hesitant to dole out benefits to the fraudulent
or undeserving. See 1970 HousE REPORT 11; note 220 supra; notes 252 & 254 infra.
251 413 U.S. 528 (1973)..
252 See note 210 and accompanying text supra. This requirement was introduced in the
1971 amendments for the stated purpose of preventing "hippies" and "hippie communes"
from qualifying to participate in the food stamp program. See H.R. REP. No. 1793, supra
note 203, at 8; 116 CONG. REc. 44,439 (1970) (remarks of Senator Holland).
253 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
254 For an example of how this exclusion works, see note 219 and accompanying text
supra. The 1971 amendments had contained this requirement also.
255 116 CONG. REc. 41,979, 41,981, 41,993, 42,021 (1970); 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 746
(1973).
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under the "traditional" equal protection analysis256 because it was
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest; the tax
dependency provision succumbed because it created a false "con-
clusive presumption" that the household containing the claimed
dependent is not in need. 257
256 In Moreno, the Court translated its due process rationale for invalidation into an
equal protection argument used throughout the opinion simply by declaring at the outset
that the challenged provision violated the "equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 413 U.S. at 532-33.
257 Because the statutory classification of households into two groups challenged in
Moreno was irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Food Stamp Act (see 7 U.S.C. § 2011
(1970)), the Court sought some other legitimate government interest upon which to sustain
the regulation. 413 U.S. at 535. But neither the avowed purpose for the rule (see note 252
supra) nor the "purpose for the purpose"-the minimization of fraud in the administration
of the program-could salvage it. The former could scarcely justify the discrimination
between related and unrelated households under the doctrine of equal protection, since "a
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest." 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in original). Nor could the latter reason
serve to sustain the classification, for the Food Stamp Act itself amply guards against fraud
and claims for aid by the "voluntarily poor" by imposing the work-registration requirement
(see 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970); note 220 supra) and strict penalties for fraudulent use or
procurement of food coupons (7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b), (c) (1970)). As a result, the Court found
the espoused "purpose behind the purpose" to be doubtful at best. 413 U.S. at 536-37.
Moreover, the particular requirement established would not rationally operate to prevent
fraud, because unrelated persons frequently could alter their living arrangements to avoid
having to be treated as a single household, by ceasing to live as an economic unit, or to share
cooking facilities, or to purchase food in common. Consequently, the Court could only
conclude that the
1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those
persons who are "likely to abuse the program" but, rather, only those persons who
are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living
arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.
Id. at 538 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court found that the 1971 amendment was
"wholly without any rational basis." Id.
Although Murry involved a similar problem, the Court for some reason adopted a
slightly different approach for its solution. Rather than concentrating on the equal protec-
tion argument, it used a straight due process analysis based on the use of the conclusive
presumption coupled with the lack of opportunity for a household to demonstrate its need
despite the tax claim of one of its members by a nonindigent household. Declared the court:
We have difficulty in concluding that it is rational to assume that a child is not
indigent this year because the parent declared the child as a dependent in his tax
return for the prior year. But even on that assumption our problem is not at an
end. Under the Act the issue is not the indigency of the child but the indigency of a
different household with which the child happens to be living. Members of that
different household are denied Food Stamps if one of its present members was
used as a tax deduction in the past year by his parents even though the remaining
members have no relation to the parent who used the tax deduction, even though
they are completely destitute and even though they are one, or 10 or 20 in number.
We conclude that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year
is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child
of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often
contrary to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process . ...
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
For a brief discussion of these two cases see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L.
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The third and final judicial attack on preexisting eligibility
standards occurred in a federal district court. Early in 1973, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
permanently enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture from refusing
food stamps to any person simply because not all persons with
whom the applicant shared living quarters and expenses were
eligible for food relief under the program. 258 In addition, that
court held invalid, as contrary to the relevant provisions of the
Food Stamp Act, all instructions and regulations which charac-
terized all persons sharing living quarters and expenses as automat-
ically comprising a single household.259
Eligibility standards, however, were not the only victims of the
trend toward enhancing rights of recipients. Two other aspects of
the food stamp program were reviewed in the courts. A federal
district court in Kentucky invalidated two FNS instructions which
severely limited federal liability for food stamps lost, stolen, or
REv. 125-33, 128-29 n.22 (1973). The authors note that "Moreno appears to be the first case
in which the Court has applied its new stricter rationality test to a classification limiting
welfare disbursements." Id. at 129. This conclusion is based upon the observation that
although the Court in Moreno professed to use the "traditional" rational basis test, it assayed
the relationship between the exclusion of unrelated households and the stated purposes for
that exclusion in greater depth than has traditionally been characteristic of equal protection
analysis, giving far less than the usual deference to legislative judgment on ends and means.
Id. at 129-31.
258 Knowles v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 228, 232-34 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
259 The defendants claimed that because all persons who share living quarters and
expenses for them compose an "economic unit," they necessarily also must be treated as a
"household for purposes of the program." As the court observed, however, FNS Instruction
732-1, § III(D)(1)(d) (1972), clearly a proper regulation for the Secretary to promulgate,
defines "economic unit" inconsistently with this view. An economic unit not only provides
common living expenses for all its members from their pooled resources, it also meets the
basic needs of all members "without regard to their [individual] ability or willingness to
contribute." 358 F. Supp. at 231. The court concluded that
[u]nder this definition, however, not all who share living quarters and share the
expenses for such quarters are an "economic unit," which is what defendants
contend; rather, the sharing of living quarters and the expenses for them would be
but one factual datum to be considered. Those who do not share income and other
resources with their cotenants and who do not share any expenses except the
expense of housing probably could not constitute an "economic unit" together with
their cotenants under this definition. Certainly, the definition does not support any
per se rule that they would.
Id. at 231-32.
To reinforce its opinion, the court then noted that even if a group of individuals does
constitute an "economic unit," that group cannot automatically be considered a "household."
Under the Food Stamp Act, an "economic unit" is only a "household" if it shares cooking
facilities and customarily purchases food in common. Id. at 232. Thus, FNS Instruction
732-1, § III(D)(2)(b) (1972) and the regulation (7 C.F.R. § 271.3(a) (1973)), which were
challenged in Knowles because they rendered ineligible an entire household if one tenant in
the commonly funded living quarters was ineligible, had to be held invalid.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:859
withheld because of a state administrative error in such a way as
effectively to eliminate all federally financed retroactive relief.160 In
its opinion, the court said that the FNS can neither categorize
retroactive food assistance as administrative costs to be borne by
the states,2 6 ' nor deny outright federal retroactive stamp relief,26 2
without violating the policies and the purposes of the Food Stamp
Act.2 6 3 Consequently, it ordered the federal government to fund
adjustments in the price of future coupons to be issued to persons
proving- that previous benefits were wrongfully withheld. 264
260 Stewart v. Butz,'356 F. Supp. 1345 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
261 Id. at 1350-51, 1353-54; FNS Instruction 734-2, § VI(C) (1969). This food stamp
directive terminated after one month federal liability for stamps lost, stolen, or, as in this
case, withheld through state administrative mistake. The federal agency declared itself
immune from payment for replacement stamps unless they were issued in the same month
as the loss and in response to a timely request for reissuance. Apparently, the federal agency
attempted to categorize the reissuance and replacement benefits as "administrative costs" to
be borne by the states. See note 204 and accompanying text supra.
262 Stewart v. Butz, 356 F. Supp. 1345, 1351-52, 1354 (W.D. Ky. 1973); FNS Instruction
732-14(D) (1972). Food stamp recipients who had prevailed at "fair hearings" to determine if
their benefits were wrongfully withheld were totally cut off from federal relief.
261 Since the Food Stamp Act is designed to provide federal funds to assist needy
families in attaining an adequate nutrition level (see 7 U.S.G. § 2011 (1970); notes 198 & 203
and accompanying text supra) regulations depriving a family of federal support for that
purpose directly conflict with congressional intent. Administrative regulations thus inconsis-
tent with their enabling legislation are void. Stewart v. Butz, 356 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (W.D.
Ky. 1973). The Kentucky court saw the inconsistency in an "unreasonable regulation" which
"effectively deprives a poor person of a federal statutory right simply because of a state
administrative error":
We simply do not see the justice of allowing a poor food stamp recipient to be the
loser caught in the midst of an administrative tangle between the federal and state
governments. We think the federal government should face up to its responsibilities
under the Food Stamp Act. The injustice of the situation becomes patent where, as
here, the food stamp recipient makes a "timely request for reissuance" during the
month of non-issuance (i.e., May, 1972) the state fails to reissue the stamps during
the month, and the food stamp recipient subsequently prevails at a fair hearing in
which it is determined that she indeed has a "right" to receive the stamps withheld
from her, but that no (federal) remedy is available. We can see the need for some
limit of federal liability for food stamps, but we do not believe that one month is
reasonable.
Id.
In support of its decision the court invoked the eleventh amendment, which strips the
federal court of the power to order a state to expend funds from its own treasury. Id. at
1352. Since Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has "elevated welfare benefits, including
food stamps, to a position of legal right and statutory entitlement," and every such right has
an attendant remedy (Stewart v. Butz, 356 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (W.D. Ky. 1973)), the court
had to formulate relief other than federal disbursement of state monies.
264 Stewart v. Butz, 356 F. Supp. 1345, 1354 (W.D. Ky. 1973). The court settled on
forward adjustment of the purchase requirements for the wrongfully deprived household as
the proper remedy because, unlike other types of "retroactive relief," it is not susceptible to
fraud. The issuance of extra food stamps may often be conducive to hoarding and the
formation of a black market in food coupons; but the reduction of the price of the stamps
for as long as necessary by as much as necessary simply compensates the wronged household
for the expenditures it had to make during the time it did not receive stamps.
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Later in the year, two circuit court decisions unequivocally
sustained the Kentucky court's rationale.265 When stamps have
been withheld wrongfully as a result of state administrative error, it
now is clear that federal policy demands that households be "given
an opportunity to make up the cash discount of which they were
deprived. 266
Finally, in mid-summer 1973, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Rodway v. United
States Department of Agriculture267 firmly cemented to the ongoing
food stamp system the right of recipients to seek judicial review of
the Secretary of Agriculture's determination of what constitutes a
"nutritionally adequate diet. '268 That right of review, however, is
confined to an inquiry as to whether the Secretary had a rational
basis for his selection of criteria for establishing a schedule of
coupon allotments.269
265 Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S.
Dec. 11, 1973); Bermudez v. Butz, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
266 Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1088 (3d Cir. 1973). Although the court recognized
the power of the federal government to impose liability on the states as an incentive to police
strictly the administration of the program and as a means of reinforcing the federal purpose
of reserving stamps for purely nutritional uses, it pointed out that neither the Act nor the
regulations provided specifically for such an "incentive-penalty" against the states. There-
fore, the court bore the responsibility of finding the appropriate remedy for the deprived
recipients. That remedy had to be levied against the federal government instead of the
states, since Congress and not the states had appropriated funds to pay for food stamp
benefits. Even though Congress could have required as a condition of state participation in
the program that each state waive its sovereign immunity and assume direct liability, it had
not done so and thus had to shoulder the burden of funding the relief alone.
From the fact that the FNS specifically had provided that even if the federal govern-
ment would not give retroactive relief the states could still do so, the court implied that the
FNS recognized the need for some adjustment. Forward adjustment struck the court as most
consistent with federal nutritional purposes because it would reimburse householders for the
money that they would have had to spend for food in lieu of stamps and would assure the
current use of food stamps for nutritional purposes. Id. at 1088-89.
267 482 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
268 Id. at 726-27. The plaintiffs were members of low income households who main-
tained that the Economy Food Plan upon which the Secretary of Agriculture based his
assessment of the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet (see notes 198, 214 & 229 supra), and
hence his schedule of coupon allotments, did not in fact provide a nutritionally adequate
diet. They also contested the Secretary's failure to adjust allotments to reflect regional
differences in food costs. The court doubted the likelihood of finding that the Secretary had
set arbitrary and unreasonable standards since Congress when it approved the 1971
amendments had been quite aware of his intent to base his standards on the Economy Food
Plan. H.R. REP. No. 1793, supra note 203, at 9. Nonetheless, the court asserted the necessity
of proper judicial review of the issue at the district court level. Rodway v. United States Dep't
of Agriculture, 482 F.2d 722, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
269 482 F.2d at 727, 729. The court directed the district court to determine whether
there was (1) no abuse of discretion by the Secretary, and (2) a rational basis for the
Secretary's determination with respect to (a) the use of the Economy Food Plan in determin-
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IV
MEDICAID PROGRAM
A. The Program Prior to 1973
1. Structure and Administration
In 1965, Congress amended title XIX of the Social Security
Act 270 in order to inaugurate a unique program of federal medical
assistance grants to the states popularly known as "Medicaid." The
purpose of this amendment was to replace the medical aid benefit
programs formerly available to the poor only through the states271
with a combined federal-state program covering "all medical care
expenses for those persons, regardless of age, whose income and
assets are low enough to meet the eligibility requirements. 2 72
Cooperatively financed with federal, state, and sometimes local
revenues, this program is jointly administered by the federal Medi-
cal Services Administration of HEW, and a single statewide agency,
usually the state department of welfare and health.273 Although
each state retains some discretion in the formulation of its own
program, title XIX in effect mandates that every state, if it is to
receive any form of federal medical assistance funding, enact some
form of Medicaid plan274 which complies with certain minimum
ing the level of coupon food allotments, and (b) in failing to provide differences in coupon
allotments to reflect regional differences in food costs. Id. at 729.
270 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. XIX, 79 Stat. 343
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972)). The 1965
amendments were heralded as the "greatest advance in social legislation ever presented to
the Congress." S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1965) (supplemental views of
Senators Ribicoff & Hartke).
271 S. REP. No. 404, supra note 270, at 2-3; Bernard & Feingold, The Impact of Medicaid,
1970 Wis. L. REv. 726, 726-27.
272 Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 726.
273 42 U.S.C. §§ 139a(a)(2), (5) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 205.100 (1973); Bernard & Feingold,
supra note 271, at 726, 741-42.
Originally the state could acquire up to 60% of its nonfederal Medicaid funds from local
governments. Since July 1, 1969, the entire nonfederal share must come from the state,
unless it has devised a means of safeguarding against an inadequate medical assistance level
in those of its political subdivisions unable to contribute adequately toward a medical
program.
As for administration, each state creates or delegates authority to one administrative
body. If this agency is not the one which normally handles public assistance, determination
'of eligibility, at least insofar as it relates to the aged, must remain a responsibility of the latter
department. Frequently, the state contracts with a private organization, usually Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, to operate its Medicaid plan, under state agency supervision, on the local
level.
274 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1970); S. REP. No. 404, supra note 270, at 204; Bernard &
Feingold, supra note 271, at 731.
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federal eligibility, coverage, and administrative standards.275 To
assure compliance, the Act requires that a participating state sub-
*mit a proposal for approval by the federal agency before its
program may take effect.2 76 Such a plan must provide for the
availability of Medicaid in all political subdivisions of the state,
prompt action on applications, a fair hearing of all grievances, an
administrative body and procedures for handling assistance cases,
restrictions on disclosure of information about recipients or appli-
cants, maintenance of health and other standards for private and
public institutions in which Medicaid recipients may receive care or
services, coverage of residents temporarily absent from the state,
reviewable records of all personnel and transactions relevant to the
administration of the program, procedures for licensing participat-
ing nursing home administrators, procedures for the use of and
payment for services available under the plan, and specific cover-
age of mandatory and elective classes through mandatory or elec-
tive services.277 As with most federally aided assistance programs,
should the plan be altered to such an extent that it no longer
complies with the Social Security Act, or should it fail in its
administration to comply with federal standards, federal assistance
will be terminated.2 7 8
Under title XIX, the states were given the option of replacing their existing public
assistance medical care programs with the Medicaid system. This "option" was in effect a
mandate, however, since title XIX curtailed federal payments for non-Medicaid medical
assistance after December 31, 1969, making Medicaid the only source of such assistance for
recipients. Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 743. To date, only Arizona has failed to
develop a Medicaid program. CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED,
755.61, at 389. Interim arrangements have been made to accommodate SSI recipients
until that state does implement Medicaid coverage.
275 See notes 279-81 & 292-99 and accompanying text infra.
276 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970).
277 Id. §§ 1396a(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (13), (16), (27),. (29), (30).
Section 1396a contains a series of additional provisions covering state financial participa-
tion, state agency reporting of its Medicaid operations, the eligibility of nursing homes for
federal financial participation, cooperation with state health and vocational rehabilitation
services, ascertainment of the legal liability of third parties for care and services arising out
of injury, disease, or disability, review procedures for providers of services and suitability of
services made available, special provisions for the blind, insured, and inmates of mental or
permanent care facilities, and other general requirements such as time periods of eligibility
and reasonable financial eligibility standards. When the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare promulgates regulations in furtherance of these statutory provisions, detailed state
plan requirements and conditions for approval, too numerous to catalogue here, appear in
the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 246 (1973).
278 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (1970). Unfortunately, this type of penalty simply cuts off further
federal money for Medicaid until correction of state noncompliance, affecting most severely
those least able to remedy the situation-the recipients.
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2. Coverage and Eligibility
The designation of specific. classes of eligible individuals rests
largely within the discretion of the state, except that each state
must include certain basic groups. Most significantly, the state must
provide medical assistance for all persons already qualifying for
benefits under the broad eligibility requirements of the federal
programs for cash-payment assistance to the aged, the blind, the
totally or permanently disabled, and families with dependent
children. 7 9 Persons qualifying for Medicaid in this way are termed
"categorically needy."
In addition to these mandatory groups, a state program may
include several other categories of individuals280 for which the
279 Id. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(a)(1), (b)(1)(i) (1973); note 309 and
accompanying text infra. This class also includes all persons determined to be "essential" to
the categorical recipients under the state categorical plan. For purposes of the Medicaid
program, a person is "essential" to another individual if that person is "the spouse of and
living with the individual, has his needs taken into account in the determination of how
much assistance to give the individual under a state financial assistance program, and has
been determined under the other program to be essential to the well-being of the individual"
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970). Furthermore, the state plan must cover individuals who could
be categorical recipients if the state plan were as broad as permitted under federal law. See
note 280 infra.
The state must also provide Medicaid to all persons who have been eligible for one of
the categorical assistance programs except for a state-imposed eligibility requirement that is
validly imposed for categorical assistance purposes but is prohibited under title XIX. 45
C.F.R. § 248.10(b)(1)(iii) (1973). For example, a state is allowed by statute to establish a
durational residency requirement for its supplemental SSI program. See notes 190-91 and
accompanying text supra. However, a state may not use a durational residency requirement
as a precondition to Medicaid eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)(3) (1970). Any plan containing
age requirements more stringent than those for a state's other financial assistance programs
will be rejected. 45 C.F.R. § 248.30(a)(3) (1973). Not only must title XIX plans cover all
United States citizens, but programs including the medically needy (see note 282 and
accompanying text infra) must include all otherwise eligible individuals, regardless of
citizenship status, although a state may choose to condition eligibility on citizenship if all of
its approved financial assistance programs contain such a condition. 45 C.F.R. § 248.50(b)
(1973). All persons voluntarily living in the state with the intention of making their homes
there must be included so long as their presence in the state is interrupted only temporarily.
During temporary absences from the state, residents continue to be eligible for medical
assistance as if they were present within the state, if the need for medical care arises from
emergency, accident, or illness, or if delay of medical care until return to the state would
impair the health of the individual, or if an attempt to return to the state for care would
endanger the individual's health. In conjunction with this provision, title XIX requires each
state to facilitate the meeting of medical needs within the state for residents from other
states. 45 C.F.R. § 248.40 (1973).
Finally, all individuals under age 21 who would qualify under the state's approved
AFDC plan except for age or school attendance requirements must also be included. 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(b)(2) (1970); 45 G.F.R. §§ 248.10(b)(I)(ii), 248.30(a)(2) (1973).
280 Among these may be persons who would be eligible for assistance under any other
state categorical assistance plan but have not applied for it, or cannot receive it because they
reside in a medical facility. 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1973); note 310 and accompany-
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states may set basic eligibility standards, subject to federal
guidelines. 28 1 The most important of these optional categories is
that consisting of the "medically needy." The "medically needy" are
those persons whose income and resources equal or exceed the
state's standards for categorical assistance but who nevertheless are
unable to meet costs both for medical insurance premiums and
necessary medical and remedial services.282
While the financial eligibility requirements for the categorically
ing text infra. The state may also include in its program those "who would be eligible for a
categorical public assistance program if the state's program were as broad as federal
legislation permits." Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 734. This group includes, for
example, persons who would be eligible for AFDC if the state program covered families with
children deprived of parental support to the full extent permitted under federal legislation.
45 C.F.R. § 248.10(b)(2)(iii) (1973). A state program might embrace all financially eligible
individuals under 21 who do not qualify as dependent children for AFDC purposes and all
caretaker relatives of these medically indigent youths. Id. § 248.I0(b)(2)(iv), (v); note 310 and
accompanying text infra. Groups of children comprising "reasonable classifications," such as
all those in foster homes, may also be designated a needy category by the state. Individuals
barred from financial assistance only because work-related child-care costs are not paid out
of earnings may participate in a state's program (45 C.F.R. § 248.10(b)(2)(vi) (1973)) as well
as any other group of individuals the state chooses. Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at
734. For these groups federal cost-sharing would not be available as far as medical costs are
concerned. See notes 287-88 and accompanying text infra.
Although its goal never materialized, the federal government, through title XIX, before
the 1972 amendments, did try to compel each state to provide at its own expense for the age
group between 21 and 65, despite that group's general ineligibility for federal participation.
Bernard & Feingold,supra note 271, at 741; see S. REP. No. 222, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
281 45 C.F.R. § 248.10(c) (1973); see note 280 supra.
Groups that a state elects to include must be based on reasonable, unambiguous, and
nonarbitrary classifications. The groups included may not be subject to more numerous or
stringent conditions of eligibility, except for need, than groups receiving other assistance
under approved state plans, and may not be subject to age, residence, or citizenship
requirements prohibited by title XIX. In addition, as some commentators have observed:
Determination of eligibility should be "consistent with simplicity of administra-
tion and the best interests of the recipients." The individual's privacy should be
protected with regard to the kinds of information sought about him and the way in
which it is sought. Typical relative responsibility requirements of public assistance
programs are relaxed under the Medicaid program so that the only relatives with
prior responsibility for payment of medical care costs are an individual's spouse and
the parents of a child who is under 21, blind, or disabled. Liens may not be imposed
against the property of any recipient while he is alive; recovery may be had only
from the estates of recipients who were 65 or over when they received medical
assistance, and then only after the death of the spouse and if there is no surviving
child aged under 21, or who is blind or disabled. The state agency is required to
publicize the program so that potential applicants are aware of it and keep persons
eligible for the program informed about the changes in the program.
Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 737 (footnotes omitted); see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396a(a)(19), (17)(D), (19) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 248.10(c)(5) (1973). Compare note
192 and accompanying text supra.
282 45 C.F.R. § 248.10(a)(2) (1973). Frequently, medically needy groups correspond to
the specified categorically needy groups; when a state plan covers a medically needy class
related to either of the specific categories, it must cover those related to both of them. Id.
§ 248.10(b)(3); Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 733; note 309 infra.
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needy are those of the pertinent financial assistance plan,283 the
state promulgates its own conditions for any medically needy
individuals that its Medicaid plan encompasses. These standards
must be reasonable and consistent with the liberalizing objectives of
title XIX. Like the conditions of eligibility for the categorically
needy, they may consider only the applicant's "in hand" funds and
may not take account of any other individual's income unless that
individual is the spouse of the applicant or recipient, or the parent
of a child under twenty-one or who is blind or totally or perma-
nently disabled.284 Moreover, the standards must provide for ad-
justments for family size and actual medical care expenses
accumulated.285
3. Services and Payment
Federal funds finance between fifty percent and eighty-three
percent of the recipient's actual medical expenses with the state
paying the remaining share.2 86 As a general rule, however, the
283 45 C.F.R. § 248.21(a)(1)(i) (1973).
284 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.21(a)(2), (3) (1973).
Income eligibility levels must be comparable as among individuals and family sizes and
must be set at any time on or after January 1, 1966, at the lesser of (1) the levels of the most
liberal money payment standard used by the state as a measure of financial eligibility in any
state categorical money payment program, or (2) the level for which federal financial
participation is available under the requirements set forth in the statute and the regulations.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(B) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 248.21(a)(3)(i)(b) (1973); notes 288-89 infra.
A lower income level will be used for individuals not living in their own home but receiving
care in nursing homes, institutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases, or other medical
facilities, commensurate with those individuals' reasonable needs for clothing and personal
items. Alternatively, if such an individual's home is being maintained for a spouse or other
dependents, the appropriate income level for such spouse, plus the individual's income level
for maintenance in a long-term care facility, is applicable. 45 C.F.R. § 248.21(a)(3)(i)(c)
(1973).
The cut-off level for resources held must be separate from income eligibility levels and
must, as a minimum, be at the most liberal level used in any state money payment program
on or after Janyary 1, 1966, and the amount of liquid assets which may be held must
increase with an increase in the number of family members. Id. § 248.21(a)(3)(i)(d).
285 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(17), 1396b(f)(1)(B)(ii), (2) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.21-
(b)(2)(ii)(b), (c) (1973). A state's income levels may also reflect variations in shelter costs
between rural and urban areas, but only for those groups not receiving aid under AFDC or
OAA, APTD or AB (now SSI).
286 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(2), 1396d(b) (1970); id. §§ 1396b(a)(1), (g) (Supp. II, 1972);
note 273 supra.
The state share in Medicaid costs equals the percentage of the total cost which bears the
same ratio to 45% as the square of the state's per capita income bears to the square of the
per capita income of the United States (including Alaska and Hawaii). 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b)
(1970).
After June 30, 1973, federal contributions for inpatient hospital, nursing facility, or
intermediate care facility services beyond 60 days in any fiscal year, or mental hospital care
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federal government will share in a state's expenditures for medical
care only "for needy or medically needy persons under 21 or over
65, but will not participate in the cost of medical services for
persons between those ages unless they are blind, disabled, or
parents of children eligible for AFDC, '' 287 even though the state
plan may include other classes of eligible individuals. Thus, a state
plan must specify which of its eligible groups lie within the scope of
federal financial participation and for which the state must bear the
full cost.28 8 On the other hand, federal cost sharing in administrative
expenses was available for all phases of a state program until
1973.-89
Medicaid coverage for individuals qualifying for or receiving
AFDC, AB, APTD, or OAA (now SSI) cash payments must be
identical in amount, duration, and scope, regardless of the category
to which the individual belongs.2 9" Likewise, assistance to all medi-
for more than 90 days, decreased by 33.3% of the costs thereof, unless the state could
demonstrate an effective program for control over utilization of such services by its Medicaid
recipients. Id. § 1396b(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
287 Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 734; see notes 311 & 313 and accompanying
text infra (listing recent additions to categories of Medicaid recipients eligible for federal
financial participation).
The federal government will participate in payments for medical care and services
provided under a state plan for all financially eligible persons under 21, 65 or over, blind, 18
or over and disabled, caretaker relatives of children under 21 who are not eligible for AFDC
because of the failure of the child to attend school regularly, and spouses of OAA, AB,
APTD, or AABD (now SSI) recipients who are determined to be essential to the well-being
of the recipient. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(i)-(vi) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(d)(2), 248.11,
248.30(b) (1973).
Title XIX also restricts federal payments to states to only such amounts as are
determined not to exceed reasonable charges for the services obtained. This restriction
eliminates the federal obligation to share in the costs of hospital inpatient services which
exceed either the institution's customary charges or "fair compensation" for the services. 42
U.S.C. § 1396(b)(i)(1)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
288 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(b)(5), (c)(2) (1973). A state may establish income eligibility levels
for medically needy individuals above the federal limits for financial participation, but must
assure the federal agency that it will limit claims for federal monies accordingly. Id.
§ 248.21(b)(3).
289 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(2) (1970); id. §§ 1396b(a)(3)-(6) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R.
§ 248.10(d)(1) (1973). Each state with an approved plan used to receive from the federal
government (1) 75% of its expenditures for compensation to or training of professional
medical personnel and their supporting staff, (2) 90% of expenditures for design, develop-
ment, or installation of mechanized claims processing or information retrieval systems to
update and improve administration and 75% of the cost of operating such systems, (3) 90%
of the cost for cost-determination systems in state-owned hospitals, (4) 100% of expenditures
for compensation or training of inspection personnel for reviewing long-term care provider
institutions, (5) 90% of the costs of family planning services and supplies, and (6) 50% of any
other necessary administrative costs. Payments were made quarterly. For the current
position on federal contribution for administrative costs, see note 311 infra.
290 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970). Such assistance may not be less in amount,
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cally needy groups must be equal, 29 although services offered to
the categorically needy need not be the same as those made
available to the medically needy. 292 Some institutional and non-
duration, or scope than that made available for groups eligible for Medicaid but not
receiving categorical assistance.
291 Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii). For an interesting discussion of this requirement and that
above (see note 290 supra), see Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 736.
292 A state has the option of offering the medically needy either the same five items of
medical and remedial care that it provides for categorically needy recipients or any seven of
the comparable services enumerated in title XIX. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970); id.
§§ 1396a(a)(13), 1396d(a) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 249.10 (1973). Medicaid programs
may cover any of the f6lowing designated services:
(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for tuber-
culosis or mental diseases);
(2) outpatient hospital services;
(3) other laboratory and X-ray services;
(4) (A) skilled nursing facility services .. . for individuals 21 years of age or
older (B) effective July 1, 1969, such early and periodic screening and diagnosis of
individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21 to ascertain
their physical or mental defects, and such health care, treatment, and other
measures to correct or ameliorate defects and chronic conditions discovered
thereby, as may be provided in regulations of the Secretary; and (C) family
planning services and supplies furnished . . .
(5) physicians' services furnished by a physician ... whether furnished in the
office, the patient's home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing facility, or elsewhere;
(6) medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under State
law, furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined
by State law;
(7) home health care services;
(8) private duty nursing services;
(9) clinic services;
(10) dental services;
(11) physical therapy and related services;
(12) prescribed drugs, dentures, and prosthetic devices; and eyeglasses pre-
scribed by a physician skilled in diseases of the eye or by an optometrist, whichever
the individual may select;
(13) other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and rehabilitative services;
(14) inpatient hospital services, skilled nursing facility services, and inter-
mediate care facility services for individuals 65 years of age or over in an institution
for tuberculosis or mental diseases;
(15) intermediate care facility services (other than such services in an institu-
tion for tuberculosis or mental diseases) . . .
(16) effective January 1, 1973, inpatient psychiatric hospital services for indi-
viduals under 21 . ...
Id. §§ 1396d(a)(1)-(3), (6)-(13) (1970); id. §§ 1396d(a)(4)-(5), (14)-(16) (Supp. II, 1972). In
addition, a state may supply medical assistance for any other medical or remedial care
recognized under state law and specified by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. Id. § 1396d(a)(17) (Supp. II, 1972).
A state must, however, provide at least items one through five for all Medicaid recipients
also receiving AFDC or OAA, AB or APTD (now SSI) benefits. At its option the state may
provide these same items, or any seven other items in the list, to other recipients. If a state
chooses the optional seven services and elects to cover hospital and skilled nursing facility
services, it must also provide physicians' services to an individual while he is in the hospital
or skilled nursing facility. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(1), (2) (1973).
Bernard and Feingold observe that
[t]he most frequently offered services, in addition to the basic five, are, in descend-
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institutional care and services must be afforded all recipients,
however, including the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital ser-
vices provided under the plan.293
Payment for available services will amount to "reasonable
charges consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care. 294
In some cases, states make payments directly to the recipient, and
in others, to the provider of the service or treatment.295 In any
event, any individual eligible for Medicaid may freely choose to
obtain medical care from any qualified provider of such treatment
who will arrange for its availability on a prepayment basis. This
right of choice, of course, remains subject to the state's right to
establish the fees which may be paid to providers of various types
of care or service and to promulgate reasonable qualification stan-
dards for providers to Medicaid beneficiaries.296 The state must
make payments for medical care and services furnished to eligible
individuals in or after the third month prior to the month of
application, so long as the individual was, or would have been,
eligible at the time services weie obtained. 97 No categorically
ing order, prosthetic devices, home health care, dental care, prescribed drugs,
eyeglasses and ambulance service (as of July 1968). These choices reflect, at least in
part, fiscal pressures prompting choice of low cost options rather than higher
priority but more expensive options. It is very likely, for example, that prescribed
drugs are more important to a coherent medical care program than are prosthetic
devices, but drugs are also much more expensive.
Bernard & Feingold, supra note 271, at 745 n.73.
293 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (Supp. II, 1972).
Federal medical assistance programs must be designed to dispense aid "sufficient in
amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve their purpose." 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5)
(1973). They must provide extensive diagnostic services, some home health services, and
necessary transportation of recipients to and from providers. Id. §§ 249.10(a)(3), (4), (5).
294 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (Supp. II, 1972). Lengthy regulations govern these charges.
45 C.F.R. § 250.30 (1973).
295 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 249.32 (1973).
296 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 249.11 (1973). This provision
means that no state may restrict the obtaining of Medicaid-covered services to public
hospitals or any other specific facilities.
297 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 249.81 (1973); note 314 infra.
Until 1974, the federal regulations made available payments through federal financial
participation for the month in which they were paid, regardless of the eligibility status of the
individual in the month of payment, if:
(a) He was found eligible for medical assistance for the month during which
the medical care and services were rendered, and was alive at the time the
application was made;
(b) He received such medical care and services in or after the third month
before the month in which he made application; and
(c) Not more than 24 imonths have elapsed since the month of the latest
services for which the particular payment is being made with respect to the
individual, except that:
(1) This time limitation does not apply with respect to retroactive adjust-
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needy recipient may be required to share in the cost of, or pay a
deduction, enrollment fee, premium, or other charge for medical
or remedial care furnished under the plan. However, a state may
impose administratively feasible cost sharing upon the medically
needy, if the cost sharing is reasonably related to the individual
recipient's income and resources.2 98 Receipt of Medicaid may not
interfere with or reduce a categorically needy recipient's AFDC or
SSI benefits.2 99
B. Program Developments
Like most other federally funded assistance programs,
Medicaid underwent substantial changes in its eligibility require-
ments and administrative procedures in 1973.
1. Federal Court Action
The federal courts considerably clarified the rights of
Medicaid recipients and the availability of program benefits. Action
in the Supreme Court both assured the broad availability of
benefits to one group of applicants and upheld the termination of
Medicaid funds to another group of would-be recipients. On the
one hand, the Court affirmed on equal protection grounds the
right of women Medicaid beneficiaries to receive medical assistance
for purely elective as well as for medically indicated abortions. 3I'l
ment payments where services are reimbursed on the same basis as under title
XVIII;
(2) Where a claim for payment for services has been filed timely for title
XVIII purposes with the Social Security Administration, an intermediary or a
carrier, Federal financial participation is available in payments for such services
made by the title XIX agency after the 24-month period provided they are
made within 6 months after the month in which the title XIX agency or the
vendor receives notice regarding the claim.
45 C.F.R. § 249.81 (1973).
298 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(14) (Supp. II, 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 249.40 (1973).
299 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c) (1970). The purpose of this provision, according to the Senate
Report on the legislation, is
to make certain that States do not divert funds from the provision of basic
maintenance to the provision of medical care. If the Secretary should find that his
approval of a title XIX plan would result in a reduction of aid or assistance for
persons receiving basic maintenance under the public assistance titles of the Social
Security Act (except as specified above) he may not approve such a plan under title
XIX. The committee recognizes the need and urgency for States to maintain, if not
improve, the level of basic maintenance provided for needy people under the public
assistance programs. The provision is intended to prevent any unwarranted diver-
sion of funds from basic maintenance to medical care.
S. REP. No. 404, supra note 270, at 82-83.
... Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973). In Klein, the Court
vacated and remanded without opinion, for consideration in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), aspects of the decision in Klein v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924
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At the same time, it also endorsed as constitutional the regulations
excluding from Medicaid coverage patients in state mental institu-
tions who are under sixty-five years of age, despite equal protection
and due process challenges.30 '
A number of lower federal courts also addressed various
Medicaid issues in 1973. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida struck down as unconstitutional a
Florida provision that precluded the dispensing of Medicaid
benefits to aliens who had not been residents of the United States
for at least twenty years.30 2 However, the court declined to order
retroactive benefits for any individuals who had been excluded by
the provision. On the basis of the supremacy clause, another
Florida district court invalidated and enjoined the enforcement of
certain Florida regulations which allowed the state to terminate or
(1973), aff'g in part, Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). The Court's several rulings on the three-judge district court's decision that denial of
Medicaid assistance for elective, not medically indicated abortions would deprive indigent
women of equal protection of the laws, have been interpreted as securing the right to
medical assistance for eligibles seeking any kind of legal abortion within the 24-week period
established by Doe v. Bolton, supra, and Roe v. Wade, supra. 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 17,065,
17,066 (1973). A federal district court reiterated this interpretation of constitutional re-
quirements later last summer. Doe v. Rose, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,859 (D. Utah 1973).
301 Legion v. Weinberger, 94 S. Ct. 564, aff'g mem. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp.
456 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
In Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the plaintiffs brought a class
action allegedly on behalf of a million mentally ill American inpatients of public mental
institutions, seeking either a declaration that the Medicare and Medicaid programs were
unconstitutional per se or, in the alternative, a declaration that the exclusion from the benefits
of the plaintiff class was constitutionally invalid. 354 F. Supp. at 457. The plaintiffs'
challenges to the Medicaid program were based upon the theory that it discriminated against
"the poorer and sicker of America's hospitalized mentally ill" by making only state mental
institutions ineligible for Medicaid benefits under the statutory definition of available
medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(15)(B) (1970). This exclusion operates to prohibit
federal payment for medical services rendered to patients under 65 who receive their
treatment for mental disease not in a general hospital, or private psychiatric hospital, or
community mental-health center affiliated with a general hospital, but in an "institution"
solely providing treatment for mental diseases. 45 C.F.R. §§ 249.10(b)(1), (4)(i), (14) (1973);
note 287 and accompanying text supra. The court held, however, that this procedure was
constitutional because it merely reflected "the belief by Congress that care of the mentally ill
in state hospitals was the responsibility of the states." 354 F. Supp. at 459.
Although it acknowledged sympathy for the inadequate care often afforded the in-
stitutionalized mentally ill, the three-judge district court would not declare either challenged
program unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the individual plaintiffs. The court
disposed of the plaintiffs' equal protection argument by finding a rational distinction
between medically indigent persons in need of short-term as opposed to long-term care. Id.
The court also rejected any due process claim and consequently dismissed the complaint on
the merits. Id. at 459-60.
302 Machado v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,577
(S.D. Fla. 1973).
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reduce Medicaid assistance for prescribed medicine without prior
notice and hearing for the recipient. The state's policy of eliminat-
ing these procedural safeguards was found to be inconsistent with
the "fair hearings" requirements of the Social Security Act and its
implementing regulations. 303
Other states were affected by federal court action as well.
Pennsylvania was directed to excise from its welfare regulations a
provision which openly violated the Social Security Act, by provid-
ing for the determination of financial eligibility for Medicaid on the
basis of gross rather than net available income.30 4 In a related
development, Michigan's welfare agency was ordered by the Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Michigan to implement
procedures for the medical screening, diagnosis, and treatment of
eligible individuals under the age of twenty-one. That state had
failed to take any action during the eleven months after HEW had
clearly mandated the establishment of such procedures. 30 5 Finally,
in a decision less favorable to Medicaid recipients, the Fifth Circuit
disclaimed the eligibility for Medicaid of an individual who had lost
his original eligibility because his gross income from Social Security
disability benefits exceeded the state's categorical assistance stan-
dard, but who asserted alternative eligibility under a "spenddown"
provision covering medically needy persons.30 6
2. Administrative Changes
Even more pervasive changes in the Medicaid program
emerged through the rules and regulations promulgated by the
303 Silvey v. Roberts, 363 F. Supp. 1006 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The complainants in this case,
without prior notice and hearing, had been deprived of Medicaid payments which were to
supplement the $20 state drug allowance by covering medicine expenses in excess of the
allotted state aid. The court determined that not only were the Florida procedures directly in
conflict with the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(4), 1302(2), (3), 602(a)(4),
1202(a)(4) (1970)) and the regulations (45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1973)), butthey also raised grave
constitutional questions. 363 F. Supp. at 1012. See notes 389-485 and accompanying text
infra.
304 Baran v. Wohlgemuth, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,626 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
305 Dominguez v. Milliken, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 16,863 (W.D. Mich. 1973). The
violated HEW directive appears in 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(3)(iv) (1973).
306 Freeman v. Parham, 475 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1973). The so-called "spenddown
provision" of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1970)) allows for flexibility in
income eligibility standards by providing that medical or remedial care expenses, such as
insurance premiums and other actual health care costs, will be taken into account in
ascertaining an applicant's income. But, as the court indicated in Freeman, that provision only
applies when a state has elected to aid the medically needy, because only those individuals
not qualifying under another assistance program are subject to the specified medical
assistance eligibility standards. 475 F.2d at 187. Since a state need never choose to cover the
medically needy under the statute (42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(B) (1970)) and because his state
had not chosen to include them, this individual was without relief.
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Social and Rehabilitation Service of HEW over the course of 1973.
The most comprehensive of these changes appeared at the end of
the year, in the form of a revision in Medicaid eligibility
requirements.3 0 7 Still acting to implement the Social Security
Amendments of 1972,308 HEW amended the definition of "categor-
ically needy" to include certain additional groups of individuals 30 9
and revised state plan requirements for optional categorically
needy groups. 10 Moreover, HEW altered certain general condi-
307 38 Fed. Reg. 33,380-83 (1973).
308 1972 Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 42
U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1972)).
309 38 Fed. Reg. 33,380-81 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(a)(1), (b)(3), (4) (1973);
see notes 279-80 and accompanying text supra. After August 1972 and until July 1, 1975, any
individual who was receiving or was eligible to receive assistance under a state categorical
assistance program during the month of August 1972 and who was entitled to monthly
insurance benefits under title II of the Social Security Act for the same month may be
treated as "categorically needy" if he would have been eligible for federal financial assistance
"for the current month" except for the increase in his monthly insurance benefits under tide
II resulting from the enactment of Public Law 92-336. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (Supp. II, 1972). To
come within this special dass of "categorically needy" recipients, the applicant actually must
have received financial assistance during the designated month, or have been potentially
eligible except for his failure to apply or his residence in a medical or intermediate care
facility. Even if he had been thus potentially eligible under the federal guidelines, however,
the applicant could not qualify unless his state Medicaid program in August 1972 had
covered as categorically needy those persons who had not applied or were barred from
eligibility solely because of their institutional residence. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.10(b)(2)(i), (ii)
(1973). Besides these requirements, the applicant must satisfy the agency that he is eligible
for financial assistance for the current month. Proof of financial eligibility may be shown in
one of two ways. The applicant may simply demonstrate that he meets all conditions for
financial assistance, whether or not he has applied. Alternatively, he may establish that he
would be eligible for financial assistance if he left the medical or intermediate care facility in
which he resides, because his state's title XIX plan extends coverage to individuals who
would qualify as categorically needy except for the single reason that they presently are
inpatients at a medical institution. See 45 C.F.R. § 248.10(b)(2)(ii) (1973), as amended, 38 Fed.
Reg. 33,381 (1973). The former group of "currently eligible" persons is eligible to the same
extent as any other individuals receiving categorical assistance; the latter are to be consi-
dered as categorically needy and eligible to the same degree as other categorically needy
individuals in medical or intermediate care facilities. Id.
Moreover, effective January 1, 1974, state plans must also provide
that any family that was receiving assistance under the State's plan under title IV-A
in at least 3 of the 6 months immediately preceding the month in which such family
became ineligible for such assistance because of increased income from employ-
ment; will continue to be eligible for medical assistance to the same extent and
under the same conditions as it is furnished to the categorically needy under the
current title XIX plan, for a period of 4 calendar months beginning with the month
in which such family became ineligible for assistance under title IV-A because of
increased earnings, as long as a member of the family is employed.
Id.
310 Id. at 33,380-81; notes 279-80 and accompanying text supra. Besides adding rules
which assure that the states adjust their programs to cover the new "treated-as-
categorically-needy" groups, the recent rules broaden the definitions of permissible "categor-
ically needy" individuals which may, but need not, be covered by a state plan. 38 Fed. Reg.
33,380-81 (1973). To the persons who would be eligible for financial assistance under
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tions for federal financial participation in the program, 31' slightly
revised age limitations on federal financial participation to cover
the new groups of eligible individuals, 312 expanded the scope of
the limited federal funding for medical care to inmates of public
institutions to encompass patients in intermediate care facilities and
youthful recipients of inpatient psychiatric hospital services, 313 and
modified the time limitations imposed on federal financial con-
tributions to medical assistance payments.3 14
In addition, the Social and Rehabilitation Service made several
other changes in the Medicaid regulations affecting recipients'
ability to obtain coverage for the services of skilled nursing homes.
First, federal subsidies for services received in skilled nursing
facilities were extended to cover certain institutions located in
Indian reservations.3 1 5  Christian Science sanatoria now are ex-
another state plan except for their continuing stay in a medical or intermediate care facility
but who may nevertheless be covered by a Medicaid plan, the revisions annex any inpatient
children who would be eligible under a state's AFDC plan if outside the facility. Id. at 33,381.
In addition, HEW sweeps into the optional category embracing persons under 21 who are
financially eligible but not qualified as dependent children under the appropriate AFDC
plan, not only children publicly or privately placed in foster homes or private institutions,
but also, effective July 1, 1973, individuals below the age of 21 who are in intermediate care
facilities, including institutions for the mentally retarded and psychiatric hospitals. Id.
311 Id. at 33,381-82. The December 1973 regulations provide that the federal govern-
ment, as of October 30, 1972, will participate only in the administrative costs of providing
medical care and services to persons in whose medical-care costs the federal government also
shares. Id. at 33,381. Compare note 289 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, they
extend the scope of federal cost-sharing for medical care and services provided under a state
plan for young eligibles to include persons 22 or younger who receive inpatient psychiatric
hospital care, and to residents in intermediate care facilities as well as to patients in medical
institutions. 38 Fed. Reg. 33,381-82 (1973); note 287 and accompanying text supra.
Of course, these regulations also provide financial eligibility standards and certify the
availability of federal financial participation for the newly-covered auxiliary classes of
categorically needy individuals and families. Id. at 33,382; note 309 supra.
312 38 Fed. Reg. 33,382 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. § 248.30(b)(1) (1973).
313 38 Fed. Reg. 33,383 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.60(a)(1), (2), (3)(iv) (1973); see
note 311 supra.
3i4 38 Fed. Reg. 33,383 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. §§ 249.81(a), (c)(1), (c)(2) (1973); see
note 297 and accompanying text supra. It is no longer necessary for the recipient of federally
shared vendor payments for medical care to have been alive at the time application for
benefits was made, so long as the individual for whose care the payments are sought was
found eligible for medical assistance for the month during which services were rendered. As
a result, survivors now rightly may defray the expenses of a deceased relative's last illness by
means of federal medical assistance. 38 Fed. Reg. 33,383 (1973). Moreover, the new rules
exempt all retroactive adjustment payments from the 24-month time limit for federal
participation, not just those coinciding with title XVIII reimbursement conditions. Id. But
federal contributions to claims filed timely for title XVIII purposes with the appropriate
source, but after March 1968, will apply only when actual payment is made within three
months after the publication of the new regulations.
315 45 C.F.R. § 249. 10(b)(4)(i) (1973); see note 277 and accompanying text supra. The
institutions must be certified as qualified skilled nursing facilities by the Secretary of HEW.
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plicitly excluded from the definition of "nursing home" employed
by HEW in licensing state nursing facilities for Medicaid
purposes;316 the availability of provisional licenses for nursing
home administrators has been curtailed greatly; and grants to
states for training and instructing the previously existing class of
provisional licensees have been eliminated.3 17 Finally, HEW estab-
lished preliminary program-wide conditions for federal payment
for nursing home care, based on the provider-facility's ability to
meet the fire safety standards of the Life Safety Code of the National
Fire Protection Association.318
3. Congressional Innovations
With the exception of administrative revisions of the overall
citizenship requirements for eligibility,31 9 the remainder of the
changes in the Medicaid program in 1973 were made through
legislative action. Congress twice last year enacted amendments to
The eligible institutions do not include those treating patients older than 21 years with
tuberculosis or mental diseases.
316 45 C.F.R. § 252.10(b)(1) (1973). The definition of "nursing home' also excludes a
distinct part of a hospital which is designated as a skilled nursing facility, but is not licensed
or formally approved by the state as a nursing home.
Christian Science sanatoria are not excluded from participation under a Medicaid plan.
Since 1972, however, they need not meet the same eligibility requirements as "skilled
nursing facilities." CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED 755.13, at 382,
755.57, at 388.
-31 45 C.F.R. §§ 252.10(c)(2)(iii), (d) (1973). Provisional licenses are available only to
persons who have served as administrators for three entire years previous to their applica-
tion, for the purpose of enabling them to fill unexpectedly vacated positions, and then only
for a period of up to six months.
1973 cases involving the participation of nursing homes in the Medicaid program are
Maxwell v. Wyman, 478 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1973) (continued aid to nursing home); Florida
v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (certification rules for participating
facilities); Ross v. Lucey, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 16,785 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (summary removal of
patients for noncompliance with standards).
318 38 Fed. Reg. 21,413 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. §§ 249.33(a)(1)(vii), (c)(2) (1973).
The standards must assure compliance with the Life Safety Code of the National Fire
Protection Association (21st ed. 1967) or an equivalent state code.
319 38 Fed. Reg. 30,259, 31,174 (1973), amending 45 C.F.R. § 248.50 (1973); note 280
supra.
Beginning January 2, 1974, a state Medicaid plan must cover all otherwise eligible
individuals who are United States residents, so long as those persons are United States citizens
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently living in the
United States under color of law. CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED
725, at 371. This mandate applies to aliens lawfully present in the United States under
§ 203(a)(7) and § 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(7),
1182(d)(5) (1970) (relating to refugees from Communist, Communist-dominated, or
middle-eastern countries, or from natural calamities, and to persons admitted to United
States for reasons of public interest). CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED
V 725, at 371.
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the Social Security Act which affect medical assistance to needy
individuals. 320
The earlier of the two amendments, enacted in July 1973,
accomplishes the most numerous changes. First, the law guarantees
continued eligibility and coverage to all "essential persons" qualify-
ing for Medicaid assistance as of December 1973.321 Second, it
prevents the expected loss of Medicaid benefits by institutionalized
recipients whose special circumstances would not have entitled
them to Medicaid once the SSI program became operative.322
Moreover, the amendment assures that blind and disabled indi-
viduals who were Medicaid beneficiaries under the old adult wel-
fare programs will continue to be eligible under SSI, regardless of
those persons' conformity or nonconformity with new federal
blindness and disability standards. 323 Finally, it extends the 1972
amendments' prohibition against disqualifying formerly eligible
categorically needy persons solely because they received an increase
in Social Security payments pursuant to the 1972 congressional
directive raising benefits under that program. 324
Dissatisfied with its attempts last summer to update the
Medicaid program, Congress at year's end made one last effort to
320 Pub. L. No. 93-66, §§ 230-34, 87 Stat. 159-60; Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 13, 87 Stat. 960.
321 Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 230, 87 Stat. 159; CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE
EXPLAINED 715, at 364; note 279 supra. "Essential spouses" of aged, blind, or disabled (now
SSI) cash assistance recipients who were eligible for Medicaid in December 1973 will be
eligible in each subsequent month in which they meet the eligibility standards effective
regarding "essential spouses" in December 1973, provided that the individuals with whom
they live remain eligible under the same criteria, and they continue in an "essential
relationship" with those individuals.
322 Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 231, 87 Stat. 159-60, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-233, §
13(b)(1)(A), 87 Stat. 964; CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED 715, at
364. Those Medicaid recipients who in December 1973 received or would have been eligible
under a state plan for cash assistance, except for their status as inpatients in medical
institutions, can still receive Medicaid. Continued eligibility, however, is restricted to the
period of successive months beginning January 1974 in which need continues for institu-
tional care for the same condition for which hospitalization occurred in December 1973. The
continued eligibility is conditioned upon the recipient's maintenance of eligibility under the
state's December 1973 plan.
.3 Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 232, 87 Stat. 160, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 13(b)(2), 87
Stat. 964; CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED T 715, at 364.
.24 Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 233, 87 Stat. 160; CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE
EXPLAINED 715, at 365. Only states which limit their programs to categorically needy
groups are subject to this provision.
The final Medicaid provision of the July legislation eliminates a subsection added to title
XIX by the 1972 amendments which delineated the formula for determining the amount of
federal funds payable to any state for expenditures for skilled nursing and intermediate care
facilities after December 1972. Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 234, 87 Stat. 160, amending, 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(j) (Supp. II, 1972).
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modify the program. Although the later law serves also to clarify
the provisions of the earlier enactment,325 its primary purpose is
otherwise as far as Medicaid is concerned. At the last possible
moment before SSI took effect, Congress adapted the Medicaid law
to conform to and complement its new program by announcing the
eligibility conditions for Medicaid which would pertain to the
newly-created category of SSI recipients, rendering the bulk of that
class eligible for medical assistance.3 26
V
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
issued a series of regulations for applications, hearings, and re-
coupment of overpayments which will significantly affect the oper-
ation of federal-state welfare programs. HEW initially purported to
apply these procedural regulations327 to all federal grant-in-aid
programs. 328 However, on January 1, 1974, all the adult welfare
325 Pub. L. No. 93-233, §§ 13(b)(1), (2), 87 Stat. 964.
326 Id. § 13(c); CCH 1974 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED 715, at 364-65.
Under this provision, the states may deem all individuals who are eligible for SSI relief
likewise eligible for Medicaid. Furthermore, the states must perpetuate Medicaid coverage of
those persons whose SSI benefits the law requires the states to supplement in order to
maintain the December 1973 income levels enjoyed by those individuals under OAA, AB,
APTD, or AABD. See note 178 and accompanying text supra. They also may classify
institutionalized individuals eligible for Medicaid, even though the individuals may have
income levels exceeding cash assistance requirements and may reside in states having no
medically needy Medicaid coverage, as long as the individuals' total incomes remain at 300%
of the SSI benefit level or less. 119 CONG. REC. H 11,957 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1973) (remarks
of Congressman Ullman).
Much earlier in 1973, the House of Representatives introduced another bill containing
"technical and conforming changes" to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1972 (H.R.
3153, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)); at the time of passage of Public Law 93-233, this bill had
still not been enacted. Provisions in it were urgently needed as the effective date for SSI
approached and accordingly were incorporated into H.R. 11333. Still pending are provisions
relating to federal matching grants under Medicaid for care to Indians and health mainte-
nance organizations under Medicaid. For the legislative history of H.R. 3153, see H. REP.
No. 81, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and S. REP. No. 553, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Before the enactment of the last-minute amendments, HEW, in response to the
congressional silence on continued Medicaid coverage for the aged, blind, and disabled,
proposed new regulations to implement the intent of Congress and the President, as
expressed in Public Law 93-66 and the Social Security Amendments of 1972. 38 Fed. Reg.
32,216-22 (1973). These regulations would have reorganized substantially part 248 of
Chapter 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and were projected to become operative on
January 1, 1974. Revised regulations no doubt will follow the enactment of the new law.
327 The regulations as first proposed appeared at 38 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1973) and
appeared in final form at 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973).
328 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1970) (OAA); id. §§ 601-610, 620-26, 630-44 (AFDC); id.
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categories were integrated into the new SSI program.3 29 SSI is
federally administered and is presently operating under new, in-
dependently proposed regulations. 330 Thus, the major programs
covered by the new regulations are AFDC and Medicaid.
Nevertheless, these developments will affect the great majority
of welfare recipients. AFDC is by far the largest need-tested cash
assistance program, both in terms of number of recipients and
benefits distributed. 331 Medicaid is presently the largest need-tested
program of all. It distributes more dollar equivalent benefits and
reaches more needy persons than even AFDC.332 Ninety-nine per-
cent of all the recipients in the grant-in-aid programs were covered
by Medicaid in 1972. 333
Since both AFDC and Medicaid will continue to be adminis-
tered by the states in accordance with federal requirements, the
issue of whether a federal court can order the state to pay retroac-
tive benefits to applicants and recipients under AFDC and
Medicaid is of extreme importance. This critical problem spawned
a substantial amount of litigation in 1973, but still awaits definitive
solution by the Supreme Court.
A. Application Procedures
1. The New System
Application procedures334 in federal assistance programs were
extensively modified by the 1973 regulations. 335 These changes will
§§ 1201-1206 (AB); id. §§ 1351-1355 (APTD); id. §§ 1381-1385 (AABD); and id. §§
1396a-1396i (Medicaid).
329 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (Supp. II, 1972).
330 Regulations for the administration of SSI will appear in title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations at § 416. Proposed regulations for SSI will function as operating guidelines until
they become finalized. For a discussion of 1973 developments in SSI, see notes 144-95 and
accompanying text supra.
There is one complication in the administration of Medicaid for SSI recipients. See 42
U.S.C. § 1383c (Supp. II, 1972). This problem is dealt with in subpart U of the proposed SSI
regulations. See Proposed HEW Regs. §§ 416.2001-.2119, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,193 (1973). The
state has the option of retaining state Medicaid administration for these recipients or
allowing for federal administration in accordance with the state plan. See id. § 416.2 101(a).
331 In 1972, AFDC benefits reached 11.1 million recipients while the adult programs
(OAA, AB, APTD) together reached only 3.4 million recipients. Likewise, $6.7 billion were
distributed by AFDC, and the adult program benefits totaled $4.1 billion. STAFF OF SUB-
COMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., PUBLIC INCOME
TRANSFER PROGRAMs: THE INCIDENCE OF MULTIPLE BENEFITS AND THE ISSUES RAISED BY
THEIR RECEIPT 5, 24 (Comm. Print 1972).
332 In 1972, Medicaid distributed $7 billion worth of benefits to 20.6 million recipients.
Id. at 5, 24.
333 Id.
334 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973).
335 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973).
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have an immediate effect upon both the recipient and the local
administrator with regard to three specific practices: (1) the form
and method of application, (2) verification of eligibility require-
ments, and (3) extended time limits for administrative action.
However, a more far-reaching impact can be expected from
two conceptual changes in the new regulations. First, in characteriz-
ing welfare benefits, the regulations now refer to "assistance"
instead of "entitlement." '336 Although HEW cannot change the
Supreme Court's definition of such benefits, 337 this modification
essentially notifies local agencies and potential recipients of a basic
change in HEW's concept of an applicant's "right" to welfare.
Furthermore, the regulations delete all references to recipients'
rights of privacy and personal dignity.338 Agencies are no longer
expressly forbidden from harassing recipients, nor from violating
common decencies. All that is left is a vague prescription to respect
constitutional and statutory rights.' HEW apparently has thus abdi-
cated responsibility for a more precise definition of what these
rights are, leaving the decision to the state and local agencies and,
ultimately, to the courts.
a. Form and Method of Application. According to the new
regulations, the states must require a written application, 339 signed
under penalty of perjury,340 to be effective only when fully com-
pleted by the applicant. This requirement is considerably more
stringent than the old regulation which allowed any action indicat-
336 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(6) (1973).
337 In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), such benefits were held to be a matter of
statutory entitlement. However, in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), the Court
analogized welfare benefits to charity.
338 Prior regulations provided:
[Standards and methods for determination of eligibility will be consistent with
the objectives of the programs, will respect the rights of individuals under the
United States Constitution, the Social Security Act, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and all other relevant provisions of Federal and State Laws,] and will not
result in practices that violate the individual's privacy or personal dignity, or harass
him or violate his constitutional rights. Under this requirement, the agency espe-
cially guards against violations of legal rights and common decencies in such areas
as entering a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses;
making home visits outside of working hours, and particularly making such visits
during sleeping hours; and searching in the home, for example, in rooms, closets,
drawers, or papers, to seek dues to possible deception.
36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(10) (1972)). The present regulations
include only the bracketed material. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(10) (1973).
The identical changes have been made in the New York State regulations. Investigators
are no longer cautioned against violating individual rights of privacy or personal dignities or
harassing applicants. See 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.1 (1973).
339 45 C.F.R. §§ 206.10(a)(1)(ii), (b)(2) (1973).
340 Id. § 206.10(a)(1)(ii).
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ing a desire to receive assistance to be treated as an application. 341
The class of persons who may file on behalf of applicants has also
been restricted,342 and the specific mandate for state simplification
of forms has been entirely deleted. 343 Also, the agency is no longer
required to help the applicant provide the necessary information
nor to give special assistance to applicants with mental or physical
disabilities. 344 In short, the application procedure has become more
complex, restrictive, and burdensome, with all responsibility for the
proper preparation of the application shifted to the individual
applicant.
b. Verification of Eligibility Requirements. In any need-tested
assistance program, the agency must have a method for comparing
applicant income and resources with a need standard, in order to
ascertain if the applicant is eligible for assistance and, if so, to
determine the level of benefits he is to receive. 45 HEW has
reaffirmed the traditional investigative method of evaluating eligi-
bility by abandoning the simplified or declaration method 346 and
the primary source rule.3 47 The impetus for this change came, from
Congress's specific prohibition of the use of the simplified method
for the iaew SSI program. 348
Regulations prescribing use of the simplified method were
.4' Compare id. § 206.10(b)(2), with 36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. §
206.10(b)(2) (1972)). The simple term "action" has been modified to require an indication in
writing that an applicant desires assistance. Application can no longer be initiated by a
telephone call or by mail as was previously specifically allowed. See 36 Fed. Reg. 26,600
(1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(1) (1972)).
342 The written application may be accepted from the applicant's "designated represen-
tative." 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(1)(ii) (1973). Previously such application could be accepted
from a "designated representative" or someone acting responsibly for the applicant. 36 Fed.
Reg. 26,600 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(1)(ii) (1972)). The new regulations provide
no specific clue as to what practical effect this change in terminology will have.
343 See 34 Fed. Reg. 1145 (1969) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(c)(1) (1972)).
344 36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12)(ii) (1972)).
34' See R. LEVY, T. LEWIs & P. MARTIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVDUAL 106-16
(1971). See generally Handler & Hollingsworth, How Obnoxious Is the "Obnoxious Means Test"?
The Views of AFDC Recipients, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 114; Comment, Eligibility Determinations in
Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
1307 (1967).
346 34 Fed. Reg. 1145 (1969) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.20 (1972)).
347 See 36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12) (1972)).
348 The Social Security Amendments of 1972 provide:
[Elligibility for benefits under this subchapter will not be determined solely on the
basis of declarations by the applicant concerning eligibility factors or other relevant
facts, and . .. relevant information will be verified from independent or collateral
sources and additional information obtained as necessary in order to assure that
such benefits are only provided to eligible individuals . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1383(e)(1)(B) (Supp. II, 1972).
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promulgated in 1969.3 49 Use of the simplified method meant that
the agency obtained needed information by relying primarily upon
the applicant's own statements.350 Independent agency verification
of these statements was allowed only when the information supplied
was incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent. 35' The method was not
used to make complex determinations which required expert
opinion.352
When the simplified method was not applicable, agencies'
investigations were restricted by the primary source rule. Under
this rule, the applicant was still the primary source of eligibility
information,353 and verification was limited to what was reasonably
necessary to ensure the legality of expenditures. 354 Agencies were
forbidden from making collateral contacts with third parties with-
out the applicant's consent.355 However, if the applicant was unwil-
ling to consent to the requested verification and the information
otherwise available to the agency was insufficient to make a proper
determination, the agency was free to deny or terminate
assistance.356
The new regulations have eliminated all existing federal
guidelines for procedures used by local agencies to verify
eligibility.357 What remains is only an imprecise requirement that
the state remain informed about local adherence to state standards
for such verification.3 58
c. Time Limits. The time available to the states for a decision
upon an application has been increased from thirty to forty-five
days for most applicants; 359 however, the disability programs retain
their sixty-day requirement. 360 This time limit runs from submis-
319 See 34 Fed. Reg. 1145 (1969).
350 Id. (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(c) (1972)).
351 Id. (former 45 G.F.R. § 205.20(a)(3) (1972)).
352 Id.
353 36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12)(i) (1972)).
354 Id. (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12)(iii) (1972)).
355 Id. (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12)(iii)(a) (1972)).
356 Id. (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12)(iii)(c) (1972)).
The New York State regulations have retained much of the primary source and
collateral contact rules. The only major difference in the New York regulations is that the
applicanes consent is no longer required before the agency makes collateral contacts.
However, the agency shall continue to explain what information is sought from each
collateral source and why it is being sought. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.5, .6 (1973).
357 36 Fed. Reg. 3865 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12) (1972)).
358 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(12) (1973).
359 Id. § 206.10(a)(3)(i) (1973).
360 Id. § 206.10(a)(3)(ii).
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sion of the completed written application. 36 1 Agencies are directed
not to use these minimum standards of promptness as a waiting
period before the granting of aid,362 and in fact, eligible applicants
are not financially burdened by this fifteen-day extension because
the regulations require that benefits begin at least as of thirty days
after the receipt of the application. 363
2. Too Much Flexibility?
HEW's watchword in instituting these changes in application
regulations was flexibility. 364 But flexibility is only a means of
achieving three stated ends-assistance to the eligible, denial of
assistance to the ineligible, and less costly, more efficient
administration. 365 In effect, however, the flexibility now written
into the regulations is an invitation to the states to reorder these
priorities, so that the denial of assistance for the ineligible becomes
the state's primary concern. Indeed, the practical thrust of welfare
reform at the state level has been in this direction.366 This in-
creased flexibility also raises the spectre of states resuming the
abusive practices of the past.367 At the very least, it is likely that the
361 Id. § 206.10(a)(6)(i)(A)(2).
162 Id. § 206.10(a)(3)(ii). Although the states are allowed time for determinations of
eligibility, they are not to delay all actions on applications to the permissible limit in order to
save on expenditures. Once the applicant is found eligible, the agency is then obligated to
commence payment of benefits.
363 Id. § 206.10(a)(6)(i)(2); see notes 383-88 and accompanying text infra.
364 See 38 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1973).
3W5 When the new regulations were first proposed HEW stated:
These changes are intended to promote efficient administration of the public
assistance programs by granting States greater flexibility in designing methods and
procedures for assuring that assistance is provided to individuals who qualify for it
under applicable Federal and State standards, and is denied to those who do not so
qualify. The greater latitude which these proposed regulations will give States in
controlling the eligibility determination and payment process is intended to assist in
elimination of error and reduction of unnecessary program costs.
38 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1973).
366 As first priority, it was determined to assist local welfare districts in removing
reportedly ineligible recipients from the rolls. The second priority was assigned to
investigations and studies to ascertain the extent, causes and possible remedies for
abuses and administrative failures in the welfare system.
OFFICE OF THE WELFARE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF NEW YORK STATE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE OFFICE OF THE WELFARE INSPECTOR GENERAL 1 (1972).
It has been reported that local welfare authorities suggest curtailing due process
guaranties in fair hearings in order to save costs. See Handler, Federal-State Interests in Welfare
Administration, in SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY, JOIr ECONOMIC COMM., 92d CONG., 2d
SESS., ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS 34 (1973).
367 See Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967). See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92d CONG.,
2d SESS., ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION: WELFARE-AN ADMINISTRATIVE NIGHTMARE
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legality of state actions will be challenged in the courts, a situation
which is hardly conducive to efficient administration. Moreover,
when the courts correct abusive or illegal state practices, the added
costs to the public may become enormous. 368
Juxtaposed against the problem of too much flexibility in some
areas is HEW's rigid requirement of a written application form.
HEW's stated objectives for this requirement. were met by the
former regulations, and there is certainly no purpose served by
delaying the processing of applications until the full written form is
submitted.36 9 These regulations effectively will make benefits less
accessible to -all, including the truly needy.370
The crux of these procedural changes is the method for
determining eligibility. Here the means test,37' collateral
contacts,37 2 and recipient rights interact most sensitively. To in-
sure accuracy in eligibility determinations, extensive verification is
necessary. 373 Although the dangers of verification to the individual
32 (1972). See generally Sitkin, Welfare Law: Narrowing the Gap Between Congressional Policy and
Local Practice in SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92d CONG., 2d
SESS., ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS 36 (1973).
368 For example, when a California court found that fair hearings had been illegally
denied to terminated recipients because the state agency had made no effort to comply with
federal guidelines, retroactive payments were ordered for those wrongfully terminated. The
California legislative subcommittee on welfare reform estimated the cost of this fiasco to
California taxpayers to be between $10 and $25 million. Sitkin, supra note 367, at 48-51.
However, HEW has indicated that agencies must still respect constitutional rights as
defined by the courts. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,007 (1973). New methods, developed within
constitutional guidelines, are purportedly aimed at avoiding inaccuracy, thus leaving more
funds available for the truly needy.
369 According to HEW, a signed application is necessary (1) to provide a dated legal
document indicating the applicant's intent, (2) to put the applicant on notice of his rights
and liabilities, (3) for evidentiary functions in court, and (4) to provide the agency with
sufficient information to make accurate decisions. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973). None of these
arguments explains why such a form is required before the agency is obligated to take even
initial action.
This is an area in which the states should experiment in order to discover more efficient
procedures. Presumably, if a state agency can now decide where the threshold between
constitutional violations and acceptable harassment lies, it could certainly decide when and
why a written application is desirable.
370 See Comment, supra note 345, at 1308.
371 The means test has been described as performing the gatekeeper's function with
regard to welfare eligibility. The test defines the recipient's net need as the difference
between an established need standard, and available recipient income and resources. Such a
test requires individual evaluation for each applicant, including detailed inquiries into all
personal circumstances affecting each variable in the need equation. See Handler & Hollings-
worth, supra note 345, at 122-23; Comment, supra note 345, at 1308.
372 Collateral contacts are simply agency contacts with anyone other than the recipient
in the process of eligibility verification.
373 38 Fed. Reg. 22,007 (1973).
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are manifold,3 74 these dangers have been subordinated to official
concerns over the size of the welfare rolls. 75 It is clear that
elaborate verification procedures can keep the absolute size of the
welfare rolls down,376 but these procedures do not necessarily
ensure accuracy or reduce overall costs to the agency. Indeed,
President Nixon has suggested that welfare reform is best served
by simplifying the entire eligibility process.3 77
Collateral contacts may create noneconomic adverse conse-
quences for the welfare agency, including inaccurate information
provided by third-party contacts, distrust among recipient neigh-
bors, and a stigmatizing effect upon recipients and applicants. 37 8
Removal of all restrictions on investigations is also an invitation for
increased administrative costs, 37 9 particularly since there has been
no showing that elaborate verification procedures will result in
overall savings to the states.3 80 Government studies did not indicate
374 See Wickham, Restricting Home Visits: Toward Making the Life of the Public Assistance
Recipient Less Public, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1192-95 (1970).
37' See notes 366-68 and accompanying text supra.
376 The Government Accounting Office found that rejection rates were higher when
eligibility workers made comprehensive investigations, than under simplified procedures.
Hearings on Problems in Administration of Public Welfare Programs, Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal
Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Hearings].
377 I propose that these payments be made upon certification of income, with
demeaning and costly investigations replaced by simplified reviews and spot checks.
If a person spent a great deal of time and effort to get on the welfare rolls,
wouldn't he think twice about risking his eligibility by taking a job that might not
last long?
The new system will lessen welfare red tape and provide administrative cost savings. To
cut out the costly investigations so bitterly resented as "welfare snooping," the
Federal payment will be based upon a certification of income, with spot checks
sufficient to prevent abuses.
• ..These simplifications will save money and eliminate indignities.
President Nixon's Welfare Reform Message of Aug. 11, 1969. 115 CONG. REc. 23,143 (1969).
378 See Comment, supra note 345, at 1328-29. HEW has stated that new methods of
eligibility determination are needed to protect the truly needy and to restore faith in the
welfare system. 38 Fed. Reg. 22,007 (1973). HEW is apparently referring to the taxpayers'
faith that no funds are being wrongfully spent and not the recipient's faith in the welfare
system with which he or she must deal.
M See Comment, supra note 345, at 1330.
38' Again all other values have been subordinated to the top priority concern of clearing
the welfare rolls of ineligibles. However, there is a trade-off between funds saved by not
providing assistance to ineligibles and funds expended on verification. For some categories,
AB or APTD, detailed initial investigations will not have to be repeated and there is arguably
a long-run savings. The question is much less clear with AFDC, in which personal status
changes constantly affect eligibility. Here continuing verification is conceivably as expensive
as payment of improper benefits. At least HEW has not shown the contrary to be true.
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that case loads increased under the use of the simplified method.38'
On the contrary, deficiencies in the simplified method were traced
either to the failure of the local agency to implement the system
properly, or to the improper application of highly complex eligibil-
ity criteria.3 82
The Social Security Act requires that assistance be furnished
with reasonable promptness.3 83 On its face, the new increase in the
time allotted for decisions on applications does not violate this
legislative mandate. HEW maintains that such an extension is
necessary for verification of eligibility in only some cases; most
decisions will be made within a shorter time.384 But the old thirty-
day requirement had a built-in "unusual circumstances" provision,
allowing the states some leeway in exceptional cases.3 85 Further-
more, HEW recently defended the thirty-day limit as the product
of considerable agency experience. 86 The extension is really
another element in the elaborate verification scheme created by the
new regulations.3 87 However, because the agency must begin pay-
ing benefits from no later than the thirtieth day after application,
any financial incentives for delay have been removed.3 88 Thus, the
impact of this extension on eligible applicants will be minimal.
There is the possibility that underlying implicit value judgments are at work here.
Administrators might feel that, on balance, it is better to spend n dollars in creating jobs for
welfare investigators, caseworkers, and office personnel, than to spend the same n dollars on
government handouts.
381 1972 Hearings 16 (statement of E. Staats, United States Comptroller Gen'l).
382 Comparison of the two methods, as applied to AFDC, showed little difference
between the extent of verification done by the agency under the investigative and the
simplified method. See 1972 Hearings 6. See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FIsCAL POLICY, JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SEss., supra note 367, at 6.
HEW has abandoned the simplified method in the face of continued recommendation
for its retention and recognition of its potential for good. See 1972 Hearings 508; Handler,
supra note 366, at 18-20; AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON
WELFARE PROPOSALs 25 (1970).
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970).
384 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973).
385 36 Fed. Reg. 3864 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1972)).
388 "The [30-day requirement] adopted draws on the experience of more than 17 years
in administering the statute, as well as the experience and comments of various states and
recipients." Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Swank v. Rodriguez,
403 U.S. 901 (1971). The history of the 30-day requirement is traced from 1951, through
the Public Assistance Handbook, and into the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. at 5-6.
387 An overall simplified application procedure obviously requires less time for the
initial agency decision. In its proposals for welfare reform, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York suggested, along with full implementation of the simplified method,
prompt decisions within ten working days. AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, supra note 382, at 26-27,
38 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973). See also note 363 and accompanying text supra.
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B. Hearings
1. New Regulations
The 1973 regulations have revised the entire framework
within which the welfare "fair hearing" functions. The only phase
of the process left unchanged is the specific conduct of the hearing
mandated by Goldberg v. Kelly. 389 Thus, minimum due process
guaranties are retained-timely and adequate notice, a personal
appearance by the recipient allowing him oral presentation of the
case and optional representation by counsel, the opportunity to
present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and a
requirement that the hearing decision be based only on rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing.390  Beyond this required
minimum, however, HEW has declined to attend to recipients'
additional procedural guaranties.
The tone of these changes is reflected in the deletion of "fair"
from the phrase "fair hearings."'391 This deletion is not merely a
389 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg involved an action brought by New York recipients of
AFDC and home relief, alleging that termination, or proposed termination, of benefits
without prior notice, and without a pretermination hearing, was a denial of due process.
Recognizing the "brutal need" of the recipients (id. at 261), and taking cognizance of the
"new property" concept (id. at 262 n.8), the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients are
entitled to a pretermination evidentiary hearing.
Although Goldberg's holding was restricted to termination of benefits, courts have
subsequently extended its procedural protections to all phases of government-individual
interaction in the welfare process. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972) (reduction in benefits); Hunt v. Edmunds, 328 F. Supp. 468
(D. Minn. 1971) (reduction in benefits); Diaz v. Wyman, 41 App. Div. 2d 722, 341 N.Y.S.2d
370 (1st Dep't 1973) (recoupment proceeding); Morales v. Lavine, 41 App. Div. 2d 627, 340
N.Y.S.2d 931 (Ist Dep't 1973) (recoupment proceeding). See also Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F.
Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970) (all phases of welfare process) (dictum). Likewise, Goldberg has
been extended to cover all cash and in-kind assistance programs. New York State regulations
prescribe fair hearing protections for recipients of cash assistance benefits, food stamps, and
social services. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358.4(a)-(c) (1973).
In issuing new fair hearing regulations on May 29, 1970, HEW specifically stated that it
was implementing the Supreme Court's holding in Goldberg. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (1970).
Except for minor procedural changes (36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971)), these regulations re-
mained substantially unchanged until the 1973 revisions.
The new regulations specifically state that hearings must meet the due process standards
of Goldberg. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1)(ii) (1973).
390 These minimum requirements of due process were detailed by the Supreme Court
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970). They are specifically incorporated into the
new regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.10(a)(13), (14) (1973). The detailed conduct of a fair
hearing in New York is prescribed at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358.16 (1973).
For a discussion of the effect of the Goldberg holding on the mechanics of a fair hearing,
see Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process- A Study of the Implementation of Fair Hearing
Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 728-33 (1972).
391 See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (1973). The Social Security Act specifically requires that
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matter of form, but reflects several minor substantive changes
made in the hearing procedure. Previously, the agency was re-
quired to provide recipients with information on how to obtain
legal help for the hearings,392 but this requirement has been
deleted. Previously, the hearing was to be held at a time and place
convenient to the recipient; 393 now the time and place need only be
reasonable. 394 Whereas the agency was previously required to help
the recipient in requesting a hearing, 395 now such help is only
discretionary.3 96 Although a clear expression of intent by the
recipient was formerly sufficient for the request of a hearing, now
the agency may demand that such a request be in writing.3 97 In
addition to this erosion of procedural guaranties, there are five
other changes: (1) the introduction of local evidentiary hearings,
(2) reduction of the timely notice requirements, (3) exceptions to
timely notice, (4) recovery of aid paid pending the hearing, and (5)
clarification of the fact-policy distinction. 398
a. Local Evidentiary Hearings. Prior regulations required
hearings before a single state agency. 399 The hearing officer was
required to be impartial and could not have been involved in the
adverse agency decision. 4 0 The states are now provided the option
of either retaining the old procedures on the state level or institut-
ing local evidentiary hearings with a right to appeal to a state
agency. 40  Local evidentiary hearings need not be provided
throughout the state.4 °2 If the recipient loses at the local eviden-
each state provide a system of "fair hearings" as part of its state plan for the grant-in-aid
programs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1972).
392 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6) (1972)).
33 Id. at 3035 (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(7) (1972)).
3- 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(8) (1973).
395 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)(ii) (1972)).
39f 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(ii) (1973).
397 Compare 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)(i) (1972)), With 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(i) (1973) (new regulation). This trend toward requiring more for-
malized recipient action before the agency is required to respond also appears in the
application regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(1)(ii) (1973). See note 339 and accompanying
text supra.
398 For an analysis of changes in the fact-policy distinction, see notes 447-85 and
accompanying text infra. This section includes a discussion of adverse determinations caused
by changes in law that affect classes of recipients and the recently defined due process
standards applicable in such circumstances.
399 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.10(a)(1), (3) (1972)).
400 Id. at 3035 (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(8) (1972)).
401 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(1) (1973).
402 Id. Arguably, providing for local evidentiary hearings in only some subdivisions of
the state, is in violation of the Social Security Act's requirement for a uniform state plan for
AFDC and for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(1), (3) (1970); id. §§ 602(a)(1), (4) (Supp.
II, 1972).
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tiary hearing, he has fifteen days within which to request a de novo
hearing before the state agency.40 3 If he appeals but does not
specifically request a de novo hearing, the state agency will deter-
mine only if the local decision was supported by substantial
evidence. 40 4 The requirements for an impartial, disinterested hear-
ing officer remain, 0 5 and both the local and state hearings are to
be conducted according to Goldberg's standards. 40 6
b. Timely Notice Requirements. Goldberg did not fix the exact
requirements of timely notice,40 7 but regulations promulgated in
response to Goldberg provided that notice of an adverse agency
action be mailed to the recipient fifteen days before such action was
taken.408 The timely notice requirement serves two functions. First,
it informs the recipient of the imminent adverse action. Addition-
ally, it establishes the time period within which the recipient is
obligated to request a hearing, if such a recipient desires continued
benefits until the hearing decision is rendered.40 9 HEW has now
reduced this required period to only ten days,410 although the state
may, at its option, extend this period for another ten days. 41'
Ironically, while shortening the time period within which a
hearing may be requested, HEW has expanded the period within
which the agency is required to reach a decision on the hearing.
Final action is now to be taken within ninety days of the date of the
hearing request. 412
c. Exceptions to Timely Notice. There are now ten specified
403 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6)(iii) (1973).
"I Id. Note, however, that the agency is no longer required to help the recipient in
requesting a hearing. See note 395 supra. Notice of the local evidentiary hearing decision
must include proper notice of opportunity to appeal. Such notice must now adequately
distinguish between the two forms of review. When the notice fails to make a proper
distinction in plain language that the recipient can understand, litigation can be expected.
405 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(9) (1973).
406 See notes 389-90 and accompanying text supra.
407 "We are not prepared to say that the seven-day notice currently provided by New
York City is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may be cases where fairness
would require that a longer time be given." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
400 See 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(i)(a) (1972)). When
these regulations were initially promulgated in 1970, HEW explained that they were in
direct response to the holding of Goldberg. See 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (1970).
409 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6)(i) (1973).
410 Id. § 205.10(a)(4)(i)(A).
411 Id. § 205.10(a)(7).
412 Id. § 205.10(a)(16). The regulations do not specify, however, whether a local
evidentiary hearing decision is final action, and if so, how long the state agency has for
decision on the subsequent state agency hearing.
Prior regulations required final administrative action within 60 days of the hearing
request. 36 Fed. Reg. 3035 (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(11) (1972)).
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circumstances which excuse the agency from having, to provide
timely notice before the termination of benefits. These include
death of a recipient, voluntary termination, commitment to an
institution or a nursing home, recipient's whereabouts unknown,
recipient receiving benefits in a new jurisdiction, judicial removal
of an AFDC child from the home, prescribed change in medical
care, and end of a special allowance. 41 3 The agency is still required,
however, to provide adequate notice no later than the date of
action.414 The tenth circumstance allowing the agency to dispense
with timely notice is the most controversial-suspected recipient
fraud. The regulation as first proposed provided that timely notice
need not be given when the agency had found that there was a
likelihood of fraud and had notified law enforcement officials. 415
The reproposed regulation would impose more stringent require-
ments on the agency. There must be clear evidence of criminal
fraud, substantiated through collateral sources when possible.
Furthermore, the agency must not have obtained the evidence in
sufficient time to provide timely notice, and a hearing must be
made immediately available to the recipient. 41 6
d. Aid Paid Pending the Hearing. A recipient now is given, up
to ninety days after an adverse agency action to appeal that action
by requesting a hearing.41 7 However, if the recipient requests a
hearing within the prescribed period, benefits continue until the
date of the hearing decision. HEW has now determined that such
continued benefits are subject to recovery if the agency action is
sustained at the hearing.418 Presumably, such recovery will be
effected under the new recoupment regulations.41 9
413 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.10(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(I) (1973). At the date of publication only these nine
circumstances had been finalized in the regulation. The tenth circumstance, suspected
recipient fraud (see notes 415-16 and accompanying text infra), had only been proposed by
HEW. The finalized regulation was not yet promulgated.
414 Id. § 205.10(a)(4)(ii).
415 See Proposed HEW Reg. § 205.10(a)(5)(ii)(E), 38 Fed. Reg. 9820 (1973).
4" See Proposed HEW Reg. § 205.10(a)(4)(ii)(j), 38 Fed. Reg. 22,042 (1973).
4,7 45 G.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iii) (1973). The regulations specify 90 days as the maximum
period available to the recipient for requesting a hearing. Under prior regulations, which
specified only a reasonable time for the recipient to make such a request (36 Fed. Reg. 3034
(1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1972)), New York established a 60-day reason-
able time period. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 358.5(a) (1973).
418 45 G.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6)(i) (1973).
419 1l § 233.20(a)(12); see notes 486-522 and accompanying text infra. The new
recoupment regulations allow recovery of overpayments from currently available resources
or assistance benefits, or both. Most cases of recoupment of aid paid pending the hearing
will therefore have an impact only when the proposed agency action is a reduction and the
recipient is still receiving benefits.
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2. Criticism
These new regulations pay lip service to Goldberg, by retaining
the basic hearing requirements, while stretching the due process
context of the hearings to the breaking point. States are given
unbridled flexibility in many areas, and once again, litigation chal-
lenging state procedures will unquestionably ensue.42 °
HEW has taken the cue for local evidentiary hearings from the
Social Security Amendments of 1972 and extended the procedure
to AFDC and Medicaid. 421 But local hearings have been criticized
on two grounds. 422 The two-tiered system of hearings will increase
administrative costs, and impartiality at the local hearing will be
difficult to attain. Whenever the local hearing officer has been
involved in any way with the recipient's case, litigation can be
expected. Increasing local staff to avoid this problem will further
increase administrative costs. Because the regulations also do not
clarify the way in which the local evidentiary hearing and the state
agency hearing will interact, substantial confusion might arise.423
Local agencies favor local evidentiary hearings because they facili-
tate the prompt discovery of errors and thereby reduce incorrect
benefit payments.424 But this saving may well be offset by the use of
less efficient administrative procedures. 425
420 HEW purports to provide for more efficient welfare administration by allowing the
states greater flexibility in designing procedures that distribute benefits only to those eligible.
See 38 Fed. Reg. 9819 (1973). This efficiency, however, does not relate to potentially
increased administrative costs. For a discussion of increased administrative expenses result-
ing from imprecise limits on agency behavior, see notes 367-68 and accompanying text supra.
421 1972 Act, § 407, 86 Stat. 1489. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 allowed the
states to institute local evidentiary hearings for adult categories until SSI became effective on
January 1, 1974. This provision is seemingly contradictory to much of the general purpose
of SSI, however, which was intended to provide streamlined, less costly federal administra-
tion.
422 See Comments on Proposed Regulations Re: Methods of Determining Eligibility,
Fair Hearings and Recoupment of Overpayments, Before the Department of Health,
Educatiion and Welfare 30-39 (1973) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). These comments
were presented as testimony before HEW by the NLSP Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law, on behalf of the National Welfare Rights Organization.
423 For example, what is the final agency action required within 90 days of the hearing
request? If only the local evidentiary hearing decision is required within this time period,
then another 105 days could pass before the recipient receives a decision from the state
agency.
Another problem involves the location of the state agency hearing. If the local eviden-
tiary hearing is made available in the recipient's county, will state agency hearings granted
only in the state capital be reasonably located, or is it necessary for all hearings to be
conducted in the recipient's county of residence? Arguably, different standards for de novo
hearings and substantial evidence review hearings could be implemented.
424 See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (1973).
425 "Efficient benefits" is used here in referring to the percentage of benefits paid only
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A further disincentive to efficient administration is the longer
period allowed for rendering hearing decisions. If aid is paid
during this time, and the hearing decision sustains the local agency
action, extra incorrect benefits will have been paid. The real risk,
however, involves the class of cases in which no timely notice is
required and the recipient is denied benefits for three months until
the agency action is reversed.4" 6 HEW's justification for such an
extension is the increased hearing case load.427 However, it does
not follow that the decisionmaker's case load is reduced by giving
him more time to respond.428
The reduction of the timely notice period is inconsistent with
the expansion of time limits for agency action. 429 The time in
which recipients must decide whether or not to request a hearing
has been reduced from fifteen to ten days. But because the regula-
tion requires only the mailing and not the receipt of notice within
ten days prior to agency action, the effective notice period may be
reduced by as much as one-half.430
HEW purports to defend the change by arguing that it re-
duces overpayments to ineligibles. 431 But even if a recipient is
ineligible, he is entitled to a due process hearing to assert his
continued eligibility. If the new regulation hinders the recipient
from requesting such a hearing, it is unconstitutional; if not, it
merely cuts benefits paid by five days while another regulation
to eligible recipients. This implicit HEW value judgment, concerning how welfare dollars are
best spent, on benefits or on administrative costs, has cropped up in the new application
regulations. See note 380 and accompanying text supra.
426 Of course, the recipient would then be entitled to receive corrective retroactive
payments for this period. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1973). However, if the recipient does
win at the hearing, he is by definition needy; yet he is deprived of benefits for up to three
months, or longer, with state agency hearings. Note also that the states are forbidden from
paying aid pending the state hearing after the recipient loses the local evidentiary hearing.
Id. § 205.10(a)(6)(iii).
427 See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973).
428 If there are n hearings every 60 days, then there would be 3/2 (n) hearings every 90
days. In either case, the hearing officer must decide the same number of hearings per day.
His burden is determined not by the time in which he must act, but rather by the volume of
hearings requested. It is only in the unusual circumstances in which the administrator
requires more than 60 days to decide a particular hearing that the extension is needed.
HEW should have limited the extension to these circumstances.
429 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(3) (1973). The time limit for agency action after initial
application has been increased by 50%. See also id. § 205.10(a)(16). The time within which the
agency must render a hearing decision has also been increased by 50%.
410 Since the period begins to run at the time of mailing, as it did with the prior 15 day
requirement, the recipient necessarily has less than 10 days for response. Therefore the
absolute five-day reduction is more than one-third of the time previously available to the
recipient.
431 See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,007 (1973).
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allows the hearing decision to be delayed by thirty days. 4 32 How-
ever, if the recipient is found eligible, no expenditures are saved,
and the recipient is unnecessarily inconvenienced. HEW could
better- achieve the same result by ensuring quick hearings and
decisions.
By reducing the timely notice period, HEW has increased the
probability that recipients will litigate the issue of whether timely
and adequate notice has been afforded in each circumstance. If the
mail delays the notice until the date of agency action, due process is
obviously violated. If the agency further requires written hearing
requests,433 it becomes practically impossible for the recipient to act
in time to request the hearing. However, states may and should
avoid these problems by allowing the recipient an additional ten
days within which to request a hearing and to receive aid pending
the decision. 434
At first glance, the circumstances in which the agency may
dispense with timely notice appear eminently reasonable. 435 All but
fraud involve clear-cut termination situations in which necessary
information can be readily verified; however, despite the availabil-
ity of verified information, factual questions, which the hearing is
designed to resolve, arise in many of these cases.436 In any event,
there is little justification for not providing timely notice. The
funds saved by not satisfying the timely notice period are insub-
stantial, and even if the savings were significant, protection of the
public fisc has not been accepted as an agency interest of sufficient
substantiality to warrant dispensing with due process. 437
These criticisms are even more compelling in the case of
suspected recipient fraud. Suspected fraud is the one situation in
432 See note 412 and accompanying text supra.
433 See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(i) (1973).
134 See id. § 205.10(a)(7).
435 For a discussion concerning timely and adequate notice in cases of class reduction
due to changes in law, see notes 465-81 and accompanying text infra.
436 These [due process] rights are important in cases such as those before us, where
recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or mis-
leading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of
particular cases.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See also notes 448-50 and
accompanying text infra.
437 Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the
individual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully
deprived of assistance.... While the problem of additional expense must be kept in
mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due
process.
397 U.S. at 261, quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (footnotes
omitted).
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which a hearing is clearly needed and in which the agency should
be prevented from taking unilateral action. The reproposed regu-
lation, seemingly an attempt to restrict unfettered agency discre-
tion, has only increased the likelihood of unilateral agency deci-
sions. Collateral contacts by the agency are required, but studies
have shown that such information is often unreliable. 4 8 The re-
quirement for an immediate hearing implies a quick decision, but
efficient administration would reduce unnecessary expenses with-
out threatening recipients' due process rights.
HEW defends these regulations on the ground that they
govern only decisions on questions of law, not of fact.439 How-
ever, the situations covered by the regulations involve changes in
recipients' circumstances, not changes in state or federal law that
affect recipients. The trend in 1973 case law has been to extend
Goldberg to all recipients individually affected, 440 but to restrict its
application when changes in law affect classes of recipients."'
These regulations conflict with this philosophy.
Probably the most questionable change in the regulations is the
provision for recoupment of aid paid pending the hearing. In one
sense this is merely another disincentive for prompt agency action,
both in scheduling the hearing and in rendering the decision.
Procedures ensuring speedy hearings would reduce undesired ad-
ministrative expenses, but HEW's scheme forces recipients to
shoulder the burden of poor administration.442
The more serious problem posed by the new regulation con-
cerns the chilling effect that it might have on the recipient's
exercise of his right to request a hearing. HEW is concerned with
deterring requests for hearings when the recipient knows that the
agency action is not erroneous.443 But the regulation will obviously
affect recipients in doubt as to the propriety of the agency's action
who would otherwise request a hearing.
The new regulations abound with potential for severe agency
abuse. For example, recipients may be denied aid paid pending the
4" See Comment, supra note 345, at 1328-29.
4" See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973).
440 See Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Carleson v. Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
441 See generally notes 465-81 and accompanying text infra.
442 One could argue that recipients do not suffer in these circumstances, that the aid
paid pending the hearing was aid for which they were ineligible in any event and was
therefore rightfully recouped. The burden, however, results from the double reduction of
benefits in such a circumstance: (1) benefits would be reduced following the sustained agency
action; and (2) benefits would be further reduced to effect recoupment. See note 419 supra.
443 See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,006 (1973).
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hearing because the agency alleges a specific exception to the
timely notice requirement.44 4 Other recipients may find their
benefits terminated at the local evidentiary hearing when the
hearing officer decides that no questions of fact are involved.
Wrongfully terminated recipients may be forced to wait up to 195
days for reinstated benefits.44 5 A delay of such magnitude provides
a tool for severe harassment.446
3. Clarification of the Fact-Policy Distinction
In 1973, cases and regulatory changes have considerably
clarified the fact-policy distinction 447 which had been applied to
determine the class of recipients and applicants to whom the full
procedural protections of Goldberg applied. The plaintiffs in Gold-
berg had complained that their benefits had been terminated on the
basis of inaccurate and misleading factual information, and that
they had not been afforded a hearing at which time they could
challenge these errors in their records. 448 In accepting the plain-
tiffs' contention that due process did indeed require a pretermina-
tion hearing for individual recipients in the plaintiffs' situation, the
Goldberg Court left unresolved the questions of what due process
required before a state could terminate the benefits of either an
individual recipient or a broad class of recipients on the basis of an
interpretation of policy or a rule of law.449 Lower courts subse-
quently held that Goldberg was implicitly limited to situations involv-
444 See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(I) (1973).
445 Ninety days are apparently allowed for the local evidentiary hearing decision. 45
C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(16) (1973). The recipient has 15 days for requesting review at a state
agency hearing. Id. § 205.10(a)(6)(iii). Presumably there is then another 90 days for decision
on the state agency hearing. Id. § 205.10(a)(16).
446 This concern is not merely idle speculation. "[I]t has been suggested by local
authorities that due process in welfare hearings should be curtailed to save welfare costs."
Handler, supra note 366, at 34.
Also, some welfare officials apparently feel that Goldberg has unnecessarily raised
administrative expenses by requiring hearings. In view of this added expense, perhaps more
stringent measures, which make such hearings more burdensome for the recipient, are
somehow justified. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92d
CONG., 2d SFass., supra note 367; at 15-16; 1972 Hearings 672.
147 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iii)(a)(1) (1972)).
448 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970). "The question for decision [was]
whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without
affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the
recipient procedural due process. ... 397 U.S. at 255.
449 397 U.S. at 268 n.15. The Court never expressly limited its holding to the federal
context.
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ing factual determinations and did not apply to situations in which
issues of law or policy were in dispute. 451
Federal regulations reflected the limitation on Goldberg which
the fact-policy distinction represented. Benefits were to be con-
tinued until the fair hearing decision was reached unless the
agency determined that the recipient's challenge to termination
raised only questions of policy and none of fact.45' However, the
terms "fact," "law," and "policy" were never defined. Nor were
distinctions drawn between policy questions affecting individual
recipients or broad classes of recipients, and across-the-board
changes affecting all recipients. Court decisions failed to provide
uniform law in this area.452
The Supreme Court, in Carleson v. Yee-Litt,4 5 3 recently applied
Goldberg's due process requirements454 to all recipients adversely
affected by agency determinations relating to the individual
recipient's case. In affirming without opinion the decision of a
three-judge panel, the Court enjoined use of the fact-policy distinc-
tion as unconstitutional under Goldberg.455 Consequently, the
agency can no longer decide, ex parte, that only questions of policy
or law are involved in a decision to terminate, thus ending benefits
before the fair hearing.
The plaintiffs in Yee-Litt were terminated recipients who had
been denied continued benefits prior to their fair hearings. In
terminating the plaintiffs' benefits, the state agency had decided
that no fact questions were left for decision at the hearings. 456 A
temporary restraining order was then issued by the court enjoining
450 See Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971); Provost v. Betit, 326 F. Supp. 920
(D. Vt. 1971); Merriweather v. Burson, 325 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
451 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iii)(a)(1) (1972)).
452 The Second Circuit failed to reach the question of whether or not strikers were
entitled to assistance benefits, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. The court went on,
however, in explicit dictum, to point out that the purpose of Goldberg was to provide eligible
recipients with an opportunity to provefacts. When only questions of law are present, there
is no need for a prior hearing. Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Seventh Circuit has held, though, that only the precise procedural requirements of
Goldberg are limited to a factual resolution. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org. v. Sterrett, 467
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972). With pure questions of law, there is no need to present or to
cross-examine witnesses, but an opportunity to be heard is still mandated. Id. With questions
of fact, alone or mixed with questions of law, Goldberg specifically applies. Id.
a51 412 U.S. 925, affg mem. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
454 See notes 389-90 and accompanying text supra.
455 Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal.), affd men. sub nom. Carleson v.
Yee-Litt, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
456 Id. at 999-1000.
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such terminations, although it was subsequently modified to allow
the agency to implement new information-gathering regulations.5
When the new regulations failed to protect the recipients' due
process rights, further use of the fact-policy distinction was en-
joined.
Yee-Litt was based on a strict interpretation of Goldberg, and did
not represent a decision to extend Goldberg to a new class of
recipient-applicants. 458 Goldberg had focused on the specific prob-
lem of denying benefits to potentially eligible recipients. 459 The
three-judge panel in Yee-Litt found the fact-policy distinction to be
inherently unworkable 46 because it inevitably denies due process
protection to a certain number of otherwise eligible individual
recipients. Two areas of particular concern were noted. The first
was termination or denial by mistake. 461 Balancing the respective
burdens, and focusing on the brutal need factor, the court found
that in such cases the agency must bear the cost of minimizing
improper adverse determinations. The second, and more far-
reaching, area was that of agency misuse of regulations.46 , The
stakes here are too great for the recipient involved to allow the
agency room for judgmental errors in deciding that no questions of
fact are present.463
HEW still has not abandoned the fact-policy distinction al-
together. If at the local evidentiary hearing a decision is made that
only questions of policy or law are involved in a dispute, benefits
may be terminated at that time, instead of when the full hearing
decision is rendered. Until this preliminary decision, benefits must
be continued.464
Goldberg has not been extended to adverse determinations
457 The California state agency argued that the fact-policy distinction was valid when
the administrator had sufficient information on which to base his decisions. Consequently
new state regulations, providing for greater information gathering prior to termination,
were enacted. The court permitted the agency to attempt to solve its own problem with its
own regulations pursuant to Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972). See 353 F. Supp. at
998-99.
456 353 F. Supp. at 1000.
4'9 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
461 "The Court further concludes that the fault does not lie with the State, but rather
with the unclear and unmanageable fact-policy distinction which the regulations have
created." 353 F. Supp. at 1001.
461 Id. at 999.
462 Id. at 1000, 1001; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
46' 353 F. Supp. at 1000.
464 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6)(i)(a) (1973). The danger here is that early termination may
be used by the agency as a harassment technique, removing recipients from the welfare rolls
and forcing them to bear the burden of obtaining reinstated benefits.
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affecting broad classes of recipients involved in an assistance pro-
gram; however, new regulations provide that timely and adequate
notice shall be afforded all recipients so affected. 465 But there is no
requirement for a pretermination or prereduction hearing in such
cases.466 Group hearings remain available when the sole question
involved is one of state or federal law or policy, but only at the
discretion of the state agency.467
These new regulations essentially embody the rationale of
recent court decisions in this area. In 1973, two circuits dealt with
the problem of timely and adequate notice and prereduction hear-
ings for large classes of recipients. In Rochester v. Baganz,4 ns the
Third Circuit reviewed an across-the-board percentage reduction
for all recipients in the state of Delaware. The reduction resulted
from limited state funding for AFDC.469 Seven-day notice was sent
to most recipients with no opportunity for continued benefits
pending a hearing. The district court had held that in such a case
the requirements of Goldberg did not apply and that notice and a
hearing were not mandated.4 7 0
The circuit court reversed in part, basing its decision on
federal regulations. The court held that while the states were free
to reduce benefits they were nevertheless required to comply with
the applicable regulations, 47'1 and timely notice had not been
465 Id. § 205.10(a)(4)(iii).
It may be helpful to distinguish the two fact situations involved in these adverse
determinations. The Yee-Litt type termination was based on the application of a rule of policy
or law to the individual recipient. For example, a stepfather might have been found living in
the recipient's home and benefits would then have been terminated according to agency
policy. A recipient could challenge this agency policy, but because no questions of fact were
involved, the man's presence being admitted, the fact-policy distinction allowed the agency to
deny aid pending the hearing. Yee-Litt has now forbidden such action. Carleson v. Yee-Litt,
412 U.S. 925, affg mem. Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Compare the Yee-Litt termination with a reduction of benefits to all recipients in a
program, as would occur if the state ran low on welfare appropriations. Here all recipients
are affected by a change in law; there is no decision to reduce benefits to selected recipients.
See notes 468-74 and accompanying text infra. Admittedly, the line between these two
examples is not always so easily drawn.
466 Id. § 205.10(a)(5)(v). Hearings are available to contest the correctness of the reduc-
tion computation. Id. § 205.10(a)(5). However, the regulations do not provide for continued
aid pending the hearing in such a case.
467 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(iv) (1973).
468 479 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1973).
469 Id. at 604. The cause of the reduction is explained with greater detail in the district
court opinion. See Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350, 352-53 (D. Del. 1972).
470 Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350 (D. Del. 1972); see Riggins v. Graham, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. $ 17,801 (Ariz. 1973).
471 479 F.2d at 605.
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provided . 4 7 2 The court found that the notice requirements were
within HEW's rulemaking authority and consistent with the aim of
orderly administration of the welfare system. 473 However, no pre-
reduction hearing was required. The regulation allowing for post-
reduction hearings to correct possible computation errors was
upheld.474
The First Circuit, in Velazco v. Minter,475 was confronted with a
general reduction of OAA benefits resulting from a congressional
increase in OASDI benefits. 47 6 The state agency had provided
timely but somewhat inexact notice477 to recipients and had denied
prereduction hearings. The court upheld the agency action on
both constitutional and statutory grounds. 478 Balancing agency and
recipient interests under the due process clause, the court found
that because overall benefits would increase there was no risk of
grievous loss to the recipients.4 7 9 Since this determination resulted
from a change in law affecting a broad class of recipients, a
prereduction hearing was not necessary.48 0 In view of the complex
nature of the recomputation, the notice was held to be adequate
under the circumstances, but the court did indicate that such notice
would fail in the ordinary case.48'
The apparent direction of these changes is both efficient and
fair. The unmanageable fact-policy distinction has been effectively
eliminated. Now in assessing the applicability of the Goldberg re-
quirements the threshold question is whether individual recipients
or a class of recipients is adversely affected by an agency decision.
472 Id. at 606. The regulations defined "timely" as requiring notice mailed at least 15
days before agency action was taken. 36 Fed. Reg. 3034 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. §
205.10(a)(5)(i)(a) (1972)).
473 479 F.2d at 606.
474 Id. at 607.
475 481 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1973).
476 OASDI benefits were increased 20% by Congress in 1972.42 U.S.C. § 415 (Supp. II,
1972). Consequently, all OAA recipients receiving OASDI had increased income which in
turn affected the level of their OAA benefits. This interaction is well detailed by the court.
See 481 F.2d at 575.
477 "While specifying the kinds of changes to be expected and indicating that the
recipient would be receiving, from both his OASDI and OAA checks, more money than
before, the notice gave no formulae, computations or amounts." 481 F.2d at 575.
478 The district court had upheld the agency action on the theory that social security
and old age welfare programs were in pari materia. Thus, there had been no reduction in
benefits at all; rather the recipient was receiving increased benefits. Velazco v. Minter, 352 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1973). The circuit court noted that its affirmance was based on a
different approach.
479 481 F.2d at 577.
413 Id. at 578.
48 Id. at 581.
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Agencies can no longer terminate benefits to individual recipients
without a hearing by resorting to the pretext of "policy"
questions.4 12 At the same time, efficient administration is promoted
by not requiring individual hearings for class reductions.483
Problems do remain, however. The contours of a policy ques-
tion are yet to be defined. This failure to delineate the boundaries
of a "question of policy" could lead to abuses of the hearing process
at the local level.48 4 Local hearing officers could merely convene a
hearing, promptly decide that no fact questions are present, and
immediately adjourn the proceeding, thereby depriving the recip-
ient of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Second, the problem
of an incorrect reduction due to agency error in the computation
of across-the-board budget cuts still remains. An individual whose
benefits are so reduced is permitted a hearing, but not prior to
benefit changes. 48 5 This procedure is particularly harsh in cases
like Rochester in which an individual could face two reductions-the
overall reduction and the improper computation.
C. Recoupment
1. New Regulations
New regulations have greatly expanded the state agency's
ability to recoup prior overpayments from assistance recipients.486
Under prior regulations, recoupment was possible in only two
circumstances: (1) when the-recipient had income or resources
currently available, or (2) when evidence clearly showed that a
recipient had willfully withheld information from the administer-
ing agency.487 Only in the latter instance was the agency able to
482 See, e.g., Yee-Litt v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Such practices also expose the state agency to the risk of extraordinary expenses for
compensating recipients wrongfully terminated. See Sitkin, supra note 367, at 48-50.
483 The district court in Rochester pointed out the possible danger that, were the state
unable to reduce the standard of need promptly, limited funds appropriated for AFDC
would run out before the end of the fiscal year. Recipients would then face the possibility of
no benefits. Both parties had an interest in the uninterrupted receipt of assistance and
therefore in prompt adjustment of the benefit level. Rochester v. Ingram, 337 F. Supp. 350,
357 (D. Del. 1972).
From the state's point of view, continuing benefits prior to fair hearings would be a
great expenditure of funds to essentially ineligible recipients. Such a procedure would also
encourage unnecessary hearings and greatly increase administrative costs. See STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SEss., supra note 367,
at 16.
484 See notes 445-46 and accompanying text supra.
4- 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5) (1973).
486 Id. § 233.20(a)(12).
487 34 Fed. Reg. 1395 (1971) (former 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c), (d) (1972)).
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effect recoupment by reducing assistance benefits. Under new
regulations, the state may recoup from currently available income
or resources, assistance benefits, or both.4 s8 When assistance is
reduced, there are only vague prescriptions that "reasonable limits"
be set on the proportion of the benefits suspended 489 and that the
state avoid causing undue hardship. 490 The only specific limitation
placed on a state plan for recoupment, in the absence of willful
withholding of information, is that the state is limited to recouping
those overpayments made in the twelve months immediately pre-
ceding the discovery of the overpayment. 491
2. Criticism
The Social Security Amendments of 1972 authorized recoup-
ment procedures for the SSI program.492 The statutory language
was very much like that of the OASDI recoupment of overpayment
provision. 493 However, the regulations promulgated by HEW for
the SSI program bear no relation to the corresponding OASDI
program.494 The "without fault" phrase, common to both statutory
schemes,495 and treated extensively by the OASDI regulations, 496 is
absent from HEW's new regulations. Thus, even the most innocent
and unknowing recipients of overpayments are subject to future
reduction in their benefit checks. This is made more troubling by
the inevitable presence of hardship in any reduction of welfare
benefits. In the statutes and the regulations, both OASDI and SSI
488 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(c) (1973).
489 Id. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(d).
490 Id. It is not dear how reductions in benefits in any need-oriented welfare program
could avoid undue hardship. See note 497 and accompanying text infra.
491 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(b) (1973).
The proposed regulations for recoupment contained no limits whatsoever on the
agency's ability to recoup overpayments. See 38 Fed. Reg. 9822 (1973). Also there was no
mention how, or even if, underpayments were to be dealt with. In apparent response to
criticism of these regulations, the new regulations included the 12-month rule and ordered
correction of underpayments, also limited to the 12 previous months. See Fed. Reg. 22,007
(1973).
492 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
493 Compare id. (SSI), with id. §§ 404(a), (b) (1970) (OASDI). OASDI requires that
there shall be no adjustment of payments to, or recovery by the United States from,
any person who is without fault if such adjustment or recovery would defeat the
purpose of this subchapter or would be against equity and good conscience.
Id. § 404(b) (1970). The corresponding language of the Social Security Amendments of 1972
includes the same terms, but is not mandatory. Rather, the Secretary is to promulgate
regulations designed to meet these same objectives. Id. § 1383(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
494 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506-15 (1973).
495 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1970); id. § 1383(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
496 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.507, 404.510-11 (1973).
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factor the recipient's hardship into the decision of whether or not
to recoup. 497 Since OASDI is not a need-determined program, the
effect of recoupment may vary considerably from case to case.
Because welfare benefits are directly related to recipient need,
however, except in cases of gross fraud, any reduction in the
amount of assistance checks will automatically result in a hardship.
The application of the new regulations to AFDC recipients
may violate the principle enunciated in King v. Smith,498 that
"protection of ... [dependent] children is the paramount goal of
AFDC. ' 499 Federal courts have applied this rationale to strike down
recoupment schemes that reduced benefits to the children as a
means of controlling or punishing other members of a family. 500 If
HEW seeks to justify the new, broadened recoupment procedures
as a deterrent to fraudulent practices, it must distinguish King and
explain why criminal fraud prosecution and civil actions for re-
coupment are insufficient to achieve the same deterrent ends. If
the purpose of recoupment is only to control welfare expendi-
tures, however, then HEW must meet a "heavy burden of
justification."'50 ' It is questionable whether a measure that creates
hardship for innocent recipients will meet this burden, particularly
when the source of the problem is agency error. 50 2
497 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (1970) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506-15 (1973) (OASDI); 42 U.S.C. §
1383(b) (Supp. II, 1972) and 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(D) (1973) (SSI).
498 392 U.S. 309 (1968). King involved an Alabama substitute father rule that denied
AFDC aid to the mother and children when the mother cohabited with any able-bodied
single or married man. Id. at 311. The Supreme Court struck down the regulation as
inconsistent with the AFDC statutory scheme. The Court held that when alternative methods
were available to the agency, benefits should not be denied to AFDC children as a means of
controlling the behavior of a parent. The Court noted that Congress had determined that
immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through the use of rehabilitative measures
(id. at 325), although it did not specify what these measures were.
199 Id. at 325.
500 See Bradford v. Juras, 331 F. Supp. 167 (D. Ore. 1971); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316
F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970). King is distinguishable from the situation presensed here. In
this situation, the state is not seeking to regulate recipient behavior; the recoupment
regulation is clearly related to HEW's objective.
501 Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85, 88 (N.D. Cal.), affd mem. sub noam. Carleson v.
Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971). The Taylor court struck down as invalid under King a California
AFDC regulation that required the remaining parent to sign a criminal nonsupport com-
plaint against the absent parent.
Note that AFDC has been denied to recipients in furtherance of valid agency aims.
Work rules have been held to be a valid state condition for eligibility and not violative of the
Social Security Act. New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
Home visits have also been held to be a valid eligibility requirement. Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309 (1971).
502 It can be seriously questioned whether providing for any recoupment is
justified. Innocent members of the family are likely to suffer if overpayments are
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In 1973, two New York courts followed the King reasoning in
disallowing recoupment of duplicate checks.50 3 One court in-
structed the state agencyto pay particular attention at the rehear-
ing to the fact that the assistance sought to be reduced was paid
primarily for the benefit of the children of the recipient parent.50 4
In the other case, the court invalidated state suspension of benefits
pending any agency investigation into the parents' misconduct.50 5
Citing King, the court stated that the parents' misconduct was not a
sufficient reason for terminating benefits to AFDC children.50 6
Arguably, the new recoupment scheme is also defective with
respect to all assistance programs because it violates the statutory
mandate to furnish assistance to needy persons. The language of
the Social Security Act is prescriptive. 50 7 Each of the assistance
programs establishes simple eligibility requirements based on need
and nonneed factors. Denying or reducing assistance to an eligible
recipient contravenes the general intent of the Social Security
Act.508
Like the new application regulations,50 9 the new recoupment
regulations are noticeably lacking in standards to guide the states.
The percentage of the assistance check that may be withheld for
recoupment is not specified, nor is the length of time during which
the state should reduce benefits.5 " The terms "willfully
withheld" '  and "undue hardship"51 2 are not.explained; one must
recovered from a guilty member .... Recoupment reduces the family benefits as a
whole, causing the family as a whole-guilty and innocent members together-to
subsist on a lesser amount of public assistance.
AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 382, at 27.
s3 Diaz v. Wyman, 41 App. Div. 2d 722, 341 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1st Dep't 1973); Morales v.
Lavine, 41 App. Div. 2d 627, 340 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1st Dep't 1973).
"I Diaz v. Wyman, 41 App. Div. 2d 722, 341 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (1st Dep't 1973).
s5 Norton v. Lavine, 74 Misc. 2d 590, 344 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
506 Id. 74 Misc. 2d at 599-600, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
5o7 "Aid ... shall be furnished .. . to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)
(1970) (AFDC). "Every aged, blind, or disabled individual who is determined .. . to be
eligible on the basis of his income and resources shall ... be paid benefits by the Secretary of
[HEW]." Id. § 1381a (Supp. II, 1972) (SSI).
508 This argument is developed in much greater detail in the National Welfare Rights
Organization's testimony before HEW concerning the proposed 1973 regulations. See
Comments on Proposed Regulations, supra note 422, at 99-103.
The argument has been used by a New York court to strike down recoupment of AFDC
benefits. Noting that need and dependency were the only eligibility requirements for AFDC,
the court forbade recoupment without consideration of the child's need. Norton v. Lavine,
74 Misc. 2d 590, 344 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
so See notes 334-88 and accompanying text supra.
See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12) (1973).
1 See note 491 and accompanying text supra.
5'12 See note 490 and accompanying text supra.
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guess as to how each state will interpret them. 513 Although HEW
could defend this procedure as allowing for experimentation at the
state level it appears to be another invitation to litigation. 514
A general criticism of HEW's new scheme is that it sanctions
gross inequity in the recoupment procedure. Studies have shown
that erroneous payments are widespread in all welfare
programs. 51 5 Nevertheless, HEW has lumped virtually all possible
overpayment situations together,51 6 not differentiating recipients
according to degrees of fault, or knowledge of their ineligibility for
benefits.
Commentators and litigants have suggested that recoupment
generally violates various constitutional provisions;51 7  but the
courts have been unresponsive to these challenges. 5 8 The Second
Circuit, in a recent decision, rejected the argument that the group
of recipients whose benefits were reduced comprised a suspect
classification. 519 Although the new'recoupment scheme is broader,
it does not appear to contain constitutional infirmities.
A recoupment system similar to that of the OASDI program
would be more equitable than the one adopted by HEW. 52 ° In view
513 Id. Contrast these regulations to the OASDI regulations regarding overpayment. All
of the key statutory terms, "without fault," "defeat the purpose of Title II," "against equity
and good conscience," are extensively defined in the regulations. Examples also are fur-
nished. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.507-11 (1973).
514 Reduction of discretionary state decisions will arguably provide for better welfare
administration. See Sitkin, supra note 367, at 54.
-5" See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D
SEss., supra note 367, at 38-40.
516 The only instance of differing treatment according to recipient culpability is the
inapplicability of the 12-month limit for recoupable overpayments in cases of willful
withholding of information. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(b) (1973).
517 See Comment, Recoupment of Welfare Overpayment: The Legal Effect of State Recoupment
of Overpayment Provisions on Welfare Recipients Who No Longer Have the Temporary Job or Income
That Caused the Overpa)ynent, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 635 (1970). The author suggests that
recoupment violates due process, equal protection, and the eighth amendment sanction
against cruel and unusual punishment.
In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the plaintiffs raised an equal protection
argument that was avoided by the Court when the case was decided on statutory grounds.
However, in a concurrence, Mr. Justice Douglas saw the man-in-the-house rule as dis-
criminating against illegitimate children and hence violative of the equal protection clause.
Id. at 336.
518 A recent circuit court decision rejected the contention that the class of recipients
from whom the agency seeks to recoup benefits is a suspect classification. Finding no
constitutional claim, the court dismissed the case for want ofjurisdiction. Hagans v. Wyman,
471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973). A district court decision upholding a regulation requiring an
AFDC mother to name the father of her illegitimate child also found no constitutional
question involved. Since a three-judge panel was denied, there was no pendent jurisdiction,
and the statutory question was not reached. Saiz v. Goodwin, 325 F. Supp. 23 (D.N.M. 197 1).
519 Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1973).
520 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.506-15 (1973).
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of the inevitable hardships resulting from reduced welfare benefits,
"without fault" should be more leniently defined, 521 and there
should be some differentiation according to recipient culpability. A
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
has suggested allowing recoupment only in cases of actual fraud
with present need still considered. 522 At the very least, HEW
should have provided more specific guidelines for the states, rather
than leaving to the courts the task of precisely defining regulatory
terms.
D. Federally Awarded Retroactive Payments
Although the new regulations have been criticized here for
creating the potential for much litigation, it is important to note
that the federal courts have become an increasingly important
forum for the assertion of welfare rights. During 1973, the only
major question before the courts concerning federal review of state
welfare programs was whether a federal court could order a state
to make retroactive payments of benefits wrongfully denied a
recipient. Four circuits have expressed differing opinions on the
question of whether the eleventh amendment is a bar to such an
order. 523 Obviously, until the Supreme Court speaks there is no
chance for any uniform law in this area.524
The retroactivity issue was addressed initially by the Second
Circuit in Rothstein v. Wyman. 525 The court found that an award of
retroactive benefits by a federal court was both an improvident
521 See id. § 404.507.
522 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 382, at 28.
'2' Retroactive benefits were denied in Anderson v. Graham, Nos. 73-1441, 73-1466
(8th Cir., Dec. 20, 1973); Like v. Carter, 486 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1973); Dawkins v. Craig, 483
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973); and Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
Retroactive benefits were granted in Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973),
and McDonald v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 430 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1970). The eleventh
amendment was not raised as a defense in McDonald, however, and the court decided the
issue simply on the equities involved.
The following district courts have also dealt with the question of retroactives. Campag-
nuolo v. White, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,219 (D. Conn. 1973); Green v. Stanton, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 17,756 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Story v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Carter v. Stanton, 350 F. Supp. 1337 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
524 After this Comment was prepared for publication, the Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit and held that the eleventh amendment did bar a federal court from
ordering a state to pay retroactive welfare benefits. Edelman v. Jordan, 42 U.S.L.W. 4419
(March 25, 1974).
525 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973) New York had enacted
a statute dividing the state into four districts with different need standards in each district.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 131-a (McKinney 1969). A seven-county area surrounding New York
City had a lower need standard than that for the five counties comprising New York City.
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exercise of its equity jurisdiction and a violation of the eleventh
amendment. In balancing the equities, the court looked to the
competing interests of the state and the recipient, and to the
overall congressional intent in this area.526 On the one hand was
recipient need, against which were weighed the desirability of
smooth administration and the limited financial resources of the
state. The court felt that the scales were tipped, however, by the
congressional policy of "cooperative federalism '527 as exemplified
by the federal-state relationship created by the Social Security Act.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that recipient need was not
determinative because so much time had elapsed between the
agency violation and the award of benefits that the payments had
become compensatory and not merely remedial. 528
The court also found that retroactive payments were jurisdic-
tionally barred by the eleventh amendment. Ex parte Young 529 had
held that the eleventh amendment did not prevent a federal court
from ordering a state official to terminate practices found to be in
conflict with federal law. However, the Rothstein court found that
the eleventh amendment did bar an action against a state official
when the order required the payment of public funds. 53 0 Although
a state could waive its eleventh amendment immunity from suit,
the court said such a waiver must be "clear and unequivocal. 5 3 1
Since there was no explicit conditioning of federal welfare funds
on a state's liability in federal court, and waiver is usually only
implied when the state has entered into activities ordinarily in the
private sector, 532 the court found that the clear and unequivocal
test had not been met.
Four months later the Seventh Circuit reached a contrary
The plaintiffs in the seven outlying counties sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The
statute was struck down, and this action was not contested on appeal. The only issue before
the Second Circuit was the district court's award of retroactive benefits for the period when §
131-a was in force. 467 F.2d at 229-33.
526 467 F.2d at 232-35.
527 Id. at 232, 235.
528 Sixteen months had elapsed between the violation and the district court's award. of
retroactive payments. The court reasoned that these benefits had no correspondence to
present need. Id. at 235. However, the assumption that merely because the plaintiffs lived
through this reduction they were not in need of benefits, is questionable. If every dollar is
needed by the recipient, by definition, any reduction will remain unremedied over time. The
mere fact that recipients lived through a reduction in no way indicates that the benefits are
not needed.
529 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
530 Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1972).
531 Id. at 238.
532 Id. The court cited Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), in making this
distinction. For a discussion of Parden, see note 544 infra.
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result in Jordan v. Weaver.533 The court based its holding on four
affirmances by the Supreme Court in cases in which retroactive
benefits were granted. 534 The court in Jordan rejected the Rothstein
interpretation of Young as applicable only to prospective injunc-
tions, by pointing out that an order to bring state procedures into
accordance with federal law would drain state funds to a greater
extent than would an award of back benefits. 535 The Seventh
Circuit emphasized that the injunction in Young constituted com-
pletely adequate relief and that nothing in Young expressly limited
its application to injunctive relief.5 36 The Jordan court asserted that
policy considerations required the payment of retroactive benefits
to compel state conformity at the earliest possible date.5 37 Also, the
court characterized retroactive benefits as restitutionary relief and
not as damages, notwithstanding the contrary assertion in
Rothstein. 538
Finally, in Jordan it was found that Illinois had waived its
sovereign immunity by participating in a federal grant-in-aid pro-
gram. The court implied a condition upon such participation,
namely, consent to suit in federal courts. The welfare program was
533 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973). The plaintiffs inJordan were eligible AABD applicants
whose applications were not acted upon within the 30 or 60-day periods prescribed by the
federal regulations. The defendant state agency began paying benefits from the date of
approval and not for prior months when the plaintiffs would have been collecting benefits
but for the agency's delays. The court enjoined further variance from the federal regulations
in addition to awarding retroactive payments.
'31 Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972); State Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Sterrett and Zarate were summary
affirmances of three-judge decisions. In Shapiro, the Court affirmed the district court
without commenting on the issue of retroactive benefits, and in Wyman, the Court affirmed
the district court per curiam, citing only Shapiro. None of these cases, however, dealt
specifically with the eleventh amendment defense. But, the Seventh Circuit noted the
precedential value of summary affirmances in awarding retroactive benefits on the authority
of these cases. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 1973).
5 Mandatory injunctions granted on the authority ofEx parte Young have certainly
had an impact on the state treasury by requiring the expenditure of public funds.
... Here the district court's permanent injunction ... requires the expenditure of
more monies than the state was spending under the practices found unlawful. In
fact [it] requires the expenditure of more monies than the seriously disputed part of
the judgment requiring the payment of wrongfully withheld benefits! Whether a
liability is declared which must be met from the state's public funds is not the
touchstone of the Eleventh Amendment's applicability.
Id. at 991.
536 Id.
537 Without retroactive payments being ordered, "the force of federal law could be
seriously blunted. The state welfare officials could withhold benefits in violation of federal
law until suit is brought and a court acts, and retain the illegal savings acquired theretofore."
Id. at 992.
538 Id. at 993.
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essentially one of congressional regulation, and the Jordan court
found that Congress had implicitly intended a violation of its laws
or regulations to be properly redressed.539
Two later circuit court decisions540 have relied on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Employees v. Department of Public Health &
Welfare541 in reaching results consistent with Rothstein. Employees
involved a suit for minimum wages for state hospital employees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.542 The Court found that
although the plaintiffs were entitled to greater wages, 543 the
eleventh amendment deprived the Court of jurisdiction to force
the state to make such an award. Moreover, the Court refused to
imply a waiver of sovereign immunity, arguing that a finding of
implied waiver is justified only if the state is engaged in private or
proprietary as opposed to governmental activity. 544 In so doing,
reliance was placed upon the congressional pursuit of "harmonious
federalism. ' '545 The Court noted that either the plaintiffs could sue
in state courts, or the Secretary of Labor could sue to enforce their
rights.546 Thus, the Supreme Court found that these plaintiffs were
without a federal remedy to redress the denial of their rights,
seemingly paving the way for a reversal of Jordan's liberalization of
the implied waiver concept.
539 Id. at 995.
510 Anderson v. Graham, Nos. 73-1441, 73-1466 (8th Cir., Dec. 20, 1973); Dawkins v.
Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973)..
541 411 U.S. 279 (1973). Rothstein was decided in the fall of 1972, andJordan followed in
January 1973. Employees was then decided in April 1973 and was followed by Dawkins and
Anderson.
542 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). Employers violating federal minimum wage standards are
liable to their employees in the amount of the unpaid wages plus an equal amount for
liquidated damages.
543 The Court had previously held, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), that
state hospital employees were covered by the FLSA. However, the question of sovereign
immunity was reserved for decision at a future date.
544 411 U.S. at 284. The Court thus limited the applicability of the implied waiver
doctrine of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Parden involved a suit by a railroad
employee for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
The defendant, Alabama, owner and operator of the railroad, asserted the defense of
sovereign immunity. The Court held, however, that by entering an area of congressional
regulation under the commerce clause, Alabama had acted as if it were a private person or
corporation and therefore had waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 196-97.
The governmental-proprietary distinction has surfaced from time to time throughout
the history of eleventh amendment litigation. See McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and
the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REv. 485, 486-92, 514 (1973).
545 411 U.S. at 286.
546 The question of whether or not the plaintiffs could sue in Missouri courts was not
reached by the majority, although the Court admitted such suits arguably were permitted.
Id. at 287. In his concurrence, however, Mr. Justice Marshall insisted that Missouri's liability
in its own courts is constitutionally mandated. Id. at 298; see 59 CORNELL L. REV. 709 (1974).
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It is apparent that none of these eleventh amendment cases
has dealt satisfactorily with all of the issues involved. Rothstein's
balancing of the equities will inevitably favor the state agency
because of its emphasis on cooperative federalism.547 A better test
would place greater stress on recipient need as opposed to adminis-
trative convenience. The purpose of AFDC is to provide assistance
to the needy, not to further a scheme of cooperative federalism. 548
Additionally, Rothstein's dismissal of the need problem is
unsound. 54 9 If recipients are living at the subsistence level, then
any deprivation remains absolute until remedied. Equally unsound
is the distinction drawn in Rothstein between an injunction and an
award of money damages. 550
Jordan reaches a more equitable result than Rothstein, but it is
unlikely to survive appeal. It is doubtful that the summary
affirmances of retroactive awards will have much value as author-
ity, since there was no mention of the eleventh amendment defense
in these cases. Also, Jordan's waiver analysis seems at least to have
been undermined by the Employees holding. If the Supreme Court
decides Jordan without reaching the constitutional question, it
hopefully will consider the underlying enforcement considerations
in balancing the equities. There is a need for quick state response
to federal statutory and regulatory changes. Present procedures for
conformity hearings have been wholly inadequate. 551 Both the
federal government and individual recipients have an interest in
the lawful administration of the state welfare system.
More generally, the Supreme Court's treatment of the
eleventh amendment has been criticized as historically unsound.
552
It has been suggested that the eleventh amendment was only
intended to bar diversity suits against a state in the federal
courts. 553 Furthermore, a limitation of Young to prospective injunc-
tive relief is fallacious. Young did not express this limitation, nor is
there any practical difference between the effect on the state of
prospective injunctive relief and that of an award of retroactive
547 See 26 VAND. L. REv. 633 (1973).
548 Indeed, the AFDC program is hardly an appropriate instrument for encouraging
cooperation between the federal government and the states. The mechanisms involved in the
administration of a grant-in-aid program are an inevitable source of federal-state tension.
549 See note 528 supra.
550 See note 535 supra. When the enforcement of an injunction costs more than the
award of retroactive payments, any distinction between the two remedies based on the
payment of public funds is clearly meaningless. See 7 GA. L. REv. 366, 377 (1973).
551 See generally Sitkin, supra note 367.
552 See McCormack, supra note 544, at 500-13; Fontaine, The Constitutional Law of
Remedies in Welfare Litigation, 23 MAINE L. REv. 41, 44-60 (1971).
5" See McCormack, supra note 544, at 500-07.
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benefits. 554 These two decisional lines produce the anomalous
result of a right existing without a remedy to vindicate it. This was
illustrated in Employees when the Court recognized an enforceable
federal right, but held that the eleventh amendment deprived the
plaintiffs of redress in federal court.555 This holding will encourage
forum shopping. If state courts will not hesitate to award retroac-
tive benefits, 556 it is overly formalistic to suppose that the federal
courts are not forcing the states to pay retroactively when they
decide that benefits were unlawfully withheld. Finally, the Court
soon will be forced to address the conflict between the fourteenth
and eleventh amendments. The eleventh amendment should not
be read to relieve the states of the responsibility of enforcing rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth. 557
Once the Supreme Court removes jurisdictional barriers to the
award of retroactive benefits, it can recognize that the overriding
concern in each case should be recipient need.55 8 For subsistence
recipients, a deprivation does not disappear when full benefits
are reinstated. Retroactive benefits are mandated in any need-
oriented program.
CONCLUSION
The sheer number of significant developments in 1973 illus-
trates the volatile nature of the nation's entire welfare system, and
the ongoing process of amending and reinterpreting the Social
Security Act will undoubtedly continue while the country searches
for realistic alternatives. Throughout this evolutionary process, it is
important to try to keep up with these changes not only to assist in
the efficient operation of the various programs but also properly to
evaluate comprehensive reform proposals.
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554 See 7 GA. L. REv. 366, 373-77 (1973).
555 Commentators have suggested that a proper analysis of sovereign immunity under
the eleventh amendment must distinguish between rights granted to the people by congres-
sional acts and inherent rights of the people guaranteed protection by the Constitution. See
McCormack, supra note 544, at 507. See generally Fontaine, supra note 552. It is illogical to
suppose that the states are immune from federal enforcement of federal rights.
55 See, e.g., Campbell v. Department of Pub. Aid, 9 Ill. App. 3d 962, 294 N.E.2d 698
(1973).
557 See Fontaine, supra note 552, at 55-60. This is a further reason for limiting the
application of the eleventh amendment to cases in which the federal court's jurisdiction is
based on diversity. Such a limitation has been recently suggested by various commentators.
Id. at 60-61; McCormack, supr note 544, at 515; 26 VAND. L. REv. 633, 642 (1973).
"' See Levy, The Aftermath of Victory: The Availability of Retroactive Welfare Benefits Illegally
Denied, 3 CLEARINGHOUsE REV. 253 (1970).
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